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ORIGINAL PAPERS

TO ERNEST JONES

On the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday

The first piece of work that it fell to psycho-analysis to perform was the discovery of those instincts which are common to all mankind—and not only to those alive to-day, but also to the people of antiquity and prehistoric man. It was no great effort for psycho-analysis, therefore, to ignore differences in human beings due to their differing race, speech or country of origin. Psycho-analysis was *international* from the beginning; it is known that its adherents overcame the sundering influences of the Great War before any others did so.

Among the men who met at Salzburg in the spring of 1908 for the first Psycho-Analytical Congress, a young English medical man attracted notice; he read a short paper on 'Rationalization in Everyday Life'. The substance of this first piece of work is still valid to-day; our young science was enriched by it with a valuable concept and an indispensable term.

From that time onwards Ernest Jones has never rested. First in his post as professor at Toronto, later as a physician in London, as the founder and leader of a Society, the director of a Press, founder and editor of a Journal, director of a Training Institute, he has worked indefatigably for psycho-analysis, making the latest accessions to its fund of knowledge widely known by lectures and articles, defending it against the attacks and misinterpretations of its opponents by dexterous and stringent, but just, criticism, maintaining its difficult position in England against the claims of professional privilege, and, alongside all these externally directed activities, accomplishing a quantity of scientific work in loyal co-operation with the developments reached by workers on the Continent, to which, among others, his *Papers on Psycho-Analysis* and *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis* bear witness.

Now, in the prime of his life, not only is he unquestionably the leading man among English-speaking analysts, but is acknowledged as one of the foremost of all the representatives of psycho-analysis—a mainstay to his friends, who look to him still with future hopes for our science.

Now that the Director of this JOURNAL has broken the silence imposed by his years—or to which he is privileged by them—in order to greet a friend, let it be permitted him to conclude, not with a wish, for we do not believe in the omnipotence of our thoughts, but with the avowal that he cannot imagine Ernest Jones after his fiftieth birthday any other than he was before—zealous, combative, energetic and devoted to the cause.[1]

SIGM. FREUD.

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[1] A bibliography of the scientific publications of Ernest Jones, M.D., will be found at the end of this Part of the JOURNAL.

THE UNWELCOME CHILD AND HIS DEATH-INSTINCT

BY

S. FERENCZI

BUDAPEST

In his short study 'Cold, Disease and Birth',[1] Ernest Jones, linking up his own ideas with some trains of thought in my 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality'[2] and related views of Trotter's, Stärcke's, Alexander's and Rank's, traces the disposition of so many people to colds and such-like illnesses back in part to early infantile traumatic impressions, particularly to painful experiences which the child must undergo upon removal from the warm maternal environment and which, according to the law of the 'repetition instinct', he must later always experience anew. The conclusions drawn by Jones were chiefly based on physio-pathological but also partly on analytic considerations. In the following brief communication I shall put forward a similar train of ideas, ranging, however, over a rather wider field.

Since the epoch-making work of Freud on the irreducible instinctual foundations of everything organic (in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*) we have become accustomed to look upon all the phenomena of life, including those of mental life, as in the last resort a mixture of the forms of expression of the two fundamental instincts: the life and the death instinct. On just one occasion Freud also mentioned the derivation of a pathological manifestation from the almost complete defusion of these two main instincts; he surmises that the symptoms of epilepsy express the frenzy of a tendency to self-destruction that is almost free from the inhibitions of the wish to live. Psycho-analytic investigations of my own have since in my opinion corroborated the plausibility of this interpretation. I know of cases in which the epileptic attack followed upon painful experiences which made the patient feel that life was hardly any longer worth living. (Naturally I do not mean this as a pronouncement upon the nature of the attack.)

As physician in charge of a war hospital it was one of my duties to decide upon the fitness of many epileptics for service. After exclusion of the not infrequent cases of simulation and hysterical attacks, there

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[1] *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Third Edition. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. IX, 1923.

[2] *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis.*

remained a series of cases with typical epileptic manifestations, in which I was able to examine more closely the expressions of the death-instinct. After the tonic rigidity and clonic spasms had run their course, there usually followed (with continuing deep coma and pupillar rigidity) complete relaxation of the musculature and extremely laboured and inadequate stertorous breathing, evidently caused through relaxation of the muscles of the tongue and larynx. At this stage stopping up the respiratory passages which were still open was very often effective in cutting short the seizure. In other cases this attempt had to be broken off, on account of threatening danger of asphyxiation. It was natural to conjecture behind this diversity in the depth of coma a difference in completeness of defusion of the death-instinct. Unfortunately, however, external circumstances prevented any deep analytic working through of these cases.

I obtained a somewhat deeper insight into the genesis of unconscious self-destructive trends during analysis of nervous circulatory and respiratory disturbances, especially of asthma bronchialis, but also of cases of complete loss of appetite and emaciation, not explicable anatomically. All these symptoms fitted on occasion perfectly into the total psychic trend of the patients, who had to struggle a great deal against suicidal tendencies. I also had to interpret the retrospective analysis of some cases of infantile glottal spasms as in two instances attempts at suicide by self-strangulation. Now in the analysis of these latter cases I came to form the surmise which I wish to communicate here, in the hope that a wider circle of observers (I am thinking particularly of children's physicians) will bring forward further material in its support.

Both patients came into the world as *unwelcome guests of the family*, so to speak. One was the tenth child of a mother who was manifestly much overburdened, the other the offspring of a father who was mortally ill and in fact died soon after. All the indications shew that these children had observed the conscious and unconscious signs of the aversion or impatience of the mother, and that their desire to live had been broken by this. In later life relatively slight occasions were then sufficient motivation for a desire to die, even if this was resisted by a strong effort of will. Moral and philosophic pessimism, scepticism and mistrust became conspicuous character-traits in these patients. One could also note ill-disguised longing for (passive) tenderness, repugnance to work, incapacity for prolonged effort, and thus a certain degree of emotional infantilism, naturally not without attempts at

forced character-strengthening. A case of alcoholism in a still youthful woman revealed itself as a particularly severe case of aversion to life, existing from infancy. She naturally also turned difficulties in the analytic situation into occasions for suicidal impulses, mastered only with effort. She can remember, and members of her family also confirm this, that as the third girl in a family without boys she was very ungraciously received. She naturally felt herself innocent, and by precocious brooding she sought to explain the hatred and impatience of her mother. She kept for life a leaning towards cosmological speculation, with a strain of pessimism. Her broodings about the origin of all living things were only, as it were, a continuation of the question which had remained unanswered, why she had been brought into the world at all if those who did so were not willing to receive her cordially. As in all other cases so in this one, the Œdipus conflict naturally proved an ordeal to which the patient was not equal, any more than she was to the difficulties of adaptation to married life, which happened in her case to be unusually great. She remained frigid, just as all the ' unwelcome children ' of the male sex observed by me suffered from more or less severe disturbances of potency. The tendency to colds postulated by Jones in similar cases was often present; in one special case there was even a quite peculiar, intense cooling down at night, with subnormal temperatures, difficult to explain organically.

It cannot, of course, be my task to go at all exhaustively into the symptomatology of this nosogenic type, here only presented in its etiological aspect; for this purpose, as already indicated, the experience of one person would not suffice. I only wish to point to the probability that children who are received in a harsh and disagreeable way die easily and willingly. Either they use one of the many proffered organic possibilities for a quick exit, or if they escape this fate, they keep a streak of pessimism and of aversion to life.

This etiological assumption is based upon a theoretical view differing from the accepted one as to the operation of the life and death instincts at the various ages. On account of the dazzling effect of the impressive unfolding of growth at the beginning of life, the view has tended to be that in individuals only just brought into the world the life-instincts were greatly preponderant. In general, there has been a disposition to represent the life and death-instincts as a simple complementary series in which the life maximum was placed at the beginning of life, but the zero point at the most advanced age. This does not, however, appear to be quite accurate. It is true that the organs and their functions

develop at the beginning of life within and without the uterus with astonishing profusion and speed—but only under the particularly favourable conditions of germinal and infantile protective environment. The child has to be induced, by means of an immense expenditure of love, tenderness and care, to forgive his parents for having brought him into the world without any intention on his part ; otherwise the destructive instincts begin to stir immediately. And this is not really surprising, since the infant is still much closer to individual non-being, and not divided from it by so much bitter experience as the adult. Slipping back into this non-being might therefore come much more easily to children. The ' life force ' which rears itself against the difficulties of life has therefore not really any great innate strength, and becomes established only when tactful treatment and upbringing gradually give rise to progressive immunization against physical and psychical injuries. Corresponding to the drop in the curve of mortality and disease in middle age, the life-instinct would only counterbalance the destructive tendencies at the age of maturity.

If we wish to assign to cases with this etiology their place among the nosogenic types of neurosis which Freud formulated so early and yet so exhaustively, we must situate them somewhere about the point of transition from the purely endogenous to the exogenous, i.e. among the ' frustration ' neuroses. Those who develop so precocious an aversion to life give the impression of a defective capacity for adaptation, similarly to those who, in Freud's grouping, suffer from an inherited weakness in their capacity for life, but with the difference that in our cases the innateness of the sickly tendency is deceptive and not genuine, owing to the early incidence of the trauma. There remains of course the task of ascertaining the finer differences in neurotic symptoms between children maltreated from the start, and those who are at first received with enthusiasm, indeed with passionate love, but then ' dropped '.

Now there naturally arises the question whether I have anything to say as to a special therapy for this nosogenic group. In accordance with my attempts, communicated elsewhere, at a certain ' elasticity ' of analytic technique,[3] I found myself gradually compelled, in these cases of diminished desire for life, to relax my demands for active efforts on the part of these patients more and more as the treatment went on. Finally a situation became apparent which could only be

[3] *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIV, 1928.

described as one in which the patient had to be allowed for a time to have his way like a child, not unlike the ' pre-treatment ' which Anna Freud considers necessary in the case of real children. Through this indulgence the patient is permitted, properly speaking for the first time, to enjoy the irresponsibility of childhood, which is equivalent to the introduction of *positive* life-impulses and motives for his subsequent existence. Only later can one proceed cautiously to those demands for privation which characterize our analyses generally. However, such an analysis must of course end, like every other, with the clearing up of the resistances which have inevitably been aroused, and with adaptation to a reality full of frustrations, but supplemented, one hopes, by the ability to enjoy good fortune where it is really granted.

On an occasion when I spoke of the importance of supplying ' positive life-impulses ', i.e. of tenderness in relation to children, a very intelligent woman who had been, however, one-sidedly influenced by ' ego-psychology ', immediately retorted: how was this to be reconciled with the significance of sexuality in the etiology of the neuroses, as affirmed by psycho-analysis ? The answer gave me no difficulty, since in my *Genital Theory* [4] I had had to advocate the view that the manifestations of life of very young children are almost exclusively libidinal (erotic), but that that erotism was inconspicuous *just because of its ubiquity*. Only after the development of a special organ for erotism does sexuality become unmistakable and undeniable. This would also be my reply to all those who might attack Freud's libidinal theory of the neuroses on the ground of the present communication. For the remainder, I have already pointed out that often it is only the struggles of the Œdipus conflict and the demands of genitality which reveal the consequences of an aversion to life acquired at an early stage.

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[4] *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie,* Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1923.

AN EVERY-DAY COMPULSION

BY

PAUL FEDERN

VIENNA

In his paper entitled 'Some Cases of Obsessional Neurosis' Ernest Jones has done far more than give a clinical sketch. He has demonstrated separately the many roots of each component-instinct which exist in the infantile instinctual constitution of the patients, and has shewn that every symptom not only reveals a manifold determination when the development of the disease is viewed, as it were, in longitudinal section, but is also over-determined through the repression of *several* instinct-components, as we see when examining the disease in cross-section.

This statement applies to the obsessional symptom which is the subject of this paper—probably the most frequently met with of all such symptoms. So, before I go into what in my opinion is the deepest and most fundamental significance of the 'street-pavement' obsession, I will mention briefly its other determinations and the many other explanations suggested. Several of the causes assigned to it are rationalizations in the sense which Jones was the first to attach to this term. I may take the opportunity of pointing out, that the German word '*Rationalisierung*', as used in practical scientific literature, has a different significance from that assigned to it by Jones. It means the *application* of rational standpoints and reflection to procedure which was hitherto divorced from thought or purely instinctive. 'Rationalization' in Jones' sense means the conscious, subjective explanation (held by the subject to be adequate), side by side with and beneath which are concealed the unconscious determinants whose absence is then not remarked at all.

It is interesting to note that 'rationalizations' in Jones' sense are not necessarily purely intelligible and reasonable motivations but may themselves contain motives which are unconscious though less deeply repressed. Thus the explanations put forward by the disciples of individual psychology are largely rationalizations which are only in part rational: for the most part they advance as fundamental causes neurotic compromise-reactions against repressed motives. They are not on that account invariably objectively false: often they are only incorrectly localized topographically and over-estimated as dynamic

factors. Even since psycho-analysis has brought to light the deep sources of the neuroses there persist, in the minds of scientists as well as others, many rationalizations, in which actually existing, single, unconscious motives are incorrectly utilized. ' Rationalization ' in Jones' sense follows on the heels of a knowledge of the unconscious, so that as far as possible the latter may escape recognition. Hence Jones' writings are stimulating and important, especially in relation to our present subject.

In our towns it is only the individual quite free from psychological impediment who goes his way with an easy mind, without ever noticing the conformation of the pavement. Ease of mind is the affective antithesis to obsession ; the obsessional neurotic lacks the sense of ease. The degree in which the innocent structure of the pavement disturbs the people who walk over it varies greatly. Some people simply habitually choose to walk on the edge or in the middle of it, while at the other extreme there are persons who cannot bear to overlook even a single join between the stones. Often a slight disturbance of this sort appears as a symptom of hysteria, but when it is serious it must be regarded as an obsessional neurosis.

The ceremonials observed in the latter cases vary and are always determined down to each individual detail. Generally, the point is that the subject must not tread on a join, but there are also many people who feel compelled to make sure that they tread on every one or every second one. Others again are obliged to omit every second stone, treading exactly in the middle, or to tread near, but not on any account too near, the edge ; some have to go on tiptoe, others to tread on the stone with their whole foot. If the obsession is disguised by the subject's making a game of it with fixed rules, he will adopt an elaborate gait, such as many children invent. The Viennese word ' *Faxen* ' is used of this [*Faxe* = foolery]. I must point out here that obsessional neurotics may acquire a special art in concealing their obsessions and covering them by conscious mannerisms. But this conscious correction is not really ' rationalization ' in Jones' sense. On the contrary, it is characteristic of an obsession that it resists any sort of rationalization. Neurotic symptoms of another kind, instinct-prompted and affective unconscious motives may be replaced by rationalizations : only that part of the unconscious motives which resists rationalization is felt as an obsession. We may go further and say that, when a man achieves the rationalization of unconscious motives, he regains the peace of mind which was destroyed by them, but obsessive processes resist

rationalization and admit of no peace of mind at all. It is true that many obsessional neurotics enlist against their illness a certain, often rather grim, humour which does sometimes help them. Conscious concealment and disguise of obsessions are designed for the outside world ; ' rationalization ' in Jones' sense for the individual himself.

Now what is the cause of this very banal and often very tiresome obsession ? How do we explain it psycho-analytically ? We need not discuss the evasive explanations put forward—habit, idiosyncrasy, imitation, tomfoolery, etc. The answer given by the patients themselves is a neurotic rationalization, the form of which is determined by their mental attitude as a whole. Thus, they will say that in the precision with which they succeed in treading on or avoiding the paving-stones they see an omen of the success or failure of some undertaking that they have in mind. Or they are making difficulties for themselves, the overcoming of which leads them to hope that in general they will be able to perform difficult tasks. Or they walk in this way in order to divert their minds from disagreeable thoughts and because they have to occupy their minds somehow : it might just as well be by counting certain objects or reading the shop-signs. Or it is unpleasant to walk without any plan : they feel they must know exactly what they have got to do.

Obsessional neurotics certainly do use their obsessions for this sort of superstitious relief of their mental uneasiness. Their superstition is a modified form of magic and recalls to us the way in which ancient taboos used to be magically overcome. Finally, every join in the stones is remotely like a threshold, and there is a taboo of the threshold, according to which the guest must be lifted over it by the tabooed master of the house (headman of the clan), in order that the guest may not bring in death with him. I do not know whether my explanation of the symptom applies to the old taboo also. We shall see that it is intimately allied with the ideas that the headmen themselves are taboo.

One woman, who had herself formerly suffered from obsessions of this sort but had quite lost them as time went on, gave me a subjective explanation which had nothing to do with death and the threat of death. She pointed out that to little children the joins between the stones are a difficulty which they learn with pride to surmount. Later, they take a delight in stepping just in the joins without stumbling or else in making such big strides that they avoid the joins. The neurosis which comes later in life regresses to this childish pleasure. This explanation may hold for the habits mentioned, but it is far too harm

less, as applied to obsessional behaviour, to supply more than an early nucleus for the symptom.

We come nearer the truth in a reference to the obstinate delight taken by many children in treading in excrement. This indicates the anal instinct-component. Every join reminds the child of infantile erotogenic zones—the anus, the labia, even the mother's breast—and so patients with this obsession are attaining or shunning (according as the positive or negative aspect prevails) gratification familiar to the child and later repressed, while in the unconscious, both in positive and negative cases, the gratification is striven for and emphasized.

Psycho-analysis confirms this explanation in respect of both the anal and the genital significance of the join. Every fissure stands symbolically for the vagina. The content of the obsession therefore may be this : one must *not* touch the female symbol with the foot, which is so commonly a male symbol. But, equally well, to tread on the join may be the obsessional reaction against the taboo of the fissure. If one treads there, one has the assurance that the tabooed temptation has not been ignored.

There is another, secondary, psycho-analytical meaning of the obsession. Its manifest content betrays an unconscious prohibition against touching something. Now we know that prohibitions against touching are often connected with the prohibition of onanism, and it might be conjectured that a person who avoids the join intends to express the fact that he is anxiously endeavouring not to touch a forbidden part of the body. It is, however, improbable that walking can represent to the unconscious a touching of the subject's own body. We are accustomed to the fact that a process connected with the lower half of the body may be displaced to the upper half, but not to finding the upper extremities replaced by the lower by means of unconscious mechanisms. As a secondary phenomenon it is certainly an every-day occurrence that obsessions assert themselves when a sexual sense of guilt is felt, whether in some unconscious connection or owing to actual self-gratification. In general the frequency and intensity with which any obsession recurs vary. Every bad mood, every disappointment, and also every tense effort after a real or phantasied pleasure-goal increase obsessions. They diminish when the sense of guilt abates and also with the abatement of libidinal tension. Thus the ' pavement-obsession ' will sometimes vanish when onanism is given up and sometimes persist while other symptoms diminish. But the prohibition of onanism is not a sufficient explanation of the obsession.

The form of the obsession reveals it as a typical example of the mechanism which Freud in his *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst* has described as the craving to isolate. The separation of the paving-stones affords ample opportunity for associating thoughts with the stones thus isolated and for practising and laying stress upon isolation both actually and symbolically. Freud pointed out that isolation does not merely assist in the formal singleness of thought but has also a magical significance. The obsession which we are considering has a special magical significance of this sort. I saw this clearly in the case of a man ' with a hundred obsessions ', and I believe that what proved to be the content of this particular obsession in him is of universal significance.

This patient suffered continuously from the ' paving-stone obsession '. Such a stone was one of many analogous points where he unravelled his confusing double trains of thought. *Every* lamp-post, tree, bar in the railings of the park, every telegraph-post, every upright line in the row of houses and also every spot of dirt on the pavement, every stripe in the carpet or line on the floor, had to have its setting and its adjustment, in case of need sketched only with a glance but preferably with the motions of his foot. At every step he felt the compulsion towards isolation, and, if he evaded this by driving, it dogged him with dizzying rapidity from glance to glance. The isolation obsession in relation to vertical objects had a much more complicated ceremonial which space does not admit of my describing here. In relation to paving-stones the obsession took a relatively simple form : they had to be noted and at the same time the foot had to be put down at the correct point. This obsession had a long history of development, in the course of which the ceremonial had become shorter, but there was an increasing tendency for the compulsion to radiate more and more widely. Analysis succeeded in explaining very fully the meaning of the original obsession. I will merely give the essential points in the explanation.

The original, much more complicated obsession first made its appearance when the patient, then at the beginning of puberty, was standing in front of a certain house. He said that nowhere else in the town were there such fine square paving-stones as just there. And there he originated a complicated walking-ceremonial which, several times a day, made the boy a laughing-stock to his companions on this road, which they constantly took. At this point he did not simply walk straight onward, but, hopping like a plover, he stepped in

the middle of the next large stone. At the same time he was compelled to touch with his right hand first the middle of his shin and then the middle of his thigh, pushing his overcoat to the side in order to do so. At the same time another obsession made its appearance, which later turned into a general obsessional sensibility to all objects which terminated by the side of the path. This obsession also is extraordinarily common, and the habit corresponding to it is very generally met with. The boy *had* to knock off with his hand or a stick every thistle-head or flower which grew out prominently at the edge of the fields. In far-off antiquity a king once used this symbol to convey to his loyal servants a command to kill the ' prominent ' men in the State. There we see the sadistic root of this obsessional attitude towards objects which project at the roadside. At that time the boy was full of ideas of killing, though he put up a powerful resistance to them.

At the same period occurrences at school and at home had strongly revived his dread of castration. But I will not here trace out this source of the obsessions. His reaction to castration-anxiety was an unusual over-estimation of the gratitude due to his father for begetting him.

Let us go back to the original form which the paving-stone obsession assumed in this boy—to the compulsion to hop, as I have described. The meaning of the movements of his hands became plain from many kindred symptoms. A number of obsessional ideas and actions served to assure him symbolically that death (and castration) could be escaped in a sheltered corner. The patient felt that he must always have a sheltered corner of this sort by him. When he touched his leg with his hand, marking-off his bent knee, as it were, in isolation, he was indicating in a highly schematic manner some such sheltered spot. In this patient's mind the whole world was divided up into dangerous open spaces and places which were comfortable, enclosed and safe. As in one of the cases described by Jones, the open spaces when extended led actually or in phantasy to the cemetery, whereas the enclosed places took him back to a room in the home where he had lived as a child before he had been overwhelmed by the shattering conflict connected with a certain event. In the boy's fifth year he had seen his father collapse fainting in a choking-fit, which in itself was harmless. From that time on the patient had been continuously preoccupied with the idea of his father's death.

The safe corner—the niche—also signified the mother's breast and,

still more, the warm body of his sister, to which he was bound by several secret experiences. For him sexuality was always the antithesis to death and was closely associated with the corner-complex. The movement of his hand was a magic sign intended to ensure protection, birth, the presence of the mother and love, in contrast to death and the presence of the father. Moreover, his hopping off the ground was designed to make impossible the menace of death—if you are away from the earth, you are away from the grave ! And it had yet another significance, also of the nature of a defence from death, as we shall see.

But how was it that this obsessive action—this denial of death—first made its appearance in this particular street ?

It was only after analysis had been continued for some years that there emerged the recollection of the events which had taken place in the street where the compulsion to hop originated. It was a street in which the dwellings of the very rich and of the very poor stood in close juxtaposition. At the point where poverty and magnificence met the fine pavement began. In the house that stood there a man who otherwise played no part in the boy's life had committed suicide—probably by hanging. For a long time the patient did not remember the association of this place with the idea of suicide. But in later years there had been a number of suicides and serious accidents amongst his friends and relations, and for a long time the analysis had had to concentrate on the ambivalency between the satisfaction he felt at the decease of the person in question and the fearful anxiety excited in him by the suddenness of these deaths.

From the age of six the boy had taken a special interest in history. History to him meant simply a series of executions, of the fall of splendid figures—the most powerful and the richest, whose security seemed complete. All his life this patient thought only in terms of these contrasts. Especially did he reflect on the possibility that the up-standing, dominating, happy man might suddenly be laid low. It was the death of powerful *men* which constantly occupied his thoughts, this preoccupation being accounted for rationally by the contents of his history-books, but having as its unconscious basis the Œdipus complex. For a long time he had no suspicion of the strength of the impulses of hate and the death-wishes which, from his earliest childhood, he had entertained against his father, a man who was in actual fact a powerful and splendid figure. As the analysis progressed, these feelings became conscious, and simultaneously the problem of the fall of the mighty and the possibility of sudden death ceased constantly to

occupy the patient's mind, to hinder him in his work and make it difficult for him to read books and newspapers.

By one of the absurd coincidences which are sometimes met with in psycho-analysis the name of the suicide who lived in the street of which I have spoken happened to be ' Sturz ' [*Sturz* = a sudden fall]. We know, of course, that neurotic mechanisms work independently of such superficial connections ; only the time and the place at which the obsession established itself were determined by this coincidence.

We see now that the unconscious death-wish and the desire to ward off the possibility of death constituted the meaning of the obsession in this case as in that of most obsessional neurotics. But how can paving-stones take on this meaning ?

We have to imagine an almost incredible sensitivity of the complex if we are to credit the mental situation as revealed in this patient. For him *every* line which divided two objects, and therefore every join in the pavement, signified the cessation of something old and the beginning of something new : death and birth or, in his case, death and procreation.

Now patients suffering from such a severe obsession cannot endure even the faintest hint that something is ceasing and something else beginning, even when there is nothing terrible about this beginning. With the new beginning they always associate the end of that which is past. Thus every cessation grieves them and no beginning gives them pleasure, for all cessation is a symbol of death and wakes in their unconscious the unbearable wish for the father's death, which by the law of talion involves their own. It is intolerable for these patients to feel themselves mental parricides. In order that the actual wish for the father's death may never come into their minds they shun everything which reminds them of death, making use in this of the familiar phobia-mechanism of obsessional neurosis. But the sadism inherent in their instinctual constitution and the repressed desire constantly impel them to approach the death-complex, as it were tentatively. The whole intensity of the Œdipus conflict, in so far as it relates to the father, is thus diffused amongst innumerable trivial thoughts and countless representations of death, cancelled every time by the second phase of the obsessional behaviour, for this phase symbolizes expiation for the presence of such thoughts.

I am now able also to explain the second meaning of the hopping, to which I referred before. All fully developed obsessional symptoms are subject to specially minute conditions, which have to be fulfilled

for the compulsion to be satisfactorily discharged. Otherwise it has to be repeated in thought. Thus, when our patient hopped, he had to do it with a particularly symmetrical swing, the effect being to connect the two paving-stones by a curve through the air, as it were carelessly making them one. In comparison with this mode of progression mere walking seemed to him jerky and angular, like a zig-zag. Angularity signifies here, in contrast to the rounded, concave niche, a separation, i.e. a death-symbol. Hopping, which connects the stones with a swinging movement, does away with the dividing-line. It is thus an obsessional annulling, at every step, of the possibility of death.

To sum up: This most common of all obsessions acquires its significance from the fact that for the unconscious of the obsessional neurotic every end and every separation stand for death—ultimately, for the wished-for death of the father.

Although we discovered the meaning of the patient's obsessions only from his personal experiences, the fundamental mechanism in them consists in the deep symbolic significance with which the joins between the stones are endowed. It is precisely for this reason that subjectively these obsessions convey nothing to the patients. True, symbols can be translated and understood, but the normal mind does not recognize their deepest implications because, as Jones in particular has shewn, they are symbols only when their source is unconscious.

THE SEXUAL AIM OF SADISM AS MANIFESTED IN ACTS OF VIOLENCE

BY

J. H. W. VAN OPHUIJSEN

THE HAGUE

In the following remarks I shall endeavour to formulate as briefly as possible the conclusions I arrived at in an earlier discussion [1] of the sexual aim of sadism as manifested in acts of violence.

In considering sadism we can distinguish two different kinds of sexual aim : (*a*) that of doing violence to, destroying or mastering the object, and (*b*) that of soiling it. (Where corrosive substances are used for the latter purpose, the aim may probably be regarded as intermediate between the two.) It is generally [2] assumed that the intention of sadistic violence is to inflict (bodily or mental) suffering (pain, degradation) on the object, because the perception of this suffering produces in the subject pleasure or gratification (orgasm). Again, it is generally assumed that the masochist desires himself to undergo what the sadist takes pleasure in inflicting on the object. The same, it is thought, is true of sadistic and masochistic phantasies. If we accept this notion (even leaving aside the question of activity and passivity) we are bound to regard sadism and masochism as obverse and reverse, and to speak of ' sado-masochism ', of active and passive sexual cruelty, and active and passive algolagnia.

These views are contested more or less hotly by individual observers. On the one hand, Magnus Hirschfeld [3] denies, on grounds of his experience, that the term algolagnia can be applied to masochism ; for, he says, the true masochist experiences only as pleasure the stimuli applied to him, and this ceases as soon as pain is caused. On the other hand, Moll [4] and Federn [5] doubt whether it is correct to say that

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[1] ' Some Observations on the Origin of Sadism '. Read before the Ninth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Homburg, September, 1925. Reproduced in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XI, S. 509.

[2] See Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Eulenburg and others.

[3] *Sexualpathologie*, 1918, Bd. II, S. 233.

[4] *Handbuch*, S. 640.

[5] ' Beiträge zur Analyse des Sadismus und Masochismus ', *Internationale Zeitschrift*, Bd. I and II, S. 44.

cruelty, i.e. the characteristic of deriving pleasure from the suffering inflicted on the object, is the real motive of sadistic actions. Experience has taught us that the sadist often continues his violence after death has supervened and rendered the object incapable of sensation, or that he actually chooses for his victim a lifeless person. v. Krafft-Ebing [6] even suggests in one instance that it was just the lifeless condition which constituted the stimulus to sadistic action. We have, besides, in the literature of the subject a number of cases in which sadistic psychopaths either were overcome with pity and desisted from the premeditated violence or achieved gratification before the object had suffered at all. My experience of the neuroses supplies me with the following example,—a communication by a patient in a state of vehement anxiety. She said : ' Oh, how I should like to ill-treat someone, to do just whatever I liked to him, but—it would have to be someone who would not feel it, a dead person, I suppose '. She added that then she would regain her peace of mind. A number of such experiences have convinced me that the sexual aim of sadism as manifested in violence is not to inflict suffering on the object, but to perform certain activities (which I will presently discuss in greater detail) in relation to an object which either may be regarded as, or actually is, insensible. It follows that we shall naturally look for the early development of sadism in that period of life in which the capacity for pity does not as yet exist.[7] In this connection it is significant that various authors [8] many years ago drew attention to the simultaneous occurrence of anal and sadistic traits in certain clinical pictures where there was markedly strong narcissistic fixation.

It cannot be denied that in those neurotic and psychopathic phantasies which may be termed ' sadistic ' [9] the pain inflicted on the

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[6] *Psychopathia Sexualis*, 1918, S. 80.

[7] Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, 1926, S. 67.

[8] Cf. Tausk, in a paper read at the International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Munich, 1913.

[9] We may speak of phantasies as sadistic or masochistic according as the subject identifies himself principally with the active or the passive figure in the phantasy, although a closer analysis invariably shews that he really identifies himself with both. In order to indicate this fact we might speak of sado-masochistic phantasies ; I do not do so, because in my opinion pure sadism and pure masochism are not a true antithesis. Moreover, it is very rare to find either sadism or masochism in a pure form.

objects is of great importance and the perception of it enhances the subject's feeling of pleasure. What I would assert is that this phenomenon does not come under the heading of pure sadism but is a consequence of the fact which has been established by various writers [10]: namely, that the sadistic tendency readily unites with other tendencies. Naturally the tendencies in question are such as manifest themselves in the same or similar ways as sadism. (The above statement is true of masochism also.) First and foremost come hate and revenge, which are certainly compatible with cruelty. Next, in men and in women of a masculine temperament, comes sexual aggression. In many cases it is obvious at the first glance that the instrument of destruction employed by the sadist is overdetermined and has also a phallic significance. But the meaning of these phantasies is never *exhausted* when we have traced them to sexual aggression for the purpose of genital gratification. As I have said, we seldom meet with the sadistic tendency in an unmixed form, but occasionally we succeed in proving that it does so exist. We have an example of this in the following little incident. A patient who cherished an implacable hatred of a sister ten years younger than herself said to me once, in an access of rage against her: 'I should like to revile her—spit at her—poison her—beat her—hack her to bits with a hatchet'—here I interrupted *experimenti causa*, with the words: 'and eat the pieces!' There was a long pause, and then my patient said very decisively: 'No. That would be—a form of love!'. Thus, she refused to regard the devouring of her sister, after the latter had been chopped to pieces, as a further way of revenging herself. This shews that she assumed that the object of her hate also would feel the further action, which I had suggested, to be a manifestation of love.

Freud [11] classifies sadism amongst the instinct-components which are to some extent independent of erotogenic zones and of which from the outset other people are the subject's sexual object. He adds, however, that it is well known that this instinct has not yet been thoroughly analysed. We are therefore not surprised that several of his followers have tried to discover the ultimate source of sadism and to trace it to the function of a particular erotogenic zone. In this con-

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[10] Freud, *loc. cit.* Ernest Jones, 'Hate and Anal Erotism in the Obsessional Neurosis', *Papers on Psycho-Analysis.*

[11] *Loc. cit.*, p. 66.

nection we think first of Federn [12] and Sadger.[13] Federn holds that, in men, the erotogenic zone in question is the genital. This view, however, obliges us to regard sadism not as an instinct-component but as a neurotic symptom: the return of very early repressed impulses to perform coitus. I do not think this hypothesis is an adequate explanation of typical sadistic acts of violence, but it has the merit of throwing light on the manner in which sexual aggression is allied with sadism.

Sadger has principally demonstrated the complexity of sadistic phantasies and has pointed out the part played by muscle erotism. He even seems to hint at the view which I myself hold and which Abraham[14] published after a conversation we had in 1921. Both he and I had for some time past come to the conclusion that we must differentiate two phases in the development of oral erotism: that of sucking and that of biting. I would say at once that these correspond to two phases in the development of anal erotism. I had become convinced that sadism expressed in violence was a derivative of the second phase of oral erotism and that its source was to be found in libidinal biting, just as other erotic activities derive from libidinal sucking. Abraham says: 'There can be no doubt that a child's teeth are his first weapon of destruction in the object-world—a weapon which he can use when his hands can merely assist in this, for the utmost he can do with them is to clutch and hold on. . . . We should note further the intimate connection between sadism and the muscular system. There is no question but that no other muscles are anything like so effective in children as those used in biting and chewing. . . . One has only to watch a child to be convinced of the strength of his impulse to bite, an impulse in which the instinct of nutrition and the libido are still combined'. We must remember, in reading this passage, that the objects to which Abraham alludes are love-objects! [15]

In the patient whom I last quoted it seemed as if sadistic love made its appearance as soon as there was any question of making the (unconsciously loved) object the object of the destructive impulse to obtain

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[12] *Loc. cit.*, S. 30. Cf. also Abraham, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, 1924, S. 39.

[13] *Jahrbuch*, Bd. V, S. 157; also *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, 1921.

[14] *Loc. cit.*, S. 38.

[15] Of course Freud long ago pointed out the similarity to cannibalism. But he has not as yet traced sadism to the function of the mouth in biting.

pleasure in biting. From many such examples which I have come across in practice I will select one, which is specially significant because, while there had as yet been no psycho-analytical interpretation, clinical observation was able to establish that a change had taken place in the patient's sadistic impulses and that they had reverted to their original form. A young, married woman was coming for treatment because she suffered from anxiety in different forms. As we should expect, these proved to be a defence against impulses which arose with lightning suddenness. Sometimes the patient could not altogether suppress them, and on the spur of the moment she would smash some object to pieces, knock over a table and so on. She recognized that these violent actions were a substitute for the violence she was being impelled to do to her husband and children. The form they took had changed during the course of her illness: first of all she had had impulses to stab them with a knife, then she felt a craving to strangle them with her hands [16] and finally, while she was kissing the children, she was seized with an overwhelming desire to bite their necks. The best example hitherto published of oral sadism in neurosis we owe to Abraham.[17] A woman whom a certain patient loved having died as the result of an operation, he reacted to his loss by falling into a state of depression, one of the symptoms of which was that he had a marked repugnance to eating. One day this distaste vanished, and in the evening he ate a good meal. That night he had two dreams which were made up of the recollection of the operation and of the immediate occasion of the dreams—his enjoyment of a dish of meat. They represented the fulfilment of his desire to assume possession of the beloved person in the typical sadistic manner.

We have heard over and over again that there are certain persons whose gratification in committing murder culminates only when they tear their victim to pieces with their teeth (and hands). Sometimes such people go even further in equating the love-object to the food they eat, for they take away fragments of the body, cook them and devour them.

In one psychopathic case of sadism without oral symptoms, which took the form of stabbing girls in the calf of the leg, Carp [18] found out that in the patient's youth he had manifested oral-sadistic tendencies.

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[16] Cf. Sanzara, *Das verlorene Kind.*

[17] *Loc. cit.*, S. 24.

[18] ' Die Analyse einer besonderen Form von Sadismus ', *Psychiatrische en Neurologische Bladen*, 1927, Heft 6.

We may assume that, after the muscles used in biting, the muscles of the upper extremities next begin to play an increasing part in mastering and destroying the loved object. When these come into play, overpowering and controlling the object may become the most prominent features in the clinical picture. (I am purposely leaving the anal components out of consideration.) This later form of activity may completely replace the original form—that of biting.

Perhaps the fusion of pure sadism with sexual aggression may explain why this perversion occurs more frequently in men than in women, and the reason why, when it does occur in the latter, sadism so often persists in its original form may be that this fusion is largely inhibited in women and also that their muscular system is less developed.

There are three conclusions to be drawn from the views which I have put forward in this paper :

(1) In future sadism and masochism should not be regarded as a true antithesis.

(2) Cruelty is not a feature of pure sadism.

(3) Sadism manifested in violence is a derivative of the second phase of oral development.

UNCONSCIOUS INSIGHT: SOME OF ITS MANIFESTATIONS [1]

BY

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From our studies of the neuroses and psychoses we know that the neurotic symptom represents a sort of solution of an insoluble problem, and that the whole process of untanglement took place in the unconscious. For a long time the patient struggles with his conscious difficulties. There is seemingly no way out of these until unconsciously the compromise forms which results in the symptom. The patient then is neurotic or ill. He is more or less incapacitated, but he gains something thereby, even if it be a morbid gain. If we study the case after the neurosis has existed for many years, we are struck by the ingenious elaboration of the whole structure. Everything seems to dovetail, the façade looks massive and the machinery works perfectly. The patient is so well adjusted, or rather maladjusted, to it that at best it is hard to change him, and often very little can be done, notwithstanding his apparent willingness. This state of affairs is still worse in the psychoses wherein the patient loses all association with reality and lives in a world of his own. He is in a dereistic state [2] and, as a rule, inaccessible to treatment. But even here, when we get an occasional glimpse behind the scenes, we find the same mechanism as in a neurosis, albeit more complex in elaboration and more resistive to any approach. Both the neuroses and psychoses may be designated as fortresses erected to protect the patient from pain or displeasure. For ' the dominating tendency of psychic life, perhaps of nerve life in general ', as Freud words it, ' is the striving for reduction, keeping at a constant level, or for a removal of the inner stimulus of tension (the Nirvana principle of Barbara Low) as it manifests itself in the pleasure principle '.[3] When the individual finds himself blocked in his struggle with the outer world so that he cannot keep up, an unconscious adjustment takes place in one way or another so as to enable him to live with

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[1] Read before the American Psycho-Analytic Association, December 27, 1928, at the New York Academy of Medicine.

[2] Bleuler, *Textbook of Psychiatry*, p. 45, translated by A. A. Brill. The Macmillan Company, 1924.

[3] *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 4.

a minimum amount of effort. Everything tends to move on the lines of least resistance. The unconscious then holds sway, and particularly in the psychoses controls every avenue of approach. Ordinarily, nothing seems to disturb the patient, and if a deliberate effort is made to agitate this dereistic state there is a transient resistive reaction, but the patient soon returns to his former state. In 1919, I saw a young girl of eighteen years of age, who insisted that her brother, who had been dead for over six months, was still living. This brother was her favourite, and for months while he was dying of tuberculosis she was almost constantly near him. When he finally died, she almost collapsed from grief, but soon stopped crying and acted as though the thing never happened. In actuality she behaved like a schizophrenic. She ate when taken to the table, attended to her natural wants, but shewed no spontaneity to anything. She remained in the house in a sort of dreamy state, often staring into space, expressing absolutely no wishes of any kind. The parents at first took her behaviour as a manifestation of deep sorrow and deliberately kept away from the subject of death, but as time went on, they made repeated efforts to reconcile her to the situation by imploring her to be reasonable and accept the inevitable. Usually, she paid no attention to them, but on a few occasions, when hard pressed, she burst out crying that Jimmy was alive, and that they were lying when they said he was dead. She acted in the same manner when I firmly told her that her brother was dead, and that he had been dead for over six months. She began to scream like a child when crossed, and repeated, ' No, he is home and very strong and healthy '. It looked to me like a situation psychosis on a schizophrenic background, and so I diagnosed the case. There was, however, one feature that one does not usually see in præcoxes, namely her affectivity. Her screams were accompanied by tears, and her parents told me that she was often seen shedding tears when she thought she was alone. To be sure, I know that the affectivity is not extinguished in præcoxes, that it is only concealed and repressed. Still, when we notice any emotivity we usually find Straunsky's phenomenon of the disproportion between the noo-psyche and the thymo-psyche. Here the tears were in the right place. I concluded that we dealt with a schizoid personality [4] who reacted to a shock with a definite split-off from reality, but that the patient had good insight into her condition. I said that the patient had ' *unconscious insight* ',

[4] Bleuler, *loc. cit.*, p. 175.

and that the tears represented the real situation which now and then broke through the crust of repression. As the patient could be kept in New York City only a few weeks, I recommended that, regardless of her reaction, she should be told that her brother was dead and that she must resign herself to it. It took about a year before the patient returned to normal life.

In 1910 I was consulted about Miss G., a girl of twenty, who was a somnambulist or sleepwalker. She was an only child who developed well, shewing no abnormality until 1909, when she began to shew somnambulistic phenomena. Her father stated that she often walked around in her sleep, and that she did all sorts of things while in this state. Usually she moved the furniture around, took off the pictures and piled them on the table or the bed; she continued in this way until he would be awakened by the noise, partially arouse her, and then put her back to bed. What alarmed the parents was the fact that only a few nights before she was brought to me she almost choked her mother to death when the latter, instead of the father, attempted to awaken her from a somnambulistic state. Now somnambulism, like talking in sleep, is nothing but an effort on the part of the motor functions to co-operate with the wish tendencies of the dreamer. The dreamer not only realizes his wishes dereistically, but actually tries to put them into operation. In our case, the dream represented a wish to move to another place. The patient disliked the neighbourhood in which she lived because within the last ten years it had undergone such a marked deterioration that she felt abashed when her friends called on her. Her parents refused to accede to her wishes as they were the owners of their home; they had been living there for over twenty-five years, and they hoped that she would marry soon and leave them in their old home. The discussion was repeatedly revived by the young daughter until she finally began to realize her wish somnambulistically. In her waking state she remembered nothing of her somnambulism. It took, for example, much effort to convince her of her violent action toward her mother.

I speak here of *unconscious insight* because the patient never behaved violently toward her father when he guided her in her somnambulism. He usually made an effort to wake her and then led her back to bed. She always obeyed his suggestions. But when her mother attempted to do the same thing, she attacked her, and had it not been for the timely appearance of her father, she might have killed her. Analysis shewed that the rivalry always existing between the

mother and her only daughter was lately enhanced by the fact that it was the mother who had always kept the father from leaving the neighbourhood. Everything pointed to the fact that although the patient was in a state of somnambulism, she realized that she was again frustrated in her desires by her mother, and actually attempted to put her lifelong hostile wishes into operation.

But *unconscious insight* is usually seen best where the organism reacts to a vehement shock, as in the following case: L. W. came to me in 1921. He was a schizoid manic personality, shewing a mixed neurosis. Among other things, he mentioned the fact that although his left arm was amputated in June, 1901, twenty years before, he still felt that he had both arms and ' had to rouse himself to the realization ' that he really had only one arm, and that it was not another person, whom he visualized, who had only one arm. The patient described the accident with its minute details: ' I worked in a smelter driving a slag car which removed the lava from the furnace. I reached over to throw a switch and missed. I fell down in front of the car, and one of the wheels ran up my left arm, from the finger to above the elbow. I felt great physical pain when the bones snapped, like the breaking of dry twigs. Men came running and began to devise means for lifting the car. I told them it would be best to hitch a horse to the back end of the car and pull it off, which was done. I stood up and looked at my arm, limp as a rag, and when I saw the mangled hand and fingers I felt something snap in my chest and instantly I became another person. I thought, " That fellow is pretty badly smashed up " '. And following this there was a complete dissociation between himself and the injured cripple. To quote his words: ' My mind was myself and the hurt fellow was like a weak brother that in some way I was partly responsible for. My wife came to see me and brought our little girl, aged four, and on seeing them I thought: " What a fine-looking wife and child that fellow has." I thought of them as my friend's family. I felt that I had no family, that the family belonged to the crippled man, and that in a way I was responsible for his welfare and the welfare of his family '.

The last remarks would indicate that despite the mental schism, there was some *unconscious insight* as to the real situation. The patient then described how the doctors tried to save him from the amputation, but that at the end of several days, when he developed chills and a temperature of 107° F., the limb was amputated, and he was expected to die. Throughout all this he was simply an objective

observer, arguing with the doctors and nurses in the manner of an onlooker, so that they could not quite understand him. Thus, while he was very sick, he urged the nurse to watch this hurt fellow closely because he was in bad shape, and he felt that this fellow was in grave danger of dying. This was actually true, as he was in very poor physical condition.

As soon as he began to recover from the operation he merged into a hypomanic state which he described in the following words: 'I became very buoyant. All sense of responsibility seemed to leave me, and I felt very free and happy. All my life I have felt constrained, tied down, enslaved by conditions and circumstances, and now I seemed reborn into another life, another world in which people were very different from what they were before. I was much freer in my relations with everybody, especially with women'. He went on to say that he was surprised when people made remarks about his misfortune. 'They seemed to think that I was a cripple, but I knew better'. This manic state continued for many weeks, during which time he had no idea that he was in any way afflicted. Even before the stump was healed, he travelled around and subjected himself to all sorts of perilous risks, of which I shall mention only one incident. Before he left his home to go to work in the smelter he sold a bronco to his mother's hired man. 'The horse turned out bad, the man was afraid of it, and used a very severe bit in the bronco's mouth, which caused the broncho to acquire the habit of rearing and falling backwards on his rider. When I came to my mother after the operation, I saw the hobbled bronco in the pasture, and it occurred to me that it would be a good joke on the hired man if I should catch the bronco and ride him without saddle or bridle, which I did. My mother and wife were much excited because I had only one arm, and the wound was not yet healed. I could not understand their excitement. I felt that I was in first-class health, otherwise I should not have attempted such a foolhardy feat. I was sure they meant my hurt friend'. About two months after the accident, while still in this hypomanic state, he was going to mow the meadow, and attempting to use his arms the thought occurred to him, '"I am a cripple. I have only one arm," and I looked at my arm and saw it was true. A great flood of emotion swept over me. I sat down and began to cry'. This was the first conscious realization of the true state of affairs, and it lasted only a few minutes and passed away. Following this transient depression, he was again somewhat elated, but as far as I could discover, he gradually returned to a more or less normal state

of affectivity. The schizoidism however continued. It was always the other fellow who was the cripple. Only on one other occasion did he fully realize that he and the cripple were one and the same man. The patient was under my care for about four months and made a good recovery. He lost all his neurotic symptoms, and I succeeded in bringing about a perfect integration of the mental schism produced by the traumatic event.

I cannot discuss here more than a few points of this interesting case. Throughout the whole acute state, lasting almost six months, when the mental schism was at its height, the patient shewed repeatedly what I would call unconscious insight into his condition. Whenever he was sharply confronted with the reality of the situation, when he was told that he had only one arm, and as proof of it his empty sleeve was dangled in front of his eyes, his attitude became rigid, he stared in front of him, and said: 'Poor fellow, he has only one arm'. His words were accompanied by marked emovity, such as facial twitching and running of tears. This peculiar behaviour was repeated on occasion for over twenty years. During the first interview with me, in spite of relating to me clearly the strangeness of his case with perfect insight, he reacted in the same manner when I remarked: 'But you are sure now that you have only one arm'. The emotional feeling accompanying his words convinced me that throughout the splitting process, even in the beginning, the patient knew that he had only one arm. Indeed, I consider the hypomanic attack as a sign of an unconscious reaction to the trauma. It seems to me that although the motive of it was plainly a flight from a very painful situation, it differs psychologically from either the spontaneous or psychogenetic attacks which one ordinarily finds. For we know from Freud that in manic depressive psychosis the manic attack is a reaction to the depressive state. The ego yielding to the tortures of the super-ego would ordinarily lead the patient to commit suicide, but instead, there is a flight from this terrible situation into a contrasting emotional state, or into an elation.[5] At first sight it seems impossible to give here the same interpretation, as there was no period of conscious depression lasting more than a few minutes; it was more a shock than a depression. The assumption of a rebellion of the ego against the super-ego because

[5] For the manic depressive conception see Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 152; *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, p. 110; *The Ego and the Id*; also Abraham, *Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 418.

of the latter's harshness would also seem untenable here, unless the super-ego is made responsible for this accidental mutilation. Nor does this situation appear to fit in with Alexander's view, namely, that the depressive state is offered by the patient as a bribe to the super-ego, as a sort of atonement for past transgressions, so that he can later live through his primitive impulses in his manic state.[6] The hypomanic state could best be explained as a flight from a shocking situation on the basis of an effort to relieve painful tension. The situation looks different, however, when I add the following facts : At the age of about three to four years, the patient ran into a boiling kettle of soap with his left arm, and his mother grasped him and pushed the arm into a barrel of cold water. He evidently sustained a severe burn, as he stated that the arm shewed marked scars and slight contraction. This is the first memory the patient could reproduce which referred to his mother. Since the age of six or seven, he never got along well with his mother. His little brother was burned to death as a result of a fire started by his sister trying to fry an egg in the fireplace, and his mother blamed him for not having stayed at home with his brother, and for not taking him with him when he went out. There was a strong castration-wish which ran throughout the patient's life. Speaking of his mother, the patient said : ' She was very headstrong and quarrelled a lot with my father, whom she left. I never regarded her as a mother, and there was continuous warfare between us until I lost my arm, when we became very close '.

But the following case of mania cannot be explained by the psychological mechanisms at our disposal : I have known E. H., thirty-one years old, single, for about eighteen years. He is a man of learning and holds a professorship in a big university. Last August (1928), while travelling abroad, he suddenly became blind, and examination shewed that he had a tumour of the hypophysis. He received a few X-ray treatments, and his sight returned to almost normal. The patient was examined by Dr. Cushing and others, who found the typical symptoms of this malady. What interested me particularly was his psychic state. You can readily imagine the emotional state of a man who is an inveterate reader and writer of books, when he is suddenly struck blind, and hears that it is the result of a brain tumour. The patient was extremely shocked, and for a few days he was in the

[6] *Die Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wien, 1927.

depths of depression, but ' strange to say '—I am quoting the patient—' I soon shook it off and became curiously cheerful '. And for almost two months the patient remained in a manic state. Always very careful and punctilious in his habits, he became careless, and unreliable in his appointments, and very extravagant in money matters. He suddenly found himself in debt to the amount of over $2,000·00, for which he could give no account, and in addition, shewed a strong erotic appetence. He was happy and distinctly elated. He felt like singing, and started to take singing lessons. When he came to see me in October his vision was of almost normal range, but the other signs of the growth still persisted. The patient realizes all the grave possibilities of this malady, but seems unconcerned, even when it is brought to his attention, as I purposely did on a few occasions. For a few moments he expressed some worry about his forgetfulness and the difficulty of finding the right words, but soon began to speak about his singing, and forthwith demonstrated his nice voice. Of special interest was his tendency to joke, the familiar phenomenon of *Witzelsucht* [joking mania], first described by H. Oppenheim.[7] For weeks he shewed a tendency to pun about anything and everything, which is rare now. The patient has been improving steadily, and for the last two weeks there has been a distinct drop in his upward curve. It is quite obvious that the height of the elation was commensurate with the *unconscious insight* as to the seriousness of the situation ; the more serious the symptoms, the greater was the exaltation. Here the manic attack was a clear effort on the part of the organism to run away from a very painful reality ; the lowering of this extreme tension could only be effected by means of contrasting emotions.

As I said above, neither in this case nor in a few similar manic reactions to sudden serious organic or psychic dangers could I discover the typical psychic mechanisms of Freud mentioned before nor the bribe mechanism of Alexander. Is it possible that in some acute states where the fright or shock appears suddenly in consequence of a destructive organic process the individual regresses to an early phase of life wherein the ego and super-ego are still in the early stage of development ? If that be the case, one would not expect to see many evidences of the stern super-ego. On the contrary, one would be more likely to observe the protective efforts of mother-cathexis. Or is it

[7] *Lehrbuch der Nervenkrankheiten*, Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 1026, Karger, Berlin, 1908.

possible that, as a result of the terrific onslaught of the super-ego, as manifested in the destructive process, the ego revolts against it and allows some id tendencies to come to the surface ? It is difficult to say which is the case, but I am inclined to follow the former assumption. The smug comfort and the childish tendencies displayed in all vehement reactions, organic or psychic, would seem to indicate that we are dealing largely with mother-cathexes rather than with a tension between the ego and super-ego.

This view seems to be confirmed by such phenomena as *Witzelsucht* and *moria*, described by H. Oppenheim and Jastrowitz respectively, as diagnostic signs of tumour of the frontal lobe. The literature on the subject shews that there are differences of opinion on the part of neurologists as to whether these symptoms are characteristic of frontal lobe tumours or not. Oppenheim himself states : ' But some cases of frontal lobe tumours were observed without any psychic disturbances, and it is particularly true that tumours in any other cerebral location can produce a severe affection of the psychic life '. Schuster states : ' To be sure, it may be readily conceded that the cases in which *Witzelsucht* was expressly noted were not very numerous '.[8] Of 322 cases observed by him, only twenty-three shewed *Witzelsucht.* The same observer energetically disputes the relation of tumours of the frontal lobe to the psychic life, and justly attributes the psychic disturbances to the general cerebral pressure especially produced by tumours of the frontal lobe on account of their large size. Reichardt also ascribes the psychic disturbances to a general injury of the brain through pressure, inflammation or atrophy.[9]

Beside the case mentioned, I have seen only a few cases of cerebral tumours with so-called *Witzelsucht.* In February, 1910, Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe shewed me a case of frontal tumour with *Witzelsucht* which he observed in the Neurological Institute, the diagnosis of which was later verified by operation. I am grateful to Dr. Jelliffe for permitting me to quote from his notes the following remarks : ' Constantly euphoric tendency to play with words, somewhat silly and yet always happy '. A few examples of naïve joking were then given. I know of another case of frontal brain tumour in a man of sixty-five years, on whom a decompression was made about fourteen years ago. Before the operation he shewed a hypomanic state which largely disappeared after

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[8] *Psychische Störungen bei Hirntumoren*, p. 330, 1902.

[9] Quoted from Oppenheim, *loc. cit.*

the operation, and for the last few years he has shewn a childish dilapidation which could plainly be described as moria.

From the few quotations selected from the literature, it would seem that so-called *Witzelsucht* hardly deserves to be designated as a diagnostic phenomenon. Something resembling *Witzelsucht* or moria, or a mixture of both, may be observed in cases of cerebral tumours of any location. It is my opinion that we deal here with euphoric expressions of the schizoid manic variety, which may appear in organic brain disturbances as a reaction to an unconsciously perceived peril of disintegration, as shewn in our young professor.

A phenomenon resembling *Witzelsucht* may also be observed in the manic reaction to senile and tubercular disintegrations. A few years ago, I examined Mr. M. because he shewed considerable restlessness of the pressure activity type, and was childishly euphoric. He felt ' perfectly fine ', talked much in a jocund manner, and squandered large sums of money buying land. He spent all his own money, and then continued to buy land with cheques which his wife was compelled to honour. Dr. James A. Miller examined the patient at my request, and found him in the last stages of pulmonary tuberculosis. The land he bought was in an isolated part of Texas, and there was no chance of realizing any profit or of making any use of it. When I asked him why he bought so much land he said : ' In twenty years this land will be worth a fortune '. It never occurred to him that he had only a few more months to live. That side was split off completely, but unconsciously he was aware of it, and hence, he continuously assured himself of at least twenty years more of life, by making provision for the future.[10]

In October, 1926, I was consulted by Miss H., sixty-five years old, single, who shewed distinct signs of senile psychosis. In addition to her psychic disturbances, she was in very poor physical condition, barely being able to maintain herself on her feet. Emotionally, she was somewhat elated, and had no insight into her condition. She refused to go to a hospital, and insisted that she was as strong as any woman of forty. She wanted the doctors to teach her how to get a husband. Some of her productions could have easily been taken for *Witzelsucht*. Her desire to marry and her euphoric state were, as in the tubercular patient, reactions to an unconscious insight of her rapid disintegration.

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[10] The *spes phthisica* of consumptives frequently observed in advanced cases belongs to the same reaction.

These two cases selected at random from a great many similar ones shew conclusively that the unconscious manic-like reaction to mental and physical disintegration may be independent of brain tumours.

Occasionally, the real situation breaks into consciousness, and one can catch a glimpse of it. On February 24, 1920, I examined S. R., an advanced paretic of the classical type. He boasted of his great intellect and wealth, stating that he was worth millions, billions, and trillions, and that he had written thousands of books as well as all the movie scenarios given on Broadway, etc. While he was vaunting in this excited manner, I struck his knee with my percussion hammer. He suddenly stopped and pointing to his forehead, said: 'Here, doctor, is the trouble, not in the knee'. I was amazed and said: 'Do you mean to say that there is something wrong with your head?', to which he replied: 'I am the most brilliant playwright in the world', and continued to brag as before. There was no doubt in my mind that this rapidly deteriorating paretic unconsciously realized his sad state, and reacted to it with an extremely manic-like self-enhancement; for a moment, however, the true situation broke through, and he actually had conscious cognition of the situation.

The same phenomenon prevails in schizophrenics when they laugh without knowing why. I have investigated this problem for many years, and I am convinced that the *purposeless laughter* is a reaction to a very active unconscious revaluation of the patient's psyche. The patient fears and resists it, and shews it by the secondary phenomena which he projects to the outer world. It is very difficult to get direct information about this involuntary laughter, at least when we see the patients, because by this time the malady is already in a flourishing state and the patients are inaccessible. Now and then, however, I see schizophrenics who come to me years before the secondary phenomena develop, when they seemingly shew psychoneurotic mechanisms. The laughter, although involuntary, can still be controlled to some extent by the patient. Thus a young woman of twenty-six years, who shewed ideas of reference and elementary auditory hallucinations, had marked outbursts of laughter which were annoying to her. After a few weeks of treatment, she gained considerable insight, and at my suggestion she tried to discover the cause of her laughter. She found that usually before the outburst she was assailed by sad or angry phantasies. Her laughter and crying were frequently affectless; the former she herself

called ' hollow ', and the latter she designated as ' dry crying ', for no tears came. Thus, on one occasion, while she was in my office talking to me, she began to cry and then laughed boisterously. Questioning revealed that she suddenly saw in her phantasy *a little girl with panties on her head*, which looked funny to her. A few days later I urged her to give me more associations, and we found the following: She had begun to cry when she perceived a sudden impulse to urinate, and had had to restrain herself because she was in my office. The next image was the little girl with the panties on her head which looked funny to her. A few days later, I obtained the full explanation. As a little girl she had terrible resistances to her governess because the latter was too rigid in training her. Whenever she wet herself the governess put the wet panties on her head, and made her stay in a corner in this manner until she promised to be good. This developed in her a desire to spite the nurse by wetting herself. Her impulse to urinate which she felt in my office was also due to a resistance to my effort to train her. She began to cry as if she had urinated, but when the punishment was visualized she had to laugh because it looked funny. In reality she had always cried very hard when she had to stay with her wet panties on her head.

A young schizophrenic of eighteen years said to me recently: ' I must have lost my sense of humour, the laughter just comes out of me '. On further questioning, I found that the laughter was a reaction to sad thoughts of having been put out of school. Another young schizophrenic, while being fed by his mother because he refused to eat, was urged by her to take more. He began to laugh, and laughing he repeated the word ' more ' over and over again: ' more and more an more an more an more an,' etc., until the sound associations became ' moron, moron,' etc. On being questioned, he said seriously: ' I am getting to be a moron. I am a moron, moron, moron '. In advanced cases, laughter often displaces crying, and *vice versâ*. But in all accessible cases, schizophrenic laughter was found to be a reaction to disagreeable thoughts or feelings. As one of my patients put it, ' When I wish to cry, I just laugh '. Its counterpart in the normal may be observed in the so-called mocking or cynical laughter of the proverbial clown. As the disease progresses, everything becomes unrecognizable as a result of the various mechanisms of distortion, so that the clear affects are hardly distinguishable; but Bleuler expresses the situation when he states, ' thus there is no doubt that the ability of the psyche in schizophrenics to produce affects has not

been destroyed',[11] and that it only shews a 'lack of uniformity in expression'.[12]

Weygand defines *Galgenhumor* or the grim humour of alcoholics as a 'mixture of exalted feelings and ungodly ideas'.[13] He follows Kraepelin in this definition, who, speaking of the *Trinkerhumor*, the humour of drunkards, states: 'They have lost the capacity to take serious matters seriously; in the obscure feelings of their abulia they fluctuate between unmanly whimpering and undignified grim humour of which even in their self-abasement they can feel only the comic side'.[14] And describing the affect of delirium tremens he states: 'It is now anxiously terrifying and now peculiarly humorous. The patient whose forehead is bathed with the sweat of anxiety makes merry over his own sad state'. . . . 'Laughter and mortal dread follow each other in rapid succession'.[15]

It seems that the alcoholic continually runs away from his disagreeable and sad situation by making merry over it, a phenomenon especially well observed in states of delirium tremens. After studying alcoholics for many years, one soon learns to distrust their solemn promises. There is no doubt, however, that the promises are given honestly. The patient means exactly what he says, but he rarely ever sticks to it. We know that he resorts to alcohol as a flight from reality [16] and that, even before he took to alcohol as an escape, he used various other psychic means of escape; every chronic alcoholic is either a bad psychoneurotic or psychotic. When I attempt to recall to sober alcoholics some of their humorous productions, they usually become irritated by them, and see no humour in the situation. As a matter of fact, all the escapades of alcoholics that I could subject to analytic study shewed themselves comical on the surface only.

But as the grim humour of alcoholics is only a distorted form of normal humour, it will be best to examine its psychic mechanism in the following example: A gang of cowboys caught a horse thief and are about to hang him; the noose is on his neck, and the rope pulled over a high solid branch of an oak tree. The leader then asks the outlaw

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[11] *Dementia Præcox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenie*, p. 38.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[13] *Psychiatrie*, p. 588, München, 1902.

[14] *Psychiatrie*, Vol. II, p. 66, Leipzig, 1899.

[15] *Loc. cit.*, p. 83.

[16] Glover, *The Etiology of Alcoholism*, reprint from the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, Vol. XXI, 1928.

whether he has anything to say before dying. The outlaw begins by requesting the gang not to tell his mother that he was a thief and becomes quite sentimental, but ends up by saying: 'Now, pardners, you must excuse me for being a bit nervous; this is my first experience in this role'.

Let us postpone for a while the full analysis of this excellent witticism, which in its essence shews a mixture of distress and pleasantry, and examine the following case shewn by Dr. M. S. Gregory, of Bellevue Hospital, at the November meeting of the New York Society for Clinical Psychiatry: T., twenty-eight years old, married, has a long criminal record which started at the age of about twelve years with 'juvenile delinquency' and ended with the charge of 'homicide and carrying a gun'. He had been arrested nine times altogether, and between the first and last crimes, he was charged respectively with grand larceny, burglary, rape and abduction, and more burglaries. The last crime was committed with two other gangsters on August 1, 1928; they 'held up' and shot a business man. T., who ordinarily adapted himself well to prisons, having been out of Sing Sing only two weeks, now became restless and agitated, so that he had to be transferred to the Psychopathic Department of Bellevue Hospital. His main symptoms seemed to be an almost allopsychic disorientation. He shewed a perfect amnesia for what had happened, and in his attitude and manner he resembled a schizophrenic. He was somewhat resistive, masturbated *coram publico*, or held his hand on his genital region in a position suggesting masturbation or protection. When an attempt was made to get him to talk, he would usually not answer, but when urged he gave stereotyped answers. To almost everything he would say: 'You are crazy, you are crazy'. When he was told that he was charged with murder, and that he would 'get the chair', he gave the same answer, 'You are crazy. I'm a good boy. I'm going home with mamma'. The last sentence too was frequently repeated. In a stereotyped way he repeated that his mamma was downstairs, and that he was going home with her. What struck his observers at the hospital was his tendency to naïve joking which he shewed very clearly in our presence. Dr. Feigin, of Dr. Gregory's staff, presented the case for diagnosis. The majority of those present seemed inclined to look upon the case as not simulating. I felt that we dealt with a case of situation psychosis of the Ganser type in a very schizoid personality.[17]

[17] From the history and examination of the patient, it would be safe to state that he is constitutionally inferior.

There are a few phenomena shewn by this patient which interest us here. First, the motive for the psychosis. In spite of the criminal personality, when the situation became very tense, when he knew that a death sentence was staring him in the face, he resorted to a ' flight into disease '. The only way that the high tension could be lowered was through a full dissociation or rather a tearing away from reality. Nevertheless, as I looked at the patient, I felt that unconsciously he fully realized his sad state, for while he was repeating his stereotyped sentences and continued to be facetious, his facial muscles suddenly began to twitch, his pupils dilated, his nares rapidly opened and closed, his forehead shewed beads of perspiration, and tears ran down on his cheeks. Such vaso-motor changes were frequently noted in the hospital records. The stereotyped remark ' You are crazy ', which resembles Wernicke's ' transitivism ', is in my opinion another corroboration of his unconscious insight. For, according to Wernicke, transitivism is often seen in acute mental disturbances, and is due to the fact that lacking all psychic feeling of illness, the patients are so changed in all their thoughts and feelings that the assumption of identical mental streams, which enable us to perceive correctly the attitude and manner of others, no longer holds true with them.[18] I always felt that granting the truth of this statement, it still does not explain how the patient comes to think that others are crazy. I interpret this phenomenon as an *outward projection of the patient's unconscious insight.* To the idea, ' You are acting peculiarly, there is something wrong with your mind ', the patient reacts with, ' No, I am not crazy, you are crazy '. And last but not least, the unconscious insight is confirmed by the patient's tendency to naïve joking, which is another manic reaction to his sad plight. His whole behaviour points to a regression to the autoerotic [19] phase of childhood wherein anaclitically the mother is the only person from the outer world whom the child needs and craves: ' You are crazy. I am going home with mother. I am a good boy, I am a good boy '.[20]

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[18] *Grundriss der Psychiatrie*, p. 217, 2nd ed., Thieme, Leipzig, 1906.

[19] In terms of the ego and the id, one can say that there is a definite flight of the ego from the super-ego. The patient shews a number of mechanisms suggesting a marked castration fear.

[20] I saw the patient about six weeks later and found him considerably calmer emotionally, but he maintained the same mannerisms in speech and actions. His arms were tied to prevent him from masturbating, and

Throughout this paper I had in mind Freud's saying quoted above, namely, that the tendency of psychic life is to reduce and remove tension in order to protect the individual from pain, and I endeavoured to shew this tendency in the behaviour of the cases presented. To stress my point, I selected the phenomenon of wit as it manifests itself in some abnormal mental conditions, as wit is one of the great instruments whereby we reduce the tension of inexorable reality in normal life. In closing his profound work on wit, Freud gives the following formulæ for wit, the comic and humour: 'It has seemed to us that the pleasure of wit originates from an *economy of expenditure in inhibition*, of the comic from an *economy of expenditure in thought*, and of humour from an *economy of expenditure in feeling*'.[21] It is the last formula, the economy of expenditure in feeling, which is of special interest to us, for in all the cases enumerated we dealt with a strong effort on the part of the organism to save feelings. In normal life, humour serves the same purpose as seen in the outlaw's witticism given above. We feel sympathetically inclined to any one who is about to forfeit his life, we are moved by the outlaw's last thoughts about his mother, but this solemn feeling vanishes when he concludes: 'You must excuse me, pardners, for being a bit nervous, for this is my first experience in this role'. The thought occurs to us that, far from being dismayed and terrified over his sad fate, this outlaw takes the whole situation very lightly, he laughs it off, so to speak. And we, who empathize ourselves into his misfortune, are also spared the affects developed by the situation and escape the possibility of deep feelings with a joke.

To be sure, the cases cited here belong to the neurotic and psychotic types, and all shewed definite schizoid mechanisms. It is significant, however, that only those who were, psychiatrically speaking, of the schizoid manic type reacted to their difficulties with manic-like reactions. This seems to correspond with my observation of humorists in normal life. Not every person shews a sense of humour, but the few I had the good fortune to know and study belonged to the same type of personality; to a greater or lesser degree they were all subject to occasional schizoid manic moods, but whereas they made free use of

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he asked me again and again to untie him, so that he should be able to masturbate.

[21] *Wit and the Unconscious*, translated by A. A. Brill, Doubleday Doran & Co., New York, 1916, p. 384.

pure humour, the cases mentioned here only partially succeeded in using wit and humour as a reactive escape.

In his effort to explain the nature of humour, Freud comes to the conclusion that the humoristic attitude toward others is like the behaviour of a grown-up toward a child. But in an earlier situation of humour, the person directs his humoristic attitude toward his own person in order to defend himself against pain. That is, he treats himself as a child, and at the same time plays the role of the superior grown-up toward this child. To understand this, one must bear in mind the relation of the ego to the super-ego as formulated in Freud's scheme of the psychic apparatus. The super-ego,[22] the highest force of the psychic apparatus, the heir of the parental force (moral and ethical principles), frequently holds the ego in marked dependence and treats it as the parents treat the child. The humoristic process can thus be explained by the fact that the person of the humorist displaces the psychic accent from the ego to the super-ego. But one may ask, how it is that the super-ego, which is ordinarily a strict master, would serve as an agent for producing pleasure through humour. The main thing about humour is its implication, which means to say: 'Well, is this the world which looks so formidable? It is merely child's play, good enough to make a joke of it!' It is in this way that the super-ego endeavours to console the intimidated ego. I wish to add that from my studies of the super-ego in the neuroses, psychoses, dreams, and in such cases as are presented here, it would seem that the super-ego is not only a precipitate of the strict tyrannical father, but also of the consoling and loving mother. This is not new, for although Freud emphasizes the father element in the ideal ego, he always speaks of the parents. Moreover, many of our cultural ideals evince distinct feminine imprints; thus the reverence shewn to the mother in ancient cults and religions, and especially in modern Christianity (Madonna cult), seems to be another indication of man's outward projection of mother-ideals. Nevertheless, in great stress, the individual is not only confronted by the omniscient and omnipotent father, but he imploringly turns to the cheering and protecting mother. 'You are crazy, you are crazy. I am a good boy. I am going home with mother'.

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[22] Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 12.

PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL GROUNDWORK IN GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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The right of the psycho-analyst to appraise the mental data of anthropology and to regard the main problems of sociology as coming within his province has been maintained by none more stoutly than by Ernest Jones [1]; and, it need hardly be added, he has justified this claim in a series of essays in which the findings of individual (psycho-analytic) psychology have been made to illuminate various obscure aspects of group activity (custom, myth, folklore, etc.).[2] As he has pointed out, direct observation of data (field-work) is one only of the pre-requisites for effective investigation, the other being an adequate grounding in psycho-analytic science. This legitimate assumption of interpretative privilege on the part of the psycho-analyst brings with it, however, certain responsibilities, the most arduous of which is that no field of investigation should be allowed to lie fallow. The object of the present communication is to draw attention to a hiatus in those psycho-analytical investigations which bear directly on problems of group psychology. The data in question afford direct evidence in support of the psycho-analytic theory of group-formation and at the same time shew that many psycho-analytical findings as to infantile development might have been deduced from a study of early group-formations. Finally, they give the psycho-analyst opportunities of ' field work ' in anthropology which up till now have been the preserve of more travelled investigators. The particular field of study I have in mind is represented by the activities of ' pubertal ' groups which are formed spontaneously and preserve their formation over a number of years.

If we take Freud's essay on *Group Psychology* as a model of psycho-analytical approach to this subject, it will be seen that three main sources of information are laid under tribute, viz. the facts of individual

[1] ' The Relation of Psycho-Analysis to Sociology ', *Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis*, Williams and Norgate, 1923. ' Psycho-Analysis and Anthropology ', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1924, liv. 47.

[2] *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 5, London, 1923.

development in relation to the family group, certain anthropological data from which the most primitive forms of group-formation are conjectured, and the manifestations of transient or stable group-formations in civilized communities.

Of these three sources, the first, viz. psycho-analytical data, has proved so far the most direct and illuminating : from the point of view of group psychology, psycho-analysis might be regarded as an investigation into the individual's first group-reactions. Moreover, the transference neurosis repeats and uncovers characteristic group-manifestations and is the means whereby ill-adapted social reactions are ' called in ' and condensed to their original family magnitude and intensity. Anthropological investigations, on the other hand, are subject to the inevitable drawback of being much less direct, and the conclusions drawn from them as to primal groups are bound to be hypothetical. When we come to consider the third source of information, study of group-formations in civilized communities, one cannot but be impressed by the fact that the groups in question, whether transient or stable, organized or unorganized, are groups of adults. Admittedly a study of adult groups enables one to observe the differences between individual and collective tendencies and to attempt some correlation of these tendencies ; but it presents difficulties similar to those encountered by the introspectionist when he endeavours to find evidence in himself for an unconscious mental system. For example, whilst it can be inferred from adult group-phenomena that direct sexual tendencies are unfavourable to the formation of groups, opportunities for actual study of group-relations of sexual love in civilized communities are practically limited to the orgiastic habits of more or less secret groups, particularly those united by a bond of manifest homosexual interest ; and, in the absence of other data, one is thrown back on the study of group-marriage amongst primitives. The fact remains, however, that much more positive information is available on these and other aspects of group-relations, provided one is prepared to turn from the study of adult groups to that of pubescents.

It would be interesting to consider why so little attention has been paid to spontaneous group-formations amongst children and adolescents. It is certainly noteworthy that in most academic treatises on group psychology their existence is scarcely mentioned, and one is inclined to think that the same internal resistances are operative here which prevent the academic psychologist from observing the most patent manifestations of infantile sexuality ; the point being that within the

boundaries of early groups there is much more direct evidence of the libidinal nature of the ties and of group sexual activities. It might be held of course that child or adolescent groupings are either too transient and unorganized or too artificial to permit of satisfactory investigation. Most published observations of group activities are open to this criticism (e.g. reports of short-lived secret societies with a secret language, rites and initiations, the latter frequently of a manifest sexual order ; or observations of artificial school groupings ; or again descriptions of periodic group ebullitions such as the ceremony of ' barrin' oot the Dominie '). What has not received the attention it deserves is the fact that round about the years of puberty, groups are to be observed which are by no means fleeting in duration, which are homogeneous, formed without the artificial groupings of childhood, kept together by internal forces and, although primitive, are not without a certain complication of structure, to say nothing of advanced ethical codes.

These groups flourish in village communities, small enough to escape the mainly artificial conditions of child groupings prevailing in town areas and yet sufficiently populous to prevent a mere continuance of infantile conditions on a larger scale. A striking feature is the spontaneous nature of their formation ; they are not influenced by the artificial conditions of organization associated with school or club groupings, and the factor of a common relationship to extra-familial authority is absent. Social distinctions do not exist within the groups, and their homogeneous nature depends on two factors, age and sex. Each group exercises a certain territorial sway, and each village is divided up into ' spheres of influence ', more literally ' hunting-grounds ', which are guarded jealously by the ' packs ' in question. As we shall see, the final disruptive force—the expansion of heterosexual libidinal aims—is either undeveloped or takes forms in which the pack can join and make a matter of communal enterprise. Amongst younger members overt gratification is limited to residues of the component impulses ; amongst the more advanced members overt individual or mutual masturbation constitutes the main erotic gratification sporadically indulged. On rare occasions ' group ' or ' chain ' masturbation is practised. Group sexual advances on girls of the same age or older can be observed, but frequent exploitation of them is a prelude to final disruption and subsequent individual pursuit of heterosexual aims. The unconscious ties holding the group together are first and foremost of a homosexual nature.

This integrity and community of libidinal aim is what distinguishes the pack on the one hand from adolescent groups, and on the other from the innumerable post-infantile groups, from the shattered remains of which the pubertal group is welded. Adolescent groupings are unstable because of increasing exogamous interests, whilst the first extra-familial groups are unstable because of treacherous tendencies to retreat to the original family group. Even when these early extra-familial groupings have developed a more stable organization, an element is present in these immature packs which foredooms them to disruption. There is little or no sex distinction in these early packs. Once the phase of infantile sexuality has been completely covered over, group distinctions of sex appear, e.g. the exclusion of girls from male groups is sufficiently rigid to be taken as a matter of course. Female groups of the same size and with the same degree of organization are however not observed. Once formed, the ' pubertal ' group remains closely knit, and although liable to occasional volcanic upheavals of hostility, the formation is preserved until more adult strivings and conditions of existence make their appearance. Desertion is rare and expulsion almost unknown.

The age factor plays an important part in these group-formations ; hence it is easy to observe interfamilial ties being cut across by group distinctions. It is uncommon to find brothers in the same group unless the age-difference does not exceed at the most three years. Where the operations of the group involve hostile action against the elder brothers of a group member the latter sides with the pack. On isolated occasions a much younger brother may be included in the group as a kind of ' mascot ' : he holds a specially favoured position comparable to that of the ' young hero ', but this role is played more frequently by a child not related to any member. He is accepted and treated as the ' younger brother ' of the whole group.

As has been suggested, the most interesting feature of these pubertal groups is the transitional state of development of their moral codes. It is possible to observe quite overt sexual activities, to note various inhibitions partly controlling these activities, to study the familiar sublimations of infantile sexual interests, and at the same time to formulate definite codes of morality governing behaviour. Apart from these manifestations of group regulation, there exists a highly developed ethical code which differs only slightly from those in vogue amongst adult communities. The most obvious differences pertain to the expression of aggressive impulses ; almost invariably these are gratified

freely, provided they can be directed against other groups or against external representatives of authority. Internecine warfare, except on very significant occasions which we are about to describe, is distinguished by its absence.

To illustrate the transitional nature of impulse-modification characteristic of the group, we may single out the rules governing exhibitionism and viewing. Defæcation is carried out quite openly either individually or in group-formation. Urination, on the other hand, is subject to ceremonial modification : only younger members of the group handle the penis openly ; older members urinate in public (usually simultaneously and often in competition), but the penis is covered by the hand. Nevertheless, on orgiastic occasions of masturbation amongst the older members concealment is not practised and is of course impossible in the case of ' group ' or ' chain ' masturbation. In the same way the habits of undressing associated with bathing exhibit interesting variations. Only the youngest members exhibit the penis freely ; the older members have the habit of covering the penis with the hand when stripped. At the same time there is *on these occasions* no display of direct sexual curiosity unless perhaps in the case of some structural abnormality.

Bearing in mind this rough code, it is interesting to observe what happens on occasions when internecine strife breaks out in the group. These are accompanied by the abandonment of previous sexual limitations and lead to the temporary disintegration and dissolution of the pack itself. The disturbances are heralded, significantly enough, by a phase of boredom combined with restless dissatisfaction, familiar precursors of a wave of sadism. When this has reached its climax, the signal for action is given, not by the most prominent members of the group but by less important units, and on many occasions by the ' young hero ' himself. One particular member is singled out, and the demand is made to ' show ' him. The group then falls on the chosen victim, who is pinned on his back, his clothes ripped open, the penis exposed and gazed at in turn by each member of the group, who usually throws some grass or soil at the exposed phallus or spits on it. The victim is not allowed to defend himself or to obtain redress by challenging the original instigator to fight. But he can institute a talion revenge. He nominates the next victim, and in this way member after member undergoes the ordeal. Towards the end of the sequence the ' young hero ' pays the price of his original rashness : he is dealt with in due course, but is treated with a contemptuous leniency. Then comes the

climax ; the most authoritative members of the group, who up to then may have played a more or less inactive part except in the actual viewing, are themselves attacked. These exercise the privilege of fighting denied the more junior members and are only overcome by the main force of the combined pack. This completes the ceremony of 'showing' (known in different parts of the country as 'sighting', 'viewing' or 'laying out'), and for a short space of time the group appears to have regained its stability. But this is not the case. Actually it falls into a state of temporary disintegration and retreat is made as in post-infantile groups to the family fortress. The 'anarchic' stage has been reached, and it may be days before pack law and habits resume their sway.

With the detailed interpretation of this ceremony we are not immediately concerned ; it is sufficient for our present purpose to note the gratification of component sexual impulses (sadism, scoptophilia, etc.), the manifest expression of homosexual interest, and the explosive outlet of tendencies diverted from the positive Œdipus situation. Obviously the ceremony satisfies unconscious needs which are not adequately discharged in the sporadic sexual activities of the group (masturbation, etc.). There is wide scope for variation in the unconscious interests expressed, from the attitude to the potentially feminine 'young hero' to that expressed in 'showing' the more masculine leaders. In this last sense the ceremony is a pure castration ceremony, whilst each victim is made to experience through the combined attack of the group the omnipotent aspects of paternal authority which can be read in the sense of castration or homosexual gratification. Hence on these occasions each member of the group has ample opportunity of reflecting his individual erotic tendencies and needs.

In spite of the scanty nature of the material presented here, it is impossible in a brief communication to do more than consider a few of the problems in group psychology arising out of it. It may be said, however, that psycho-analytic formulations regarding the libidinal nature of group-ties receive first-hand confirmation. When the aim-inhibited impulses on which the group usually depends are swept aside by this periodic uprush of sadistic and other manifest activities, the group is temporarily dissolved. In the routine relationship, although there is ample opportunity for satisfying genital curiosity, there is no sadistic expression of viewing impulses ; in spite of this previous familiarity, the genitals are regarded on days of ordeal as if they had been seen for the first time, whilst each victim behaves exactly as if

he were an outraged stranger. Moreover, the libidinal nature of the group bond is thrown in greater relief by the fact that there is little or no anaclitic relation between the expressions of object-libido and self-preservative impulses. It is true these latter tendencies are expressed on occasions of inter-tribal warfare and there is some advantage in belonging to a group when alien territories must be visited; but the group is not built up primarily to serve protective ends.

Then as to the vital question of leadership: the 'pubertal' group is especially interesting in that there is no open acknowledgment of such. There are of course influential 'elders' who may be said to share some of the executive functions of leadership after the manner of consuls, but their authority is very uncertain and rarely exercised, except on occasions when physical superiority is a decisive factor. In any case it is easily undermined, and the policies of a group are as often as not shaped by junior members. On the whole it would be fair to say that in normal times the function of leadership is never clearly defined, and that when it *is* operative it is almost invariably shared out amongst the members. This absence of open leadership and of election by combat does not imply that the group is not unconsciously influenced by attitudes to a leader. There is sufficient actual leadership in operation on any one occasion to provide for displacement, and in any case the group is not a self-supporting community, hence the background of all other social relationships is one of direct dependence on authoritative figures. But it is interesting to note how these pubertal groups reduce leadership to a minimum except on two occasions: (*a*) of inter-tribal conflict and (*b*) of ordeal. On the latter occasions whichever individuals have for the moment the nearest claims to group authority are forced into leadership whether they will it or no. Although they are the last to be attacked, fight fiercely, and often escape, it seems to be just an essential part of the ceremony that they should be attacked *as leaders*. On these occasions it becomes clear that the 'castration of the father' is superimposed on the more immediate homosexual aims.

At this point one is tempted to refer to the hypotheses of the 'primal horde' which are accepted by analytical group psychologists, and include the organization of a 'band of brothers' driven out by the primal father. Of course, the ontogenetic parallel to the driving out of the sons must be regarded as occurring primarily during the infantile Œdipus stage and only as being re-enacted on subsequent important occasions, e.g. being 'sent to school'; but the group-formations

associated with these earlier occasions have always some direct relation to parental authority or its substitutes. Here at puberty, in spite of a multiplicity of group-formations having a formal constitution which, one might imagine, would satisfy the need for group relations, we find an entirely spontaneous formation in which leadership is ordinarily at a discount. One might go so far as to say then, that study of these pubertal groups may provide as direct evidence as is attainable of the validity of such hypotheses as that of the ' band of brothers ' and that the explosive disintegration of the pubertal group is a direct modern instance of ' war amongst the band of brothers '.

It is interesting to consider what light further study of these early groups may throw on the problem of the latency period. As we know, Ferenczi's inspired suggestion that the latency period represents the phylogenetic imprint of the Glacial Epoch has received the weighty support of acceptance by Freud. On the other hand a tendency exists to make too rigid use of the conception of a latency period ; some analysts, arguing no doubt on the frequent merging of prolonged infantile sexuality and precocious genital ripening, have regarded the latency period as a purely theoretical conception. Now on the one hand group habits afford manifest gratification of some component impulses organized on an unconscious homosexual basis, and on the other the junior members of the groups whose activities, as has been said, are mainly in the direction of component gratification have not freed themselves from the latency period. Several interesting speculations arise from this. It might be suggested that the phenomena of latency have some specific relation to infantile homosexual organization or that the recrudescence of open homosexual interest observed after puberty appears to be so striking because we have not investigated with sufficient care the manifestations of latency. It might also be suggested that just as the more prolonged infantile neuroses constitute a subterranean channel of communication between infantile sexuality and adult sexuality, so group habits and activities provide for the normal child a more continuous libidinal experience than has been suspected, to say nothing of opportunity for increasing instinctual modification. However that may be, it is apparent that in the group-formations of childhood we have a fruitful territory for both psycho-analytical and anthropological exploration. One looks forward to the time when anthropological references will contain as many allusions to the villages of Western Europe as are now made to aboriginal communities.

THE MECHANISMS OF ISOLATION IN NEUROSIS AND THEIR RELATION TO SCHIZOPHRENIA [1]

BY

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We know that the term *schizophrenia* is used to include a whole array of clinical cases, often differing widely from one another, whose pathogenesis remains obscure in spite of the many theories which have already been put forward on the subject. We know, further, that all these morbid states are characterized by a greater or lesser dissociation of the subject's psychic activity, accompanied by auditory, visual or sensory hallucinations or by incoherence in speech [*Wortsalat*] or symptoms of mental automatism. There is no need for me to give a detailed clinical description of schizophrenia : we are familiar with it through the writings of Bleuler and his school. My intention in this paper is rather to put before you the various psycho-analytical notions which may at any rate throw more light on certain aspects of these pathological states and suggest new aims and methods for a therapeutic technique in such cases. But before turning to the real subject of this paper we must bear in mind that psycho-analysis cannot attempt to deal with anything but psychogenic symptoms. This fact narrows the field of our investigation considerably, for we have every reason to suppose that certain schizophrenic conditions are connected with the problems of heredity and possibly even of infective diseases. All these questions, unfortunately, we must leave on one side ; we cannot enter on a discussion either of heredity [2] or infective disease and of their influence in the development of schizophrenia. We must content ourselves with attacking such problems as come within the scope of our knowledge and, in particular, of our psycho-analytical knowledge.

We are all familiar with Freud's work on the case of Schreber (published in 1911). In it Freud touches on all the important questions which confront the investigator who endeavours by means of psycho-analytical theory to discover the source of schizophrenia. Freud's aim is to shew how Schreber's dissociation may have been conditioned by the fixation of his libido at an early infantile level of development,

[1] Read before the Society of ' L'Evolution Psychiatrique ', Paris.

[2] See Kretschmer, *Körperbau und Charakter*.

how impossible it seemed for this fixation to be given up, in spite of all the patient's efforts at adaptation and how it caused a regression of his libidinal organization.

It is true that in practice this regression might have been brought about by other influences as well. Adaptation, which finds its outward expression in social life, represents the product of two factors. The first is the individual himself; the second is that which we usually call his environment—the external world, the circumstances of his life, and so on. Now it may be asserted at once, even of individuals who count as normal, that if they have to struggle with unusually great difficulties in life, they almost invariably display a more or less marked tendency to regression. In order to find compensation for the unhappiness which he experiences, the libido of the individual turns towards affective situations of childhood which are associated with the memory of real happiness.

I must say that in real life the problem seems to me to be more complicated than it appears when formulated thus. What do we mean by a failure in life? The failure itself may be the result of a large number of contributory factors, and we have every reason to suppose that it is above all the failures invoked by the patient's own neurosis which sentence him most inevitably to regression, for they leave no other channel open for the libido.

What we have to do, then, is thoroughly to investigate the mechanisms of these failures, for they constitute the barrier against which the patient's vital energies dash themselves in vain.

I am not asserting that these barriers are the *cause* of schizophrenia; they seem, however, to be the result of a disposition in our patients, of which I admit that we cannot say positively how far it may be inherited and how far acquired. But I do wish to lay special emphasis upon the important part played by these barriers in the economic system of a schizophrenic's libido. The barriers become walls and the walls prisons. I may say, too, that to explore this progressive isolation, so pregnant with consequences for the patient's development, seems to me impossible except by the aid of psychoanalysis, just as it seems impossible to treat it properly in any other way, for, if once these barriers are broken down, there is a chance for the patient's life to take a more normal direction.

In order to examine the affective mechanism which leads to this 'walling-up' of the patient's mind, we must submit to a special corrective process our instruments of observation, that is to say,

ourselves. A laborious and gradual training is necessary to enable our mental apparatus to supply us with objective data about that which we are investigating.

This ' walling-up ', as I have called it, manifests itself in practice in the absolute necessity that the patient is under constantly to reproduce the same affective situation which has him in its toils. He is quite unable to understand what is happening within him and to evade its consequences. Thus it comes about, for instance, that a man who has done brilliant work as a student regularly fails to pass his examinations, contrives to fall out with his friends, in spite of being obviously a good fellow, and is compelled to marry a woman whom he cannot love—all this in order that he may periodically manufacture a fresh opportunity to be unhappy and continue to live the life of a misunderstood man : a failure. Ultimately he will withdraw into himself and give the impression of eccentricity, being at the same time firmly convinced that he has been betrayed and despised by other people. If his case were thoroughly analysed, we should probably find that the situation in which he has placed himself is the result of an unconscious tendency which, reinforced by rationalizations, impels him to withdraw from his real surroundings and bury himself in a world of brooding and dreams. And the whole thing is the more inevitable because the patient believes that he is right in nursing a grudge against reality and avenging himself upon it.

It is easy to understand that this process of barricading oneself off from others may be either more or less thorough-going and that such patients lose touch with reality in varying degrees. Once a certain boundary-line of tolerance has been over-stepped, I think that we have entered the realm of schizophrenia. The rationalizations of which I spoke may now change into hallucinations, and the patient is just as impotent against the latter as against the former.

It seems then that delusional ideas can be traced back to morbid rationalization—a process in part identical with the pre-logical rationalization which I mentioned earlier. It is a process to which we may all of us fall victims, but we possess in a greater or lesser degree the power of correcting it. We must therefore assume that it is a progressive one and that there is a certain point after which a definite psychosis is reached and the loss of contact with reality occurs.

A psycho-analytical investigation of this mental isolation often reveals a special affective situation : the different affective tendencies of the subject arrive at a compromise along the lines of self-punishment,

masochism or self-destruction. Neither conscious nor unconscious gratification is associated with normal success in life or, in the field of sex, with the normal act—i.e. in the man with taking possession of the woman sexually, in the woman with sexual surrender to the man. That which produces gratification is a beating phantasy,[3] which takes different forms in different patients. The situation may be experienced and enjoyed in phantasy and be present in the patient's consciousness. Or it may be lived through by means of neurotic reactions, of whose meaning and bearing the subject remains unaware but from which he may derive gratification. In this case, in spite of its all remaining unconscious, he will experience after the ' crisis ' a sense of discharge of tension.

Where the phantasies are conscious, they generally take the following form. A patient, while masturbating, gives himself up to imagining that another man is beating a boy. As a rule these phantasies are highly complicated. I will quote one in greater detail: A captain engages a ship's boy, who usually represents the patient himself. The captain gives orders that only the ship's officers have the right to inflict punishment, and moreover they must use only whips made in a certain way. The boys who are to undergo punishment must always take up a particular position. The victim has the right to utter six groans under punishment, but not a single one more. If he groans more than six times, the beating must be begun all over again. The captain is present in order to make sure that everything is done in accordance with these strict regulations, which turn the ceremony into something like the caricature of a ritual act. Sexual gratification ensues when, for instance, after fifty carefully counted blows the boy utters the sixth groan. At the moment when the fiftieth blow falls and the sixth groan is uttered, orgasm occurs.

This complicated scene is really relatively simple in comparison with most of the phantasies woven by these patients. Every time the subject masturbates, the protagonists in the phantasies may be different, but at bottom it all happens on each occasion with the same exactitude as regards the social hierarchy of the persons in authority, the regulations to be complied with, the details of the instruments used, the attitudes, the cries, in many cases even the names of the people concerned.

Men are met with who spend hours daily in inventing such phan-

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[3] Cf. Freud, ' A Child is being Beaten ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

tasies, meanwhile masturbating two, three or four times or even oftener.

In women the theme of the phantasies may be as follows : I am a convict in a prison-cell and have to endure the blows of a warder. Or I am a prostitute and am beaten by a man, by a sailor, for instance, or by a German who during the War has raped the women in a convent. During masturbation the sexual gratification is associated with the idea of blows to which the patient has to submit or which in the phantasy she causes to be inflicted on someone else. But these phantasies seem less common in women than in men. Possibly, in the former they work themselves out in symptoms. This is the case with a large group of patients (men and women) who are never conscious of obtaining masochistic satisfaction, yet do so by means of various rationalizations which drive some of them into unconsciously induced diseases (very often tuberculosis) and cause others to become failures in social life, in order that they may enact what is virtually the role of a person who is being beaten.

Apparently these cases display a special psychic reaction, which does not necessarily lead to complete loss of contact with reality. The neurotic pleasure can be achieved by either psychic or organic suffering. In the sphere of psychic suffering we must distinguish between persons with criminal reactions, which are due to a kind of complicity of the super-ego, and persons whose evolution follows the line of neurotic or psychotic situations. Long ago Freud introduced into our psycho-analytical theory the conception of the ' flight into illness ' and we may assume that the process of isolation, as observed in schizophrenia, simply represents one of the many possibilities of flight which the patient has at his disposal. In this connection it might be very interesting to inquire what sort of influence a painful organic illness might have on a schizophrenic psyche. As a source of pain and perhaps as an opportunity for punishment it might absolve the patient from seeking in delusion for the element of suffering which is apparently indispensable for his mentality.

However that may be, our task is to find out how far this process of isolation represents psychically a means of flight and in what the gain derived from it consists.

Here we are confronted with one of the most singular problems : why is it that, in order to escape certain situations (often quite harmless), the patient is driven to head in a direction which may imperil his whole existence ? Sometimes we come upon really paradoxical situa-

tions, as Freud shewed in his work on those who regard themselves as ' exceptions '.

Unless one is familiar with the important part played by the craving for punishment in the economic system of persons suffering from those derangements under consideration, it is impossible to form a just estimate of the situation. It seems that a special psychic capacity is required for normal abreaction of the sense of guilt—a capacity which these patients appear to lack. They try to escape from the infantile sense of guilt (which derives from the Œdipus conflict) without even being conscious of it. To do this they immerse themselves in a system of self-punishment which they have unconsciously evolved. This serves to lighten the burden of guilt or to rid them of it altogether. Then, having already passed through purgatory without realizing it, they arrive at a state of hebetude which, through the absence of any sense of guilt, may for them be almost happiness—the happiness of insensibility, of Nirvana, of indifference. This sense of guilt, of which the patient is usually not even conscious, is as a rule most intimately connected with the Œdipus complex. In the majority of cases patients are unconscious of the latter also. We have a possible exception in those who, by undergoing a great deal of suffering, have won the right to tolerate the Œdipus dream in conscious phantasy : for instance, a son visualizes himself as performing the sexual act with his mother or a mother-imago. It is because the sense of guilt is closely connected with the Œdipus complex that the patient, in provoking punishment, does not merely relieve himself of the guilty feelings but also, once they are got rid of and the way lies clear for the sexual impulse, acquires the right to live out the Œdipus situation whether by masturbation or some other equivalent activity.

I will quote an example in illustration of these mechanisms. A patient about forty-five years old opened an analytic hour with the following free associations : ' You advise me, doctor ', he said, ' to give free rein to my thoughts at night before I go to sleep and when I wake up in the morning. But you have no idea how dangerous this is for me. Instead of giving myself up to my phantasies at night, I am forced to read, so that I may pass straight from the waking state into a dead sleep. The moment I wake up in the morning I seize the newspapers. Do you know the dangers to which I am liable in phantasying ? The thoughts come, and with them an irresistible craving to write them down, so as to tell them to you and do what you wish. And not only that—I am also compelled to torment myself in case I have for-

gotten anything and to find out whether I really had this or that thought or feeling, whether I have put it into words accurately, and so on. This torment is accompanied with an unbearable sense of anxiety, which urges me to telephone to you, although you have forbidden me to do so, just as you have forbidden me to make notes. The result is that you make me do things which I feel deserve punishment, though all the same I do think they might help us to make real progress and bring us nearer the goal for which, as you know, I have sacrificed everything. I know you will say that there is no need for me to make notes or to telephone, but my intuition tells me that you are mistaken. If these torments leave me, then there are others. I feel as if my bodily organs were dissolving within me and my heart were breaking. I am being ruthlessly murdered : my pulse beats a hundred to the minute. In the street I am afraid of collapsing or having some sort of seizure, and you know how unbearable this state is. At such moments it is an impossibility for me to think of anything else. I can only reckon up my different pains. Everything else is shut out '.

Now, what process is at work in this patient ? To him spontaneous thinking is equivalent to an act of creation or, more correctly, of evacuation. He cannot do it without, as it were, watching this defecation. The whole interest which as a child he felt in this function, when performed by his mother, has been transferred to his own mode of action. But his super-ego condemns this interest which calls forth a deep sense of guilt. The patient takes refuge in mechanisms of self-punishment, so as to acquire the right to look at what he has himself produced. But he is not satisfied with this self-punishment : he feels compelled to do something which he thinks deserves punishment. For instance, he wants to telephone to me—the telephone-call being the equivalent of the warning cry which he used to utter as a child when he had defecated in his bed. This cry always brought punishment upon him—punishment which he unconsciously desired to receive from his father and which he now anticipates from the analyst. Next, the patient has a craving to look at and feel his bodily organs. Of course, there has been a change in the organs selected—he is now concerned with his heart, etc.—but the picture is none the less vivid, and he admits that other organs come in as well as his heart, which is ' dissolving ', and his pulse, which is too rapid. Psycho-analysis enables us to see in this confession an expression of his desire to look at his mother's sexual organs with which he identifies himself. If we take away from this patient the opportunity of suffering, we are simultaneously depriving

him of the right to translate the Œdipus complex into reality in his own way. We rob him of the enormous sense of omnipotence which is his source of gratification. We compel him to take upon himself the sense of guilt and, above all, that of responsibility towards his father. He will complain bitterly because we have deprived him of the opportunity of self-punishment and cured him of the tendency, and he will say that we have restricted his genius and his possibilities of development. By denying him punishment we have greatly modified, if not altogether annihilated, that boundless confidence in himself which made him think himself equal to God. This is probably why the patient clings so tenaciously to his miseries, whether psycho-neurotic or of some other nature. They allow him to act without restraint and without the sense of guilt ; everything that might normally check him remains outside his consciousness, so that he is able to go on believing in himself when his behaviour is contrary to healthy common-sense and is already indicating delusional mental activity. Here we have the explanation of why these people so often seem to have absolutely no faculty of self-criticism and why they have no real satisfaction in being cured, since cure means for them the loss of their dearest illusions.

In a case of schizophrenia which I treated, the patient's craving for punishment and impulse to isolate himself were manifested as follows. A long course of analysis had so far modified his mental state that for some days he obviously treated me as his wet-nurse. As soon as I entered the institution where he was a patient, he would run to meet me with open arms and, in spite of his weight, would demand that I should take him up in my arms. During several analytic hours he wanted to lay his head on my breast, as though in order to suck. At the same time he had a feeling of the most intense anxiety, which after a few days reached such a pitch that he was unable to walk and wanted to have me or his attendant constantly beside him. For some days I allowed him to lean his head on me as he wished. He laid it on my shoulder, saying : ' Won't you give me some milk and some medicine, so that I shan't die ? And will you get me a priest, so that I can make my confession ? ' His demand for milk and for medicine is very significant ; characteristic also is the feeling of remorse, which was manifested in his craving to see a priest and was due to his guilty appetites. From that time on a distinct change was noticeable in his attitude to his surroundings, and especially to his attendant, whom he began to address as ' my friend '. For some days I refused to yield to his wish for milk and medicine. He reacted to my refusal by beginning

to chew paper, preferably the pieces on which I was accustomed to write down analytic explanations for him. He even went so far as to swallow pebbles, earth, cuff-links, etc. During one session he actually wanted to eat my pencil, and did really swallow half a cigarette which I had begun to smoke. The result was such a bad gastric disturbance that in one hour when I was with him he brought all these things up again. All this time the patient maintained a complete silence towards me. But the situation was so transparent that I determined one day to bring him some caramel-creams, a bottle of liqueur and a cake. You should have seen his joy. In the twinkling of an eye he had substituted the caramels and the cake for the paper (white, like milk). As for the liqueur he rationed it out with incredible care. Moreover, he would not touch it unless I also drank a little of it (in a different glass from his, but always filled by himself). From this time on, the analysis, which had come to a standstill during the days when he kept silence and chewed paper, took a more normal course. I soon learnt why he rationed the liqueur. ' Now ', he said, ' I can eat the caramels and the institution food without the risk of doing something wrong '. (I had had milk provided for him regularly by the institution.) ' To remain pure I must purge myself and never take too much liqueur. Would you bring me three decilitres of cod-liver oil ? It is nasty to take and makes one sick. It gives one a bad smell and makes one disgusting and dirty. This will be my purgatory to expiate my sins. No one will have the right to behead me or throw me down from the Eiffel Tower or cut my throat. Isn't my solution a clever one ? You can imagine how hard my brain has to work in order for me to escape all these dangers and die a decent death '. I finally realized that for this patient hunger and eating had become sexualized (oral phase) and were regarded by him as a sin, a crime which his sense of guilt, closely associated with the Œdipus complex, revived again and again. The sense of guilt was accompanied by dread of castration. In order to escape his pangs of conscience and his anxiety the patient seemed to have invented a complicated system of punishing and humiliating himself. Every moment he would strike his body or his head or twist his limbs. He forbade himself to think of going to the lavatory, and he wounded himself with sharp implements, drank his own urine and smeared his room with his excreta.[4]

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[4] Cf. ' La Pratique Psychanalytique ', *Revue française de Psychanalyse*, tome II, 1928.

Now, what are the causes of this tendency to psycho-neurotic isolation ?

The relation between the sense of guilt and the Œdipus complex proves that in these cases we have to deal with forms of psychic organization which date from the patient's earliest childhood and, having once been established, have never altered. Thus, in spite of all appearances, we are confronting an infantile psyche which has been compelled to come to terms with painful reality at an age when the child was not able to tolerate the pangs of conscience associated with reality and therefore grew into the habit of appeasing them by punishing itself. We are justified in accepting this theory, for, in spite of the many difficulties in treating these cases, we do find that a number of our adult patients acquire the capacity to give up self-punishment, to take the guilt upon themselves, shoulder the responsibility and develop in the direction of normality.

I spoke just now of ' painful reality '. The question suggests itself : Why is it painful ? There is one reason which is by far the most common. It is this : A precociously intelligent child, who has been spoilt by his parents, happens to witness a sexual act between them. There follow his mother's pregnancy and the birth of a baby brother or sister who robs him of the privileged position that he has hitherto occupied. The observing of parental coitus may, as we know, in itself produce serious consequences, for feelings are prematurely aroused in the child which he cannot gratify. The only possible outlets are infantile : that is, in phantasy he can visualize in himself the part of father and mother both.

This dissociation of his personality, which becomes a habit with the patient, may lead to a number of consequences : amongst them to the fixation of sexual gratification to these same conditions, namely, to being able to feel and visualize himself as passive and active simultaneously. He has therefore to seek out special opportunities for reproducing this situation either in phantasy or by means of certain rationalizations, as, for instance, in the mania for self-analysis, which from this standpoint develops into a mania for visualizing himself in situations associated with sexual gratification. The conditions of the Œdipus complex have to be reproduced, the resulting sense of guilt requiring to be wiped out by punishment.

This sense of guilt becomes comprehensible when we realize that the child is in the hands of his parents and needs their love and that he is liable to terrible distress the moment that he thinks he has for-

feited this and is no longer worthy of it. An adult can at all events do without the love of a given person : to a child these conflicts are inexplicable ordeals. None of the people round him understand him. Those who could help him often do all they can to make his position even worse. The flood of sadism and hate which results cannot be carried off by normal channels, but streams back on the individual in the form of masochism, repressed by the super-ego, which, to embitter the repression, does its utmost to isolate the scapegoat. We see therefore in practice how hard it is for these patients to externalize their hate in a normal manner, for only thus will they be able to give free vent to their love also and to re-establish normal contact with the world around them.

There are certainly other causes as well which may contribute to produce similar situations and to hold the subject captive in them.

We are greatly indebted to Melanie Klein and to Ernest Jones for having devoted serious study to the conflicts of the early infantile period. What they have told us about these conflicts and about the way in which they affect the development of the super-ego in this respect is of the utmost interest. I myself, in agreement with Pichon and Codet, have pointed out what seems to be the peculiar part played in the subject's development by conflicts connected with weaning. I think we have grounds for connecting schizonoia very closely with the disturbances of this period of childhood. We may go further and assume that children are better or worse equipped to withstand these trials according as they are more or less free from hereditary taint and also according to the state of their health and the kind of parents they have. Again, I believe that the way in which a child reacts, e.g. to anxiety, may depend upon the traumatic factors in his birth. But this last notion belongs to the realm of hypothesis.

Returning to facts, I should like to call your attention to a special relation which exists between the child's psyche and its mode of reaction and the psyche of the parents. It seems to me impossible to understand the schizoneuroses and psychoses if we regard the patients simply as individuals. It is far easier to get to the bottom of them if we take into account their relations with their environment. I have never yet treated a single schizophrenic patient without having to deal with an environment which was in part responsible for his illness. In several cases I have succeeded in improving the patient's mental state sufficiently for him to leave the institution where he was confined. So long as it was practically certain that psycho-analysis would fail

like all the other treatments which had been tried, the family left me alone. But as soon as there was any palpable improvement, the parents immediately underwent a reaction, the result being that the treatment was interrupted and it became completely impossible to make any progress with the patient. In certain of these cases the son or daughter was actually a weapon in the hands of the parents in their quarrels. I derived the impression that the influence of an unbalanced mother goes a long way to produce a system of isolation, which may reach such a pitch that the patient completely loses touch with reality.

Hence one has at times the feeling that the struggle in which the healthy energies of the schizophrenic are sacrificed is simply the extension of another struggle: that which is going on between the parents. But there is this peculiarity about it—the feminine principle has here gained the upper hand over the masculine and seeks to deny to the germ—the child—all access to life. Can it be that this struggle represents that between the chromosomes of the father and of the mother? It is possible, but I do not think we need go so far back, and I think it not at all impossible that a child adopted by these parents would have suffered the same fate. It is true that I have never had the opportunity to make an experiment of this sort, for the simple reason that it would be difficult to bring it about in real life, for a mother of this type would not receive an adopted child unless she were forced to do so. Such mothers belong to the '*fausses victimes*' whom I have described in another paper [5] and generally prefer to take up some scientific work or business like their husbands. I may add that very often they are remarkably successful.

I have had an opportunity of analysing some of these women. The effect of their analysis on their children was perhaps even stronger than on themselves. It seems therefore that in order to help children who are threatened with schizophrenia we ought to be allowed to treat them in their earliest years and in many cases to have treated the parents first.

If they were dealt with from this standpoint, a number of schizophrenic symptoms could be brought into relation with our general findings and could be explained by the need for punishment. This latter would seek for gratification particularly in the mechanisms of isolation, and it would have abundant opportunity of satisfaction both in psychic isolation and in the confinement of the subject in an asylum.

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[5] 'La Pratique Psychanalytique'.

In treating schizophrenia, then, what we should have to aim at is to remove the possibility of punishment and so gradually undermine the tendency in the patient to compel others to confine him. Having succeeded in this, we should then have to make him take up the battle with his feelings of guilt and inferiority. The operation is assuredly no easy one, but I have thought that in quite a number of cases it was by no means impossible and that it would result in considerable improvement and even cure. We must, of course, enlarge our experience before we can speak optimistically of permanent results from the treatment of schizophrenic patients.

CONSCIENCE AND THE ROLE OF REPETITION

BY

AUGUST STÄRCKE

DEN DOLDER, HOLLAND

§ 1. Hallucination is one of the most difficult, inaccessible and for us psychiatrists mysterious of phenomena. We shall never understand anything about it unless we assume that everyone is continually hallucinating but that the hallucinated images are obscured by the crude brightness of the projections made by the sense-organs, just as the light of the stars is obscured by day. The problem then arises: What is the force which in certain individuals lends such a resisting power to hallucination that it maintains itself in the midst of sense-perceptions? It might be one of two things: (*a*) the sensory stimuli might be dulled, e.g. through narcissism, or (*b*) the energy or energies poured out in hallucination might be peculiarly strong.

With regard to the second possibility, we know that, as a result of hallucinatory commands, people may attack others or may commit suicide, any logical objection being quite useless. The voices often give expression to a sense of guilt, they utter reproaches or abuse which might have proceeded from conscience, and the hallucinatory commands are carried out with the energy and moral satisfaction which would normally accompany a sense of duty. It seems that conscience must make at any rate an important contribution to the driving power behind hallucinations. The fact that the trend of hallucinatory commands is so often anti-social, whilst we are accustomed otherwise to regard conscience as a pro-social faculty, cannot be explained by the simple assertion that hallucinations and conscience are both after-effects of the Œdipus complex or of the earliest object-attachments in general.

In the following pages my endeavour is to give yet another explanation of what Freud told us long ago about conscience and to build thereby one more bridge from Freud to Semon and again, to Pavlov. Perhaps, too, I shall be able here and there to contribute something fresh, even though it be really only an application of principles laid down by Freud.

§ 2. Conscience is that which restricts our freedom from within. We should be free to adapt our behaviour to external circumstances, were it not that we are hindered or restrained by two bonds or injunc-

tions—habit and conscience. We do to some extent wrest ourselves free from habit : the capacity to do so we call intelligence. Intelligence is the capacity to deviate from a habit when such deviation is expedient.

It is much more difficult for intelligence to get the better of conscience. Even an otherwise powerful intelligence does not easily succeed in putting conscience aside. We might thus conjecture that the latter is the representative of very old or very deeply ingrained habits. This accords well with the findings of analysis, but then we encounter the contradiction that even very old habits are at times disputed by conscience, even those which certainly originated in a paternal command. (For instance, a girl belonging to a family of orthodox belief may become critical and refuse any longer to assume the attitude of prayer, because her conscience forbids her to simulate a belief which she no longer possesses.)

§ 3. Conscience is an organ of the ego. We define the ego as the inhibiting force or forces which bind together the parts of the personality in a functional unity. Freud says [1] : ' The ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world acting through the Pcpt-Cs, i.e. it is in some sense an extension of the surface-differentiation. It also endeavours to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies and to substitute the reality-principle for the pleasure-principle '. According to Freud the other organs of the ego are the censorship, which presumably also manifests itself as resistance, and the faculty of testing the reality of things. If we choose, we may regard conscience as a branch of this organ of reality-testing, having its direction inward. Its task is to compare our acts and thoughts with an ego-ideal.

So far, we have sufficient reason for differentiating conceptually between the ego and the super-ego, the latter being that part of the individual which comprises both the ego-ideal and the conscience which operates with it. Its function is to bind individuals together in unities of a higher order (social organizations, the simplest being that which consists of two persons, mother—child).

Apart from conscience, there are other factors which restrict our capacity for adaptation. We mentioned habits and may extend this term to include everything which, as a *mneme*, contains a certain tendency to repetition, comprising the whole system of memory and

[1] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 29.

ideation the formation of which is predisposed to by heredity. Heredity also confines within certain limits our possibilities of development.

Hence, conscience is not *the* but simply *one of the* inner factors which restrict adaptation.

§ 4. The conflict of conscience. Not every conflict of duties is a conflict of conscience. Only when the ego identifies itself with the authority which prescribes the duty, does the latter become a matter of conscience. There are three different ways in which conscience may be drawn into an inner conflict. I will give an example of each.

During the war a physician is besieged by his rich patients with requests for orders for white bread. It is easy to give an order, but his conscience hinders him from adopting this solution, which is only too well adapted to actuality, and it bids him refuse. This is no conflict of conscience in the narrower sense. Here we are dealing with the normal function of conscience as a whole, coming as such into conflict with egoistic and libidinal tendencies.

A true conflict of conscience is one in which one part of the conscience contradicts another, whether absolutely or relatively. We are familiar with the example of the railway signalman of our school-books who sees his own child playing between the rails at the moment when he ought to put down the signal for a coming express. In our little book he chooses his professional duty and his civic virtue is rewarded ; the train comes to a standstill in time, and his child is unhurt. But it does not always happen so. A physician who preserves professional secrecy, even when it is a question of syphilis or tuberculosis in the young man who wishes to marry his daughter, need not count on such a miracle, and obviously his conscience will be divided.

The third kind of conflict into which conscience leads us arises out of the fact that its utterances are different in one person and in another. The same identification leads to a different issue in the first and in the second. Thus the physician who, even when faced with the judge, invokes his own professional obligation to keep silence, comes into conflict with the lawyer who invokes a different obligation of conscience. Here we have an external conflict between individuals, grafted upon an inner one within the conscience of each. For the physician himself hears the voice of conscience bidding him speak and sometimes can reassure himself only by taking refuge in the rigid principle of silence. And, conversely, the lawyer places its full value on the duty of silence, as soon as he himself becomes a patient.

In this sort of conflict it often proves that the clashing duties belong

to different social organizations. The practising physician who upholds the duty of silence even in his dealings with his so-called colleague who is responsible for public health, serves the old organization of medicine which, regardless of all else, puts the cure and the patient first. The medical officer of health is the servant of a newer medical organization whose first care is prophylaxis and which, generally speaking, gives the healthy man preference over the sick.

In this and other cases the typical circumstance is that one part or stratum of conscience is connected with a certain level or phase of social organization, while a second stratum is connected with another level.

The embryo of society is the organization : mother—child. The second phase is that of the primitive family. Thus, even sociologically regarded, the nucleus of conscience is the after-effect of parental compulsion. The perhaps older organization of pairs of lovers still has one foot on the infra-individual scale.

Conscience seems, like sand-stone, to be composed of different strata, and these do not always harmonize with one another.

§ 5. It is remarkable to note how in the matter of conscience the universal rule once more applies : that that which is newly formed does not develop from the highest (in the sense of the most recent) existing formation but out of a lower part which has remained hitherto undeveloped. Every line of development is a blind-alley : the new sprouts from a bud which is further, sometimes much further, down. The path of development is not that of *evolution* but of *revolution*. Only out of temporary chaos does renewal proceed. Before development can take place, there must be regression. We will give this rule a name and call it the *law of retrogenesis*.

The ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution of conscience confirms the law of retrogenesis. Let me give an example. During the trial of Dreyfus it was proved, as we know, that several officers of high rank committed perjury in order to screen brother-officers ; it could not be admitted that mistakes had been made. It was ostensibly only to save the face of authority that they went so far as to break an innocent man, or at least one whose guilt had not been proved. The motive was not simply egoism or vanity, but also (as they believed) the interest of the State. Only recently I heard this point of view defended by a young lawyer.

It is a revolting truth that rulers who happened to possess a straightforward conscience would soon find themselves in the same difficulties as the citizen who tried to walk ' In His Steps '.

Every new social organization demands a new orientation in relation to good and bad and every time society chooses from the available id-factors those which are most suitable for the construction of the new stratum of conscience. That which was accounted good in the family and was established as such in the conscience is no longer good in the larger group. The ' slim ' organizers, the active captains of industry, are often people with undeveloped consciences. Women, who seldom possess a conscience (they prefer to submit to an authority in the outside world), or whose conscience has a different orientation have adjusted themselves with remarkable ease to the new conditions. The most eminent representatives of the State are seldom the noblest individuals. (Cf. Ibsen, *Pillars of Society*.)

Almost every individual vice has its socially valuable side. Conversely, the most advanced communities (the United States, New Zealand) are largely composed of the descendants of individuals who were removed from more primitive States because they were useless even to them. Freud says [2]: ' What appears later on in society as public spirit, *esprit de corps*, etc., does not belie its derivation from what was originally envy. No one shall force himself to the fore ; everyone shall be and have the same. Social justice means that we deny ourselves many things, so that others shall have to do without them as well.[2]

For this reason, every time that an individual in his ontogenesis repeats a phase of the development of society he becomes involved in conflicts of conscience. He is required to throw away as of no further value something which has become a part of himself, to exchange it for principles which he had formerly learned to condemn.

It is therefore fitting that every important step in social ontogenesis should be celebrated with a festival. We have the clearest development of this in the rites of puberty, festivities which represent the anti-moral phases (orgies) or the heteromoral (festive) phases which must necessarily precede the new crystallization. *A festival is a period during which something prohibited is converted into a duty.* The older crystals must first come into solution. Festivals are like psychoses of short duration, and many true cases of psychosis may be regarded as pathological exaggerations of these rites of puberty—festivals which have miscarried.

A dramatic conflict of this sort has never been depicted so movingly as by the great writer Hebbel in *Agnes Bernauer* (1851). Agnes, a

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[2] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 87.

simple maiden of the bourgeoisie of Augsburg, is the daughter of a barber-surgeon; because of her beauty and virtue she is called the 'Angel of Augsburg'. She kindles the love of Albrecht, the young heir to the dukedom. After he has overcome her initial resistance, he marries her secretly and against the will of the duke, his father, who had already planned a marriage for him which would have put an end to old feuds.

The old duke, Ernst, has no choice; he feels the tragedy of kingship. A prince must sacrifice his natural feelings for the good of his State. Agnes is a danger to Bavaria: therefore she must die. A tribunal appointed *ad hoc* condemns her, and she is drowned in the Danube.

No one but a genius like Hebbel could succeed not only in making this royal crime, which draws on so inevitably—a thing so monstrous that the bare thought of it makes our flesh creep—acceptable to our ethical sense, but actually in making us love all the characters in the tragedy one after the other, in shewing them as fellow-victims struck down by a single fate. Agnes is killed for no other reason than that she is beautiful and virtuous. Beauty and all outstanding gifts bring unhappiness in their train; they are enemies to the State.

This is the grim truth which Hebbel holds up to us, the tragedy of beauty—the thought which he himself regarded as the heart of his tragic play. The old duke speaks in the name of right; no one but Hebbel could have succeeded in making what the duke says sound like anything but Shavian irony. Albrecht is not allowed to die in his righteous rage and in revenge; he has to live and to become Duke of Bavaria. This is the demand which his father makes on him in the name of right and of the State and, so doing, hands over to him the sceptre which makes him his own father's judge: 'You are not as other men, who may appease justice by bowing their necks in remorse to the sword. Justice demands of you the opposite!'

Here is a complete reversal of the sense of right. It is made acceptable because necessary, but it is based on the most primitive and criminal instincts. For, apart from all his fine speeches and mental struggles, what was it that Duke Ernst really did? He caused his son's wife to be abducted, killed her and entered into a mortal conflict with him—all this with a certain amount of refinement, whereby he idealizes this primal crime, and ending up with self-punishment, for he abdicates and enters a monastery.

The crime which, from the individual point of view, is of the blackest,

becomes expedient for the State, and conscience must do itself violence and submit.

Probably but for Hebbel none of us could agree to this. To the present writer *Agnes Bernauer* meant the dawn of civic feeling and the first realization of the truth that the individual must perish if society is to live.

We see then that conscience is made up of different strata. It is the after-effect of social duties experienced earlier. Every social phase has left its deposit: on the orthophrenic [3] level, principally parents, family and horde (super-organism); on the metaphreni level the State (super-super-organisms), and alongside them every secondary organization—the pair of lovers, the group-association.

Having found that the law of retrogenesis is valid for conscience, we are forced to modify the analogy we employed. We spoke of sandstone; but the fresh formations of conscience do not grow out of the uppermost stratum but out of another, which has long been covered up. They break through the covering stratum and spread over it, like a volcanic stream of magma, which gushes up from long-forgotten depths and spreads out as a covering of lava. That which yesterday was anti-social will to-morrow be, in part, social, and that which is ethical to-day will become in turn old-fashioned to-morrow morning, anti-social to-morrow evening, and will in part grow up again the day after as a social force.

We have assumed that the ego-ideal is a stratified structure composed of mnemic deposits from all the stages of social evolution and that it is the business of a certain force, called conscience, to compare the ego with this ideal. The question now arises whether this conception might not be simplified in two respects. If a mnemic deposit has the power of spontaneously operating, the rival action of the mnemic stages would readily account for all the effects produced by the super-ego. The ego-ideal, at which we profess to aim, is the image of the introjected stimuli of the past, an image upon which our social environment throws ever-varying lights, lending it ever-varying forms. It

[3] *Orthophrenia* is the word I used in my blue manual, which I published in 1921, to describe the mental condition of the individual who is part of a family or horde; there is still a considerable remainder of the creative urge in its genital form, which aims at the procreation of children. *Metaphrenia* is the mental condition of the individual in the modern State; the creative urge is more anal and displaced on to the production of wealth.

lies behind us and does not allure us but impels us. Conscience, too, becomes identical with the mnemic structure itself, and the difference between the two (conscience and ego-ideal) resolves itself into a difference of levels in the development of self-observation. Changing external circumstances give the control first to one and then to another of the mnemic deposits.

The ego may be a part of the same structure, but the authority which impresses its stamp upon it is the sense-organ. It is the mnemic deposit of the phase of social organization—the individual.

The influence of the external world in this is to be conceived of as only selective. Society allows the operation of certain strata of the id and forbids that of others. When any factor of the id receives the sanction of society sufficiently often and sufficiently emphatically at a receptive period of the individual's life, this confers upon it the stamp of the super-ego stratum and enables it to resist rejection by the senses (in the last resort it may maintain itself by hallucination). But this by no means implies that it is withdrawn from the id. Rather is it comparable to the special reflexes of tone-and colour-stimulus, which in Pavlov's experiments become conditional reflexes, that is, attract remote effects, if their reward is sufficiently often repeated and sufficiently intense. The categorical imperative of conscience is the unchanged imperative of the instincts.

We might represent this by the following scheme :

SUPER-EGO

(Mnemic deposits of the social stages.)

EGO

(Mnemic deposits of the individual stage.)

ID

(Mnemic deposits of the infra-individual stages.)

But, since this scheme seems still to smack of demonology, a better would probably be the following :



§ 6. So far, of the functions attributed to conscience we have considered only the inhibitive ones—self-criticism, ethical inhibition, sense of guilt, remorse and self-punishment—and we have said that conscience is an inhibiting force. Often, however, perhaps always, inhibition is actively exercised, whether it be by direct active resistance or by deflection of the excitation to rival instincts.

I want now to draw your attention to two series of facts, of which



I have here given some sort of pictorial representation, because mine is the visual type of mind.

As we know, experience teaches that every action and movement, if not inhibited, repeats itself rhythmically. A single act is really always a damped-out series. In the diagram annexed we have a pictorial representation of this class of facts. We see first a damped-out sinusoid. This may represent a tendon reflex, but also, more abstractly conceived, a crime with its tendency to repetition, or, in general, a motor action with its repetitions.

A second class of facts relates to self-punishment. There we see, just as in the punishment of others, that preference is given to the *jus*

talionis, i.e. that the punishment, unless exactly prescribed, tends to be similar to the offence, the only difference being that it is directed against the person of the offender. This is illustrated in the second figure. The wrong-doing (top of the first curve) is followed by self-punishment (top of the second curve ; double line represented as taking the reverse direction. It might have been any other direction, but, for the purpose of illustration in the plane of the time-curve, the direction towards a definite object has been reversed).

The third figure represents the operation of conscience. There is no repetition of the offence and *in its place* comes self-punishment. This may be summed up in the formula : Conscience is the force which converts the repetition of an action into self-punishment and remorse.

The line of thought which is the subject of the present essay renders it, as it seems to me, a not inappropriate tribute of gratitude and respect to Ernest Jones, who has contributed so much to the analysis of normal psychological manifestations.

PERSONIFICATION IN THE PLAY OF CHILDREN

BY

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In an earlier paper [1] I gave an account of some of the mechanisms which I have found in my analysis of children to be fundamental in their play. I pointed out that the specific content of their play, which recurs again and again in the most varied forms, is identical with the nucleus of the masturbation-phantasies and that it is one of the principal functions of children's play to provide a discharge for these phantasies. Further, I discussed the very considerable analogy which exists between the means of representation used in play and in dreams and the importance of wish-fulfilment in both forms of mental activity I also drew attention to one principal mechanism in games in which different characters are invented and allotted by the child. My object in the present paper is to discuss this mechanism in more detail and also to illustrate by a number of examples of different types of illness the relation between the 'characters' or personifications introduced by them into these games and the element of wish-fulfilment.

My experience so far is that schizophrenic children are not capable of play in the proper sense. They perform certain monotonous actions, and it is a laborious piece of work to penetrate from these to the Ucs. When we do succeed, we find that the wish-fulfilment associated with these actions is pre-eminently the negation of reality and the inhibition of phantasy. In these extreme cases no 'characters' ever appear.

In the case of my little patient, Erna, who was six years old when we began the treatment, a severe obsessional neurosis marked a paranoia which was revealed after a considerable amount of analysis. In her play Erna often made me be a child, while she was the mother or a teacher. I then had to undergo fantastic tortures and humiliations. If in the game anyone treated me kindly, it generally turned out that the kindness was only simulated. The paranoiac symptoms showed in the fact that I was constantly spied upon, people divined my thoughts, and the father or teacher allied themselves with the mother against me—in fact, I was always surrounded with persecutors. I myself, in

[1] 'The Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis,' this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, 1927, p. 25.

the rôle of the child, had constantly to spy upon and torment the others. Often Erna herself played the part of the child. Then the game generally ended in her escaping the persecutions (on these occasions the ' child ' was good), becoming rich and powerful, being made a queen and taking a cruel revenge on her persecutors. After her sadism had spent itself in these phantasies, apparently unchecked by any inhibition (all this came about after we had done a good deal of analysis), reaction would set in in the form of deep depression, anxiety and bodily exhaustion. Her play then reflected her incapacity to bear this tremendous oppression, which manifested itself in a number of serious symptoms.[2] In these final phantasies all the rôles engaged could be fitted into one formula: that of two principal parts—the persecuting super-ego and the id or ego, as the case might be, threatened, but by no means less cruel.

In these games the wish-fulfilment lay principally in Erna's endeavour to identify herself with the stronger party, in order thus to master her dread of persecution. The hard-pressed ego tried to influence or deceive the super-ego, in order to prevent its overpowering the id, as it threatened to do. The ego tried to enlist the highly sadistic id in the service of the super-ego and to make the two combine in the fight with a common enemy. This necessitated extensive use of the mechanisms of projection and displacement. When Erna played the part of the cruel mother, the naughty child was the enemy; when she herself was the child who was persecuted but soon became powerful the enemy was represented by the wicked parents. In each case there was a motive, which could be made to appear quite plausible to the super-ego, for indulging in unrestrained sadism. By the terms of this agreement the super-ego was to take action against the enemy as though against the id. The id, however, in secret, naturally pursued its predominantly sadistic gratification, the objects being the primal ones. Such narcissistic satisfaction as accrued to the ego through its victory over foes both without and within helped also to appease the super-ego and thus was of considerable value in diminishing anxiety. This compact between the two forces may in less extreme cases be relatively successful: it may not be noticeable to the outside world nor lead to an outbreak of illness. But in Erna's case it broke down completely because of the excessive sadism of both id and super-ego.

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[2] I hope before long to publish a book in which a more detailed account of this case-history will be found.

Thereupon the ego joined forces with the super-ego and tried by punishing the id to extract a certain gratification, but this in its turn was naturally a failure. Reactions of intense anxiety and remorse set in again and again, showing that none of these contradictory wish-fulfilments could be sustained for long.

The next example shows how difficulties analogous to Erna's were dealt with differently in certain particulars.

George, who at the time was six years old, brought me for months on end a series of phantasies in which he, as the mighty leader of a band of savage huntsmen and wild animals, fought, conquered and cruelly put to death his enemies, who also had wild beasts to support them. The animals were then devoured. The battle never came to an end as new enemies always appeared. A considerable course of analysis had revealed in this child not only neurotic but markedly paranoiac traits. George had always consciously [3] felt himself surrounded and threatened (by magicians, witches and soldiers), but, in contrast to Erna, he had tried to defend himself against them by the aid of helping figures, also, it is true, highly phantastic creatures.

The wish-fulfilment in his phantasies was to some extent analogous to that in Erna's play. In George's case too the ego tried to ward off anxiety by identifying itself with the stronger party in phantasies of being great. Again, George too endeavoured to change the enemy into a ' bad ' enemy, in order to appease the super-ego. In him, however, sadism was not such an overpowering factor as in Erna, and so the primary sadism underlying his anxiety was less artfully concealed. His ego identified itself more thoroughly with the id and was less ready to make terms with the super-ego. Anxiety was warded off by a noticeable exclusion of reality.[4] Wish-fulfilment clearly predominated over recognition of reality—a tendency which is one of Freud's criteria of psychosis. The fact that in George's phantasies parts were played by *helpful figures* distinguished his type of personifications from that of Erna's play. Three principal parts were represented in his games : that of the id and those of the super-ego in its persecuting and its helpful aspects.

[3] Like so many children, George had invariably kept the content of his anxiety a secret from those around him. Nevertheless he clearly bore the impress of it.

[4] As George had developed, this withdrawal from reality became more and more marked in him. He was completely enmeshed in his phantasies.

The play of a child with a severe obsessional neurosis may be illustrated by the following game of my little patient, Rita, aged two and three-quarters. After a ceremonial which was plainly obsessional, her doll was tucked up to go to sleep and an elephant was placed by the doll's bed. The idea was that the elephant should prevent the 'child' from getting up; otherwise the latter would steal into its parent's bedroom and either do them some harm or take something away from them. The elephant (a father-imago) was to act the part of a person who *prevents*. In Rita's mind her father, by a process of introjection, already filled this rôle, ever since, at the time she was a year and a quarter to two years old, she had wished to usurp her mother's place with him, to steal away the child with which her mother was pregnant and to injure and castrate both parents. The reactions of rage and anxiety which took place when the 'child' was punished in these games showed that in her own mind Rita was enacting both parts: that of the authorities who inflicted punishment and that of the child who received it.

The only wish-fulfilment apparent in this game lay in the fact that the elephant succeeded for a time in preventing the 'child' from getting up. There were only the two characters: that of the doll, which embodied the id, and that of the deterring elephant, which represented the super-ego. The wish-fulfilment consisted in the defeat of the id by the super-ego. This wish-fulfilment and the allotting of the action to *two* characters are interdependent, for the game represents the struggle between super-ego and id which in severe neuroses almost entirely dominates the mental processes. In Erna's games too we saw the same personifications, consisting of the influence of a dominating super-ego and the absence of any helpful imagos. But while in Erna's play the wish-fulfilment lay in the compact with the super-ego, and in George's mainly in the id's defiance against the super-ego (by means of withdrawal from reality), in Rita it consisted in the defeat of the id by the super-ego. It was owing to the analysis which had already been done that this hardly maintained supremacy of the super-ego was possible at all. The excessive severity of the super-ego at first hindered all phantasy, and it was not until the super-ego became less severe that Rita began to play phantasy-games of the sort described. Compared with the preceding stage in which play was completely inhibited, this was progress, for now the super-ego did not *merely threaten* in a meaningless and terrifying way but tried with menaces to *prevent* the forbidden actions. The unsuccessful compromise

between the super-ego and the id gave place to that forcible suppression of instinct which consumes the subject's whole energy and is characteristic of severe obsessional neurosis in adults.[5]

Let us now consider a game which originated in a less serious phase of obsessional neurosis. Later on in Rita's analysis (when she had reached the age of three), a ' journey-game,' which went on through nearly the whole analysis, took the following form. Rita and her toy bear (who then represented the penis) went in a train to see a good woman who was to entertain them and give them presents. At the beginning of this part of the analysis this happy ending was generally spoilt. Rita wanted to drive the train herself and get rid of the driver. He, however, either refused to go or came back and threatened her. Sometimes it was a bad woman who hindered the journey, or when they got to the end they found not a good woman but a bad one. The difference between the wish-fulfilment in these cases (much disturbed as it is) and that in the cases I mentioned earlier is obvious. In this game the libidinal gratification is positive and sadism does not play so prominent a part in it as in the earlier examples. The ' characters ', as in George's case, consist of three principlal rôles : that of the ego or the id, that of a person who helps and that of a person who threatens or frustrates.

The helping figures thus invented are mostly of an extremely phantastic type, as the example of George shows. In the analysis of a boy of four-and-a-half there appeared a ' fairy-mamma ', who used to come at night and bring nice things to eat, which she shared with the little boy. The food stood for the father's penis, which she had secretly stolen from him. In another analysis the fairy-mamma used to heal with a magic wand all the wounds which the boy's harsh parents had inflicted on him ; then he and she together killed these harsh parents in some cruel way.

I have come to realize that the operation of such imagos, with phantastically good and phantastically bad characteristics, is a general

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[5] Rita suffered from an obsessional neurosis unusual at her age. It was characterized by a complicated sleep-ceremonial and other grave obsessional symptoms. My experience is that when little children suffer from such illnesses, which bear the stamp of obsessional neurosis as we see it in adults, it is very serious. On the other hand, isolated obsessional features in the general picture of neurosis in children are, I think, a regular phenomenon.

mechanism in adults as well as children.[6] These figures represent intermediate stages between the terrible menacing super-ego, which is wholly divorced from reality and the identifications which approximate more closely to reality. These intermediate figures, whose gradual evolution into the maternal and paternal helpers (who are nearer again to reality) may constantly be observed in play-analyses, and seem to me very instructive for our knowledge of the formation of the super-ego. My experience is that at the onset of the Œdipus conflict and the start of its formation the super-ego is of a tyrannical character, formed on the pattern of the pre-genital stages, which are then in the ascendant. The influence of the genital has already begun to make itself felt, but at first it is hardly perceptible. The further evolution of the super-ego towards genitality depends ultimately upon whether the prevailing oral fixation has taken the form of sucking or of biting. *The primacy of the genital phase in relation both to sexuality and to the super-ego requires a sufficiently strong fixation to the oral-sucking stage.* The further from the pregenital levels both the development of the super-ego and the libidinal development progress towards the genital level, the more closely to the figures of the real parents will the phantastic, wish-fulfilling identifications (whose source is the image of a mother who furnishes oral gratification [7]) approximate.

The imagos adopted in this early phase of ego-development bear the stamp of the pregenital instinctual impulses, although they are actually constructed on the basis of the real Œdipus objects. These early levels are responsible for the phantastic imagos which devour, cut to pieces, and overpower and in which we see a mixture of the various pregenital impulses at work. Following the evolution of the libido, these imagos are introjected under the influence of the libidinal fixation-points. But the super-ego as a whole is made up of the

[6] We have an example of this in the phantastic belief in a God who would assist in the perpetration of every sort of atrocity (as lately as in the recent war, in order to destroy the enemy and his country).

[7] In my two latest papers I had come to the conclusion that in both sexes the turning away from the mother as an oral love-object results from the oral frustrations undergone through her and that the mother who frustrates persists in the child's mental life as the mother who is feared. I would refer here to Radó, who traces to the same source the splitting-up of the mother-imago into a good and a bad mother and makes it the basis of his views about the genesis of melancholia. ('The Problem of Melancholia,' this JOURNAL, Vol. IX, 1928, p. 420.)

various identifications adopted on the different levels of development whose stamp they bear. When the latency-period sets in, the development of both super-ego and libido terminates.[8] Already during the process of its construction the ego employs its tendency to synthesis by endeavouring to form a whole out of these various identifications. The more extreme and sharply contrasting the imagos, the less successful will be the synthesis and the more difficult will it be to maintain it. The immensely strong influence exerted by these extreme types of imagos, the intensity of the need for the kindly figures in opposition to the menacing, the rapidity with which allies will change into enemies (which is also the reason why the wish-fulfilment in play so often breaks down)—all this indicates that the process of synthesizing the identifications has failed. This failure manifests itself in the ambivalence, the tendency to anxiety, the lack of stability or the readiness with which this is overthrown, and the defective relation to reality characteristic of neurotic children.[9] The necessity for a synthesis of the super-ego arises out of the difficulty experienced by the subject in coming to an understanding with a super-ego made up of imagos of such opposite natures.[10] When the latency period sets in and the demands of reality are increased, the ego makes even greater efforts to effect a synthesis of the super-ego, in order that on this basis a balance may be struck between super-ego, id and reality.

I have come to the conclusion that this splitting of the super-ego into the primal identifications introjected at different stages of development is a mechanism analogous to and closely connected with

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[8] Fenichel, in his account of my contributions to the problem of super-ego formation (*Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIV, S. 596), is not correct in assuming that I hold that the development of the super-ego terminates in the second or third year of life. In my writings I have suggested that the formation of the super-ego and the development of the libido terminate simultaneously.

[9] The further the analysis progresses the less powerful does the influence of the threatening figures become and the more strongly and lastingly do the wish-fulfilling figures appear in play ; at the same time there is a proportionate increase in the desire to play and in the satisfactoriness of the ending of the games. Pessimism has diminished : optimism has increased.

[10] Children often have quite a range of parent-figures, from the terrifying ' Giant-mummy ', ' Squashing-mummy ' up to the all-bountiful ' Fairy-mummy '. I also meet with a ' Medium-mummy ' or a ' Three-quarters-mummy ', who represent a compromise between the other extreme examples.

projection. I believe these mechanisms (splitting-up and projection) are a principal factor in the tendency to personification in play. By their means the synthesis of the super-ego, which can be maintained only with more or less effort, can be given up for the time being and, further, the tension of maintaining the truce between the super-ego as a whole and the id is diminished. The intrapsychic conflict thus becomes less violent and can be displaced into the external world. The pleasure gained thereby is increased when the ego discovers that this displacement into the external world affords it various real proofs that the psychic processes, with their cathexis of anxiety and guilt, may have a favourable issue and anxiety be greatly reduced.

I have already mentioned that in play the child's attitude to reality reveals itself. I want now to make clear how the attitude to reality is related to the factors of wish-fulfilment and personification which we have so far used as our criterion of the mental situation.

In Erna's analysis it was for a long time impossible to establish a relation to reality. There seemed to be no bridge over the gulf which separated the loving and kindly mother of real life and the monstrous persecutions and humiliations which 'she' inflicted on the child in play. But, when the analysis reached the stage in which the paranoiac traits became more prominent, there was an increasing number of details which reflected the real mother in a grotesquely distorted form. At the same time there was revealed the child's attitude to reality, which had, to be sure, undergone much displacement. With a remarkably keen faculty of observation Erna took in all the details of the actions and motives of those around her, but in *an unreal way* she worked all these into her system of being persecuted and spied upon. For instance, she believed that intercourse between her parents (which she imagined as invariably taking place whenever her parents were alone) and all the tokens of their mutual affection were mainly prompted by her mother's wish to excite jealousy in her (Erna). She assumed the same motive in all her mother's pleasures and, indeed, in everybody's enjoyment, especially in the case of women. They wore pretty clothes to cause her chagrin and so on. But she was conscious that there was something peculiar in these ideas of hers and took great care to keep them secret.

In George's play the isolation from reality was, as I have already said, considerable. Rita's play also, in the first part of the analysis, when the threatening and punishing imagos were in the ascendant, showed scarcely any relation to reality. Let us now consider that

relation as revealed in the second part of Rita's analysis. We may regard it as typical of neurotic children, even of children rather older than Rita. In her play at this period there appeared, in contrast to the attitude of the paranoiac child, the tendency to recognize reality only in so far as it related to the frustrations which she had undergone but never got the better of.

We may compare here the extensive withdrawal from reality which was revealed in George's play. It afforded him great freedom in his phantasies, which were liberated from the sense of guilt just because they were so remote from reality. In his analysis every step forward in adaptation to reality involved the releasing of large quantities of anxiety and the stronger repression of phantasies. It was always a great advance in the analysis [11] when this repression was, in its turn, lifted and the phantasies became free in their relation to reality as well.

Neurotic children have to make a compromise. A very limited amount of reality is recognized ; the rest is denied. At the same time there is extensive repression of the masturbation-phantasies, which the sense of guilt inhibits, and the result is the inhibition in play and learning which is so common in these children. The obsessional symptom in which they take refuge (at first, in play) reflects the compromise between the extensive inhibition of phantasy and the defective relation to reality and affords on this basis only the most limited forms of gratification.

The play of normal children shows a better balance between phantasy and reality.

I will now summarize the different attitudes to reality revealed in the play of children suffering from various types of illness. In paraphrenia there is the most extensive repression of phantasy and withdrawal from reality. In paranoiac children the relation to reality is subordinated to the lively workings of phantasy, the balance between the two being weighted on the side of *unreality*. The experiences which neurotic children represent in their play are obsessively coloured by

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[11] Such an advance was always accompanied also by a considerable increase in the capacity for sublimation. The phantasies, released from the sense of guilt, could now be sublimated in a manner more in accordance with reality. I may say here that the results of analysis in children far surpass what analysis can accomplish in adults in the way of increased capacity for sublimation. Even in quite little children we constantly see that, when the sense of guilt is taken away, new sublimations appear and those which already exist are strengthened.

their need for punishment and their dread of an unhappy issue. Normal children, however, are able to master reality in better ways. Their play shows that they have more power to influence and live out reality in conformity with their phantasies. Moreover, where they cannot alter the real situation they are better able to bear it, because their freer phantasy provides them with a refuge from it and also because the fuller discharge that they have for their masturbation-phantasies in an ego-syntonic form (play and other sublimations) gives them greater opportunities of gratification.

Let us now review the relation between the attitude to reality and the processes of personification and wish-fulfilment. In the play of normal children these latter processes testify to the stronger and more lasting influence of identifications originating on the genital level. In proportion as the imagos approximate to the real objects a good relation to reality (characteristic of normal people) becomes more marked. The diseases (psychosis and grave obsessional neurosis) which are characterized by a disturbed or displaced relation to reality are also those in which the wish-fulfilment is negative and extremely cruel types are personated in play. I have tried to demonstrate from these facts that here a super-ego is in the ascendant which is still in its early phases of super-ego formation, and I draw this conclusion : the ascendancy of a terrifying super-ego which has been introjected in the earliest stages of ego-development is a basic factor in psychotic disturbance.

In this paper I have discussed in detail the important function of the mechanism of personification in children's play. I have now to point out the significance of this mechanism in the mental life of adults also. I have come to the conclusion that it is fundamentally a phenomenon of great and universal significance, one which is also essential to analytic work in both children and adults, namely, in the transference. If a child's phantasy is free enough, he will assign to the analyst, during a play-analysis, the most varied and contradictory rôles. He will make me, for example, assume the part of the id, because in this projected form his phantasies can be given outlet without inspiring so much anxiety. Thus, the same boy for whom I represented the ' fairy-mamma ', who brought him the father's penis, repeatedly made me act the part of a boy who crept by night into the cage of a mother-lioness, attacked her, stole her cubs and killed and ate them. Then he himself was the lioness who discovered me and killed me in the cruellest manner. The rôles alternated in accordance

with the analytic situation and the amount of latent anxiety. At a later period, for instance, the boy himself enacted the part of the miscreant who penetrated into the lion's cage, and he made me be the cruel lioness. But in this case the lions were soon released by a helpful fairy-mamma whose part also I had to play. At this time the boy was able to represent the id himself (which indicated an advance in his relation to reality), for his anxiety had to some extent diminished, as was shewn in the appearance of the fairy-mamma.

We see then that a weakening of the conflict or its displacement into the external world, by means of the mechanisms of splitting up and projection, is one of the principal incentives to transference and a driving force in analytic work. A greater activity of phantasy and more abundant and positive capacity for personification are, moreover, the prerequisite for a greater capacity for transference. The paranoiac possesses, it is true, a rich phantasy-life, but the fact that in the structure of his super-ego the cruel, anxiety-inspiring identifications predominate, causes the types he invents to be pre-eminently negative and susceptible only of reduction to the rigid types of persecutor and persecuted. In schizophrenia, in my opinion, the capacity for personification and for transference fails, amongst other reasons, through the defective functioning of the projection-mechanism. This interferes with the capacity for establishing or maintaining the relation to reality and the external world.

From the conclusion that the transference is based on the mechanism of character-representation I have taken a hint as regards technique. I have already mentioned how very rapid the change often is from ' enemy ' to ' helper ', from the ' bad ' mother to the ' good '. In such games involving these ' types ' this change is constantly to be observed following upon the release of quantities of anxiety in consequence of interpretations. But, as the analyst assumes the hostile rôles required by the play-situation and thus subjects them to analysis, there is a constant progress in the development of the anxiety-inspiring imagos towards the kindlier identifications with their closer approximations to reality. In other words : One of the principal aims of analysis—the gradual modification of the excessive severity of the super-ego—is attained by the analyst's assumption of the rôles which the analytic situation causes to be assigned to him. This statement merely expresses what we know to be a requirement in the analysis of adults, namely, that the analyst must simply be a medium in relation to whom the different imagos can be activated and the phantasies lived through,

in order to be analysed. When the child in his play directly assigns to him certain rôles, the task of the children's analyst is clear. He will of course assume, or at least give a suggestion of playing, the rôles assigned to him [12]; otherwise he would interrupt the progress of the analytic work. But only in certain phases of child-analysis, and even then by no means invariably, do we come to personification in this open form. Far more frequently, with children as well as with adults, we have to infer from the analytic situation and material the details of the hostile rôle attributed to us, which the patient indicates through the negative transference. Now what is true of personification in its open form I have found to be also indispensable for the more disguised and obscure forms of the personifications underlying transference. The analyst who wishes to penetrate to the earliest, anxiety-inspiring imagos, i.e. to strike at the roots of the super-ego's severity, must have no preference for any particular rôle; he must accept that which comes to him naturally from the analytic situation.

In conclusion, I wish to say a few words on the subject of therapy. In this paper I have tried to shew that the severest and most pressing anxiety proceeds from the super-ego introjected at a very early stage of ego-development, and that the supremacy of this early super-ego is a fundamental factor in the genesis of psychosis.

My experience has convinced me that with the help of play-technique it is possible to analyse the early phases of super-ego-formation in quite little and in older children. Analysis of these strata diminishes the most intense and overwhelming anxiety and thus opens out the way for developments of the kindly imagos, which originate on the oral-sucking level, and therewith for attainment of genital primacy in sexuality and super-ego-formation. In this we may see a fair prospect for the diagnosis [13] and cure of the psychoses in childhood.

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[12] When children ask me to play parts which are too difficult or disagreeable I meet their wishes by saying that I am 'pretending I am doing it.'

[13] It is only in the most extreme cases that psychosis in children bears the character of psychosis in adults. In the less extreme cases it is generally brought to light only by a searching analysis lasting over a considerable period.

CLOTHES SYMBOLISM AND CLOTHES AMBIVALENCE

BY

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LONDON

It would seem only proper that some part of this special number of the JOURNAL should be devoted to symbolism; for Ernest Jones' own contributions to this subject display in a very typical manner the qualities of keen insight, deep erudition, minute study of detail and clarity of thought and exposition—precious qualities which, when present in a high degree, are all too rarely found together, but which are combined to a remarkable extent in the work of our friend and colleague whom we here desire to honour, and which indeed, through their combination, may be said to constitute the distinguishing characteristic of his scientific writings. It would, however, in any case be almost impossible to avoid touching upon the subject in some way or another, for, as Jones has himself said, symbolism in its widest sense 'comprises almost the whole development of civilization'. But it is not of symbolism in general that I here desire to speak; the masterly exposition of this subject which Jones himself gave to the world thirteen years ago still stands as the supreme accomplishment in this direction. I intend rather to confine myself to the symbolic aspect of one particular class of objects—the various articles of human clothing. A number of psycho-analysts, again including Jones himself, have already made valuable isolated contributions to our knowledge of the symbolic significance of particular garments; but the time has perhaps come when it is worth while to attempt a brief survey of what we know of the symbolism of clothing as a whole, especially as this symbolism would appear to be connected with certain interesting tendencies to conflict and ambivalence which have not yet found a fully adequate description in psycho-analytic literature.[1]

So far as our present knowledge goes, it would appear that the object most frequently symbolized by clothes is the phallus, though it is recognized that the female external genital organs may also be symbolized by various garments, occasionally by the very same ones that in other cases serve as phallic symbols. Perhaps the most familiar

[1] In what follows I have made use of certain statements of fact and of certain interesting suggestions, for which I am indebted to my friends Mr. Eric Hiller and Professor N. J. Symons, to both of whom I hereby acknowledge my sincere thanks.

symbol of all is the hat,[2] which is usually masculine, especially when pointed or decorated with horn-like appendages,[3] and occasionally feminine; and the shoe, which is again sometimes feminine,[4] as enclosing the foot (= penis), but which can also be masculine, especially in its connection with fetichism,[5] and in certain special forms, such as the long pointed *poulaines* of the Middle Ages, 'which were always regarded by mediæval casuists as the most abominable emblems of immodesty'.[6] The *poulaine* was indeed sometimes actually made without disguise in the form of the phallus,[7] thus justifying the moral indignation which this shoe aroused when the symbolism employed was of a less transparent kind, the shoe ending merely in a beak or claw. Our present-day erotic symbolism of shoes and boots is probably but a faint echo of that of earlier times, but the condemnation of the pointed toe and high heel, now usually rationalized under hygienic pretexts, is probably a relic of the feeling of outraged morality formerly aroused by the *poulaine*, for the modern pointed toe doubtless retains some of the significance of its more exuberant predecessors, and the heel, as we know, can also be a phallic symbol.[8]

The high head-dress of the eighteenth century probably played much the same rôle as the extremely long and pointed toe of earlier periods and was subject to much the same moral denunciation. It is

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[2] Vide, e.g. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, p. 132.

[3] Cf. Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis* (2nd ed.), p. 136 (Punchinello symbolism); Marie Bonaparte, 'Uber die Symbolik der Kopftrophäen', *Imago*, 1928, XIV, pp. 100 ff.

[4] Freud, loc. cit.; Ferenczi, 'Sinnreiche Variante des Schuhsymbols der Vagina': *Int. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1916, iv, 112.

[5] E.g. H. Hellmuth: 'Ein Fall von Weiblichem Fuss, richtiger Stiefelfetichismus': *Int. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse*, 1915, iii, 111. Sadger, *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, 325. Cf. the well-known lines of Herrick:

> "Her pretty feet,
> Like snails did creep
> A little out, and then
> As if they played Bo-Peep
> Did soon draw in again."

[6] Havelock Ellis: *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, V, 25, quoting Dufour, *Histoire de la Prostitution*.

[7] Havelock Ellis, loc. cit.

[8] Vide, e.g. Abraham, *Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis*.

interesting to find among these denunciations a reference to the ' storming of heaven ' motive, which Lorenz [9] has shewn to have an important phallic element. Thus one preacher said of the female wearers of such head-dresses that ' in defiance of our Saviour's words, they endeavour, as it were, to add a cubit to their stature. With their exalted heads, they do, as it were, attempt a superiority over mankind ; nay, their Babel builders seem with their lofty towers to threaten the skies and even to defy heaven itself.'[10]

Almost equally familiar to psycho-analysts is the phallic symbolism of the tie.[11] In my own experience I have found reason to believe that a similar symbolic meaning may often attach to the collar,[12] particularly the stiff collar, in spite of the fact that, as a garment through which the neck protrudes, it might seem at first sight more suitable for a female symbol. A good many men, it would appear, enjoy the stiffness of the starched collar, feel greatly strengthened thereby, and suffer a corresponding sense of inferiority when discovered collarless or with a crumpled collar. One distinguished man of science told me he ' did not feel a proper man ' in a soft collar, and I have known a youth who could not be persuaded to divest himself of his abnormally high collar even when learning a difficult and strenuous game ; he faced both argument and ridicule with the retort that he needed the collar just *because* the task was difficult. In some (now archaic) forms of collar there is a part which projects and hangs down in front very similar to a tie ; collar and tie are here one. And it seems probable that the English clergyman's collar,[13] which is fastened at the back and presents a rounded unbroken surface to the front, dispensing with the usual tie, symbolizes reduction of virility, in much the same way as certain other features of clerical costume of appearance (e.g. tonsure, skirts).

That humble, but invaluable aid to modern dress, the button, is

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[9] ' Das Titanenmotiv in der allgemeinen Mythologie ', *Imago*, 1913, II, 48.

[10] Frank Alvah Parsons, *The Psychology of Dress*, p. 188.

[11] H. R., ' Zur Symbolik der Schlange und der Kravatte ', *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, 1912, II, 675 ; Hollos, ' Schlange und Krawattensymbolik,' *Int. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse*, 1923, ix, 78 ; Freud, op. cit. 132.

[12] Melanie Klein has already shewn that this symbolism may be found in children : ' The Development of a Child,' this JOURNAL, 1923, iv, 464.

[13] The reason for the peculiarity of which, we are told by a clothes historian, ' is not at all obvious.'

also, I believe, at times invested with some phallic significance—probably in virtue of its function of passing through a hole specially made for its reception (cf. the so-called male and female screws, though it is true that in this case the analogy to the act of coitus is closer); and in the light of psycho-analytic knowledge it is not very daring to interpret the constant twiddling of buttons to which some individuals are liable in conditions of embarrassment as a symbolic act of masturbation.[14] I have also found that trousers may be treated as symbolic of the phallus or of the external male genitals as a whole, as in the following short dream of a male analysand: 'Two men, one with baggy trousers and the other with narrow trousers, attacked a girl in a ditch. I struck the one with narrow trousers with a truncheon I was carrying'. Here the baggy trousers were associated with the father, and were also clearly shewn to represent the testicles, while the narrow trousers represented the penis. The two men together thus stand for the father's genital organs, and the whole scene constitutes a rescue phantasy, with castration of the father. At one period of history the presence of the penis was of course clearly indicated in the cod-piece, a feature of dress which may have been necessitated by the tightness of men's nether garments, but which was often rendered unnecessarily obtrusive by having a special colour of its own and by being shaped so as to simulate a perpetual erection. I have myself observed a very striking representation of an enormous phallus worn by a well-known male dancer on the modern stage, while the Scotch sporran (sometimes adorned with three tassels, the middle one somewhat lower than the other two) is very clearly a symbolic object of a similar kind. The same applies almost certainly, though somewhat less obviously, to the Masonic apron.

Consideration of these latter garments inevitably suggests the Biblical fig-leaf, which has indeed already been shewn to have very strong phallic associations,[15] due probably to its remarkable similarity

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[14] As, for instance, in the well-known story—usually told, I believe, with reference to a distinguished author—of the boy who always played with a certain button when answering questions in school and who was always at the head of his class, but who immediately dropped to the bottom when an envious class-mate unobservedly cut off the button just before a lesson and induced a state of mental paralysis thereby (castration).

[15] Levy: 'Sexualsymbolik in der biblischen Paradiesgeschichte', *Imago*, 1917, iv, 27. For more detailed further consideration of the phallic significance of the fig (connection with castration in initiation ceremonies,

(especially at one stage of its development) to the male genitals and perhaps to the nature of the fruit. It is recognized by many authorities that magical beliefs probably had an important influence upon the first development of clothing and bodily ornamentation and the instruments of magic—talismans and amulets—are themselves, as we know, originally for the most part (perhaps always) symbolic of the generative organs.

That phallic symbolism is not confined to relatively small garments connected with one particular part of the body is shewn by the most surprising and unexpected of all these sartorial symbols—that of the cloak or mantle, originally found by Freud in dreams,[16] corroborated by Reik from folkloristic phenomena[17] and elucidated by the further observations of Ernest Jones.[18] Here we find that a large and voluminous garment loosely covering the body as a whole, and without any resemblance to the phallus as regards shape, may nevertheless be a frequent phallic symbol.

In all these instances the main function of the phallic symbolism of clothes would seem to be the proud display of potency. But such display, as we know, is often based upon a desire for reassurance—reassurance against the fear that the phallic organ may be lost. Accordingly it is no surprise that clothes may also play a part in the symbolic representation of castration. In this case the idea of castration usually expresses itself through the taking off or destruction of clothes. Freud has shewn[19] that the common greeting of taking off the hat may symbolise castration, and Prynce Hopkins[20] has reported a rather striking case of a similar kind, originally observed by the present

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marriage of two trees with each other, worship by women who desire offspring, beating by fig rods to ensure fertility, use in fire drill, connection with snakes, heavenly ladders and, nota bene, with clothes), see Frazer, ' Folklore in the Old Testament ', III, 217 ff, and ' The Magic Art ', II, 313 ff. I am inclined to regard Groddeck's interpretation of the fig-leaf as the hand (in contact with the genitals) as doubtful, except perhaps in special cases (*Das Buch vom Es*, p. 72).

[16] *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 132.

[17] ' Völkerpsychologische Parallelen zum Traumsymbol des Mantels ', *Int. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1920, vi, p. 350.

[18] ' Der Mantel als Symbol,' *Int. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1927, xiii, p. 77.

[19] *Collected Papers*, II, p. 163.

[20] *Father or Sons*, p. 28.

writer. The removal of head-covering seems to be only a particularly important and persistent instance of the general primitive tendency to disrobe as a sign of respect. Just as, according to Herbert Spencer,[21] clothing originated in the carrying of trophies (themselves of course largely phallic symbols), so the removal of garments or ornaments, as the same writer points out, signifies submission or reverence (similar to the giving up of weapons by the vanquished). As an unhackneyed instance of this tendency we may mention Marco Polo's description of the forcible removal of clothing from anyone who trod on the threshold of the palace at Pekin[22]—a particularly illuminating case in view of the known symbolic significance of threshold itself. I believe that certain forms of the 'typical' dreams of being naked or inappropriately clad may also on occasion be connected with castration fear, particularly perhaps those dreams in which some particular article of dress is missing or unsuitable, dreams which according to my experience are more frequent in men than in women. In other cases the idea of castration may be connected with the cutting or rending of garments. Such ideas may perhaps play a part in the tearing of garments in mourning among the Jews.[23]

The following dream well illustrates this connection between the tearing of cloth and castration: 'I dreamt that my father . . . tried to go into the house one day. I put up my hand to keep him out; as I did so, I tore a piece of cloth out of the coat he had on. For days afterwards I could feel the cloth in my hand'. Ferenczi has shewn that the sons of tailors may be especially liable to the castration complex.[24] This last point suggests that the work of preparing garments (cutting and sewing cloth, the tailor's art) may probably symbolise coitus with the mother (cloth = material = mother). The erotic significance of sewing is indeed well recognized,[25] though this significance has usually been taken as a purely auto-erotic one (a

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[21] *Principles of Sociology*, II, pp. 128, ff.

[22] Reik, 'Die Türhüter', *Imago*, 1919, V, p. 345.

[23] It has been suggested that the 'nicks' in modern coat collars (where the collar passes into the lapel) are connected with this practice; though Webb, who mentions this (*The Heritage of Dress*, p. 30), considers it doubtful.

[24] Die Söhne der Schneider', *Int. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1923, ix, p. 67.

[25] Havelock Ellis: *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, I, p. 176.

substitute for masturbation).[26] Where castration fears are reacted to by an exuberance of phallic sartorial display, this would seem to be only an instance of the usual apotropæic function of polyphallic symbolism.[27] On the important part played by certain aspects of the castration complex (the missing penis of the mother) in the production of fetichism it is not necessary to enlarge here, in view of Freud's very recent treatment of this question.[28]

In women the castration complex may, according to Sadger,[29] lead to general exhibitionistic tendencies with regard to the whole body, as if they endeavoured to compensate for the lack of the penis by the display of other charms. This is doubtless true of certain cases, but it is only fair to bear in mind that several women analysts have recently been inclined to think that the female castration complex in its simple form (castration = removal of penis) is less frequent than was formerly supposed and that the sense of inferiority may, among women, attach *ab initio* to the body as a whole.

At any rate, it seems clear that the typical male castration symbol of removing clothes does not apply to women to any great extent. Women, indeed, tend perhaps rather to throw off certain garments under the influence of the castration complex. Reassurance against castration is found, for instance, in the removal rather than in the putting on of hats. This corresponds with the fact that the conventions of modesty and respect are in many ways the opposite of those in force for men. Men remove garments in obedience to those conventions; women keep their garments on (e.g. compulsory wearing of head-dress in church, retention of outer garments in a private house until invited to remove them).

As compared with the richness of phallic sartorial symbolism, the corresponding female symbols in clothes seem to be less numerous and frequent. In addition to the hat and the shoe of which we have already spoken, the veil, girdle[30] and garter seem to be the most important of

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[26] Cf. Groddeck, *Das Buch vom Es*, p. 168.

[27] Flügel: 'Polyphallic Symbolism and the Castration Complex', this JOURNAL, 1924, V, p. 155.

[28] 'Fetichism', this JOURNAL, 1928, IX, p. 161.

[29] *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, p. 378.

[30] "... that zonulet of love
Wherein all pleasure of the world are wove.'—Herrick.

According to Babylonian mythology, when Ishtar removed her girdle in the underworld, reproduction ceased in the world (Elliot Smith, *The Evolution of the Dragon*, p. 154).

those that have attracted the attention of psycho-analysts. Bracelets and other ornaments, as well as jewellery, can however also have this significance.[31]

Do instances of this kind exhaust the female symbolism of clothes? I think not. I believe that, alongside of the symbolic representation of the external female genitalia, there is another class of female symbols, which might more appropriately be called mother-symbols or womb-symbols, and which play much the same part as regards the protective function of clothes[32] as is played by the phallic or vaginal symbolism in their decorative function. In this matter we may safely take our lead once more from the work of Ernest Jones, who, in his highly suggestive paper on 'Cold, Disease and Birth',[33] has endeavoured to shew that the unconscious foundation of the fear of cold is derived from the fear of separation from the mother—in the first instance the separation from the mother that takes place at birth. It is true that in this paper he is largely concerned with the equation 'birth = castration', so that if we follow out his train of thought in its application to clothes, we see that the function of clothes in protecting us from cold is itself another aspect of the protection that they afford against the fear of castration. But much that we have learned from psycho-analysis forbids us to believe that the psychological significance of birth and separation from the mother is exhausted by such castration symbolism. Although the idea of birth is undoubtedly connected with the idea of castration in subtle ways of which we have as yet only a partial understanding, it has as certainly a high affective value in its own right, and the fear of separation from the protecting love of the mother, together with the correlative desire to retain this love (both ultimately expressed in the wish to return to the mother's womb), may persist throughout life quite independently of any associated fears of castration. If this is so, and if cold is one of those features of a hostile world against which we should be most adequately protected by a return to the womb, we may expect that clothes, which protect us against cold, may be regarded by the unconscious as an equivalent of the protecting womb; we should expect, that is, that clothes may sometimes serve

[31] The best survey of symbols of this kind is probably that of Storfer, '*Maria's Jungfräuliche Mutterschaft*', pp. 49 ff.

[32] That is, so far as clothes serve to protect the whole body (against cold or other dangerous outer stimuli) rather than as a magical protection of the genitals.

[33] *Papers on Pyscho-Analysis*, 3rd Edition.

as womb-symbols. It is true that evidence for this symbolism is not as yet forthcoming in anything like the abundance of that in favour of the phallic significance of clothes. Nevertheless, there are various considerations which indicate that the expectation of such symbolism is far from being altogether unjustified. In the first place there exists among those who have written on clothes a strong tendency to compare the functions of clothing with the functions of the house or room—and these latter, as we know, are among the most important of womb-symbols. Clothing and houses are both protections to the body, though situated at different distances from it. Our outdoor wraps are indeed a definite substitute for the house, when we leave its protecting shelter. But the same applies to the bed, again a recognized womb symbol, and in English we stress this similarity by speaking of our sheets and blankets as ' bed-clothes '. Róheim [34] has already argued that both certain temples and certain priestly vestments symbolise the universe, and through this the womb. ' Like buildings ', he says, ' we frequently find cloaks and garments which symbolize the universe. . . . This is quite evidently derived from the state of the embryo : enveloped in the amnion like a cloak, the cloak forming the limits of the universe '. In another communication he refers to other ritual garments definitely spoken of respectively as the ' caul ' and the ' womb ' of dominion.[35] When Odysseus landed on the Island of the Phæacians, an episode which v. Winterstein [36] has shewn to be a variant of ' the myth of the birth of the hero ', he is carried ashore on a garment—the veil of Leucothea—which here replaces the basket, boat or other receptacle, which elsewhere in this myth symbolizes the womb. Quite recently too, Löwitsch in a striking paper [37] has endeavoured to shew that the symbolism of architecture is sometimes predominantly phallic, sometimes predominantly uterine, sometimes a

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[34] ' Primitive Man and Environment,' this JOURNAL, 1921, II, p. 162.

[35] ' In the Satapatha Brahmana, when the king is invested with the garment called tarpya, the officiant says : " Thou art the inner caul of dominion ". Then he puts on a second garment, saying " Thou art the outer caul of dominion ". Then he causes him to be born from what is the outer caul of dominion. He then throws over the mantle with : " Thou art the womb of dominion ". He then causes him to be born from the womb of dominion '. From a paper read to the International Folklore Congress, 1928.

[36] ' Die Nausikaaepisode in der Odysee ', *Imago*, 1920, vi, p. 349.

[37] ' Raumempfinden und Moderne Baukunst ', *Imago*, 1928, xiv, p. 293.

mixture of the two in varying proportions ; and has indicated that the same oscillation and conflict may be found in the changing fashions of clothes,[38] the present tendency lying in the direction of an accentuation of the phallic aspects. Just as we tend in other respects to seek regression to the womb in time of stress and difficulty, so also it would appear that many tend to feel the need of more or warmer garments when depressed, worried, frightened, home-sick, lonely or unloved.[39] But by far the most striking and direct equation between a protecting garment and the protecting love of a woman with which I am acquainted comes from the writer of the most celebrated of all books on clothes ; in a letter to Lord Houghton, speaking of his dead wife, Carlyle said, ' she wrapped me round like a cloak, to keep all the hard and cold world off me '.[40]

The three classes of symbols with which we have dealt—the phallic, the vaginal, and the uterine—would seem to form between them the unconscious foundations of the conscious motives of modesty, protection and display which writers on clothes are agreed to regard as the three primary functions of dress.

All these motives, both the conscious ones and the unconscious tendencies that underlie them—lead to some form of enjoyment of, or satisfaction in, dress. But these various satisfactions are not achieved without conflict. The conflicts which centre round dress would seem to be of two main kinds, though in the last resort the distinction is a physical rather than a psychological one. There are in the first place conflicts between the various kinds of clothes-satisfactions themselves. Thus, as Löwitsch has suggested, there may sometimes be a struggle between the phallic and the uterine significance of clothes—two tendencies which do not easily permit of satisfaction through a compromise. In many ways independent of this, there is the more obvious struggle between the tendencies to display (whose foundations are probably in most cases phallic) and the tendencies to modesty (which can most easily ally themselves with unconscious uterine symbolism).

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[38] Op. cit., p. 308.

[39] When the question ' Are there any circumstances (other than temperature) or states of mind in which you feel the need of more clothes than you usually wear ? ' was put to a class of fifty students, twenty-four gave replies of this kind. I am much indebted to Miss Eve Macaulay for this information.

[40] Quoted in *One Thousand Beautiful Things*, edited by Arthur Mee, p. 37.

The varying fortunes of these struggles can, to some extent, be studied in the successive changes of fashion.

Psychologically continuous with this last conflict is the struggle between modesty and the more primitive forms of exhibitionism connected with exposure of the naked body (instead of in its displaced form connected with striking or beautiful clothing). This leads us to the second class of conflicts which centre round clothes: conflicts which are fought out, not between the various motives and satisfactions of clothing itself, but between all or any of these motives and certain other motives which oppose themselves to the wearing of any clothes at all. These latter motives may be classified into two main groups—the narcissistic (exhibitionistic) and the auto-erotic. As regards the first group, nothing need be added here to the penetrating and detailed study of Rank,[41] who has admirably brought out the exquisite ambivalence manifested in the mental attitude to clothes, the repressed exhibitionistic tendencies manifesting themselves through the very objects which are used to frustrate them.

A few words may be said, however, in conclusion about the auto-erotic elements and their conflicts with the chief forms of clothes satisfaction, as these have received comparatively little attention from psycho-analysts. The auto-erotic elements concerned would seem to be chiefly of two kinds, those connected with the skin and the muscles respectively.[42] The pleasures that are undoubtedly to be derived from the stimulation of the skin by wind and sun and from the sensations accompanying muscular contraction [43]—these pleasures are necessarily dulled by clothing, particularly by stiff or heavy clothing. Hence the satisfactions afforded by clothing are obtained at the cost of some sacrifice of these skin and muscle pleasures, and persons in whom the capacity for these latter pleasures is well developed will not easily reconcile themselves to this sacrifice. Hence there are some persons

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[41] 'Die Nacktheit in Sage und Dichtung', *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung*, p. 177.

[42] Sadger's work on 'Haut, Schleimhaut und Muskelerotik', *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische Forschungen*, 1912, iii, p. 525, still seems to be the most important contribution to this somewhat neglected field.

[43] In the replies to a questionnaire recently sent out by myself such phrases as 'heavenly', 'immensely enjoyable', 'air currents mean vitality', 'like breathing in happiness', with reference to sensory pleasure of this kind are by no means rare.

who throughout life retain some of the original hostility to clothes that is probably felt by all young children ; they never learn to sublimate their exhibitionistic interests on to clothes, the strength of their cutaneous and muscular auto-erotism tending to produce a fixation of exhibitionistic tendencies upon the actual body.[44] To such persons the more positive satisfactions of clothing remain but little known ; clothes are to them instruments of oppression put into operation either (in the case of the more open rebels) by the dictates of society or (in the case of those whose super-ego has taken over the functions of society in this matter) by the sense of modesty or the sense of duty ; for at a higher level the ideals of work and duty may become firmly associated with certain kinds of dress—especially dress of a stiff and unyielding variety. The struggle here is entirely between the exhibitionistic and auto-erotic constituents of the joy of nakedness, upon the one hand, and the repressive forces opposed to these, upon the other.

In other cases, however, the pleasures connected with nakedness may conflict also with the more positive and deep-lying satisfactions in clothes that we have studied in the earlier part of this paper. It is clear, for instance, that in some persons the desire to throw off clothing as an impediment to freedom and enjoyment is closely connected with the uterine significance of clothes. To get free of clothes may thus serve as a symbolic expression of the need to become independent of the protecting, but, if excessive, hampering and paralysing love of the mother. Mothers always tend to express their anxiety for the welfare of their children by seeing that they are adequately, often indeed more than adequately clothed ; and children in their turn express their need to free themselves from the trammels of mother-fixation by the rebellious throwing off of garments. Such throwing off becomes indeed a gesture of individual independence and of the defiance of parental authority. But it is interesting to note that, even when carried to extremes, the mother is not lost thereby. As the literature of the ' Nacktkultur ' movement in Germany clearly shews, the lost

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[44] The real difficulties of development that may arise in connection with the restraint of movement (and of the expression of affect thereby) through tight clothing in young children are vividly brought out in a case described by Landauer, ' Die kindliche Bewegungsunruhe '. *Int. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1926, xii, pp. 287–288. Cf. also Chadwick, ' The Psychological Dangers of Tight Clothing in Childhood ', *National Health*, 1926, XVIII.

human mother is found again in a more ample and satisfying form in Mother Nature.[45]

With others, however, the chief conflict may be between the satisfactions of nakedness on the one hand and of sartorial phallicism on the other. The full gratification to be obtained from the phallic significance of clothes can often only be obtained when the pressure of clothes is distinctly felt—felt even to the extent of creating some degree of discomfort. But, in the words of a man who has through analysis obtained insight into his own condition, ' these tightnesses and stiffnesses are all *discomforts* gladly suffered for the sake of an *idea* '—the idea, that is, of ' having a continuous erection '. But ' at the same time ', he adds, ' to be in a loose, soft silk garment is my idea of *real* physical comfort '[46]; also he considers that he grows ' better-looking ' with every garment he takes off. In this case, which (except for the self-knowledge) seems to be typical of many, the narcissistic and auto-erotic elements concerned continue to oppose the expressions of the phallic symbolism to which they have been sacrificed.

Thus it would appear that the conflicts connected with the wearing of clothes may be both numerous and complex—tending to create in many persons a highly ambivalent attitude towards dress. Not only are there certain strong and perhaps inevitable antagonisms between the various satisfactions and reaction-formations that find expression in clothes, but the mere fact of wearing clothes at all occasions certain conflicts on its own account. Furthermore, it is often a matter of the degree of fixation or displacement that determines whether particular tendencies (e.g. those entering into exhibitionism) find themselves ranged on one side or the other of the conflict. Fully to understand the dynamic relationships involved in a man's attitude to the garments he wears would carry us far towards a knowledge of his whole psychological development.

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[45] E.g. ' only utter nakedness truly unites us for the first time with Nature '. Surén, *Man and Sunlight*, p. 107.

[46] Italics in the original.

THE MYTH OF THE BARNACLE GOOSE

BY

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The Barnacle Goose is a species of wild fowl found in the Arctic seas and visiting the British coasts in winter. The breeding place of this bird was long unrecognized and an interesting myth grew up to explain its origin, which, like all myths, bears a peculiar relation to unconscious phantasy.

The myth is quoted by many writers from the eleventh century onwards and has various forms. The bird was said to be produced from the fruit of a tree growing by the seashore; or from the tree itself, after the exudation of a 'viscous humour'; or from a shell-fish growing on rotting timber on the hulks of ships or elsewhere.

Geraldus Cambrensis,[1] in 1187, gives the following account. He says: 'There are in this place many birds which are called Bernacæ. Nature produces them against nature in the most extraordinary way—they are produced from fir timber tossed along the sea, and are at first like gum. Afterwards they hang down by their beaks as if they were a seaweed attached to the timber, and are surrounded by shells in order to grow more freely. Having thus in process of time been clothed with a strong coat of feathers, they either fall into the water or fly freely away into the air. They derive their food and growth from the sap of the wood or from the sea, by a secret and most wonderful process of alimentation. . . . They do not breed, and lay eggs, like other birds, nor do they ever hatch any eggs, nor do they seem to build nests in any corner of the earth. Hence Bishops and religious men in some parts of Ireland do not scruple to dine off these birds at the time of fasting, because they are not flesh nor born of flesh. . . . But in so doing they are led into sin. For if anyone were to eat of the leg of our first parent (Adam) although he was not born of flesh, that person could not be adjudged innocent of eating meat'.

Alexander Neckam,[2] writing in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, gives this account: 'the bird, which is commonly called bernekke, takes its origin from pinewood which has been steeped for a long time in the sea. From the surface of the wood exudes a certain viscous humour, which in course of time assumes the form of a

[1] E. Heron-Allen, *Barnacles in Nature and in Myth*, p. 11.

[2] Ibid., p. 10

little bird clothed in feathers, and it is seen to hang by its beak from the wood. This bird is eaten by the less discreet in times of fasting because it is not produced by maternal incubation from an egg '.

The shell-fish or barnacle, which appears in many forms of the myth, and from which the goose takes its name, belongs to the species *Lepas anatifera* (goose-bearer). Class: *Crustacea.* Sub-class: *Cirripedia,* on account of the plumose appendages with which the animals sweep the water in search of food. Having passed through two larval stages in which it is mobile, the barnacle presses its head on a selected spot, and cements itself to the timber, and rapidly grows two hard calcareous plates, which open and shut upon a basal hinge.

In Heron-Allen's book, *Barnacles in Nature,* [3] the following description is given: ' In the case of the stalked barnacle, as soon as the cypris has attached itself to its selected log, or other means of conveyance about the world, by the antennulæ or suckers, the pliable tube forms itself between the creature and the point of attachment, to a length of one to three inches, by which it hangs, swaying to and fro in the water, and forming the neck of the goose in the Myth. . . . The barnacles are normally hermaphrodite, depending upon no collaboration for the reproduction of their species '.

The history of the myth does not begin with the records of the eleventh century, for M. Frédéric Houssay [4] described (in 1895) the representations of a ' barnaculized goose ' upon Mycenæan pottery. He says: ' I concluded that the animals which were accurately delineated had frequently been seen, whilst the others had not, either because they were rare in the region, or perhaps rather because they did not really exist at all. This second alternative seemed to me to be the correct view, when my attention was arrested by a sort of bird, a goose or duck, the representation of which gives us a strange mixture of the real and the impossible (see the Ossuary of Crete). All the specimens (of birds) painted upon this Ossuary have the same form, but no two of them have the same plumage, which would seem to suggest that the artist had not known, had not been able, or had not dared to delineate these mysterious creatures too precisely. Furthermore, each of these animals has on its back two small appendages, improbable if we regard them as the wings of birds, but almost rigor-

[3] E. Heron-Allen, *Barnacles in Nature and in Myth,* p. 7.

[4] Ibid., p. 109.

ously exact, as to position and form, if one sees them as the appendages of a barnacle, the cirripede crustacean which one finds, as a rule, attached to floating logs. There are those, no doubt, who will ask themselves how figured forms, which, whilst they present peculiar features, on the whole represent birds, can suggest the idea of a crustacean, which is after all little known.

'It is because there is precisely a legend, which has reached us from a nebulous antiquity adown the ages, familiar to those who have interested themselves in the history of ideas concerning spontaneous generation, and which sets forth at length that the barnacle goose is born of the barnacle (*Lepas anatifera*), the crustacean in question. There is no doubt in my mind that I had before me, if not the origin, at any rate an early version of this peculiarly persistent legend, which exists to the present day among the fishermen of our coasts. I seemed even to understand, in contemplating these drawings, how an interpretation apparently so fantastic had come into being: birds in general appearance, barnacles in detail. I asked myself whether the animals thus represented had merely been selected on account of their beauty or strangeness, or whether they had not established their position, as explanatory phenomena in some more or less confused theory concerning the origin of life? In a word, were not the decorators of Mycenæ always symbolists, even when they appeared to be most realistic'?

The essential points of the myth may be summarized as follows. Owing to the fact that the breeding-place of certain kinds of wild geese was in the Arctic regions, and therefore not accessible or visible to mankind, a stimulus was given to the formulation of an unnatural theory of procreation, which was partially determined by a superficial resemblance in form between the supposed progenitor and its offspring.

The result of the exploitation of the myth by the early Christian Church was that the goose was no longer considered to be flesh, and could be eaten on fasting days. It has been suggested that the fact that the same myth is portrayed on the pottery of the Mycenæ about 1200 B.C. makes it possible that the Church was cognizant of this early myth, and was induced by the pressure of instinctual demands to employ it as a means of obtaining licence from prohibition. The psycho-analyst does not hesitate to link together the two myths, but the existence of conscious knowledge is not a necessary concomitant of this view, for the unconscious determinants of the myth are present in

all ages, and when the need is sufficiently great the myth is 're-born'.

The symbolism of the paintings referred to by Houssay can be interpreted with the aid of psycho-analysis. There is not space in this article to do more than emphasize the bisexual significance of all the 'motifs' employed, which follow closely the forms of the goose and of the barnacle. The symbolism of the barnacle of the later (medieval) version of the myth is apparently both genital and pregenital; the curved shells of the barnacles which open to emit the plumose appendages are symbolic of the female genitals, whilst the stalk and appendages are phallic symbols. The goose with its long sinewy neck, curved-shaped body and webbed feet bears a superficial resemblance in form to the barnacle itself, and suggests a reduplication of the same symbolism. In this connection it is interesting to note that the most striking paintings are found on the Ossuary from Crete, on which the barnacle geese are depicted as rising from the leaves of a nautical plant of a conventional design. The symbolism of an Ossuary, a receptacle for bones (female genitals containing the father's penis), falls in line with that of the birds. But the symbolism is obviously not exclusively genital, and most of the accounts of the myth describe the exudation of a viscous humour or gum from the tree or log, before the barnacle or bird appears; further the barnacles are always attached to rotten and decaying wood, suggesting that an excremental substance was the precursor of the barnacle or goose.

Sir Ray Lankester [5] says in *The Diversions of a Naturalist* that in earlier centuries 'it was held to be a matter of common observation and certainty that all sorts of living things are spontaneously generated by slime, by sea foam, by mud, and by decomposing dead bodies of animals and trees.'

Shakespeare speaks of the same belief—
The Queen in *Hamlet* (Act III, Sec. 4), says :—

> 'And, as the sleeping soldiers in the alarm,
> Your bedded hair, like life in excrements,
> Starts up, and stands on end.'

Briefly we can recognize, therefore, two different aspects of the myth : (1) The unconscious bisexual significance of the symbolism of the barnacle and the barnacle goose. (2) The conscious phantasy of spontaneous generation which is derived from the omnipotent

[5] Sir Ray Lankester, *Diversions of a Naturalist*, p. 125.

phantasies of the pregenital, anal and oral levels of psychological development.

In both the Mycenæan and medieval versions of the myth the sea plays a constant part. The goose-bearing tree is nautical, and the barnacles are attached to trees growing on the edge of the sea, or on ships. The sea, ships and trees are mother-symbols, so that it is clear that the mother motif must be represented, albeit unconsciously, special emphasis being laid on the fixity of the situation. The barnacle is *fixed* to ship, log, etc.

We can see that the belief in the spontaneous generation of the goose from the barnacle was the essential conscious factor in the myth when we glance at the outcome of the legend, which was the granting of a licence by the Church to break the Lenten fast. The goose might be eaten because it was not flesh, owing to the supposition that it had been born without fertilization.

At the time during which the myth was accepted, we find another use of the word ' goose ', combined with another lifting of a prohibition. The term ' goose ' was in use for a prostitute, and also for a form of venereal disease. A common term was the ' Winchester Goose ', which referred to prostitutes who lived in houses in Winchester licensed by the Bishop of Winchester. The *English Gazetteer* (1778) says, ' In the times of popery there were no less than 18 houses on the Bankside, licensed by the Bishops of Winchester, to keep whores, who were therefore commonly called Winchester Geese.' The New English Dictionary—under goose—has :

Goose or Winchester goose—a certain venereal disorder. Hence a prostitute.

If we compare the characteristics of the prostitute and the barnacle, first from a superficial point of view, we see that they are both parasitic, being attached to a host to which they do not belong. The prostitute has no parents or family ; she belongs to and is dependent on the community, but is not of it. The barnacle goose is spontaneously created, and has therefore no parents.

Freud has directed our attention to the relation between the incest taboo and the customs of primitive races and the origin and formulation of religious practices. In *Totem and Taboo* [6] he gives an account of the Arunta tribe, who did not recognize the fatherhood of their children and thought a spirit entered into the woman and pro-

[6] Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, p. 190.

duced conception. The refusal to recognize the relation between copulation and conception was accompanied by a licence to eat the totem of the tribe and to copulate with the women of the tribe.

The Mycenæ, who illustrated the myth in their paintings, worshipped Aphrodite, the Greek goddess of love, and believed she was born from the foam of the sea. Her myth and cult were primarily Semitic, but she soon became Hellenized. The Oriental Aphrodite was worshipped as the bestower of all animal and vegetable fruitfulness. This worship became degraded by religious prostitution, and in this connection there appeared an idea of a divinity half-male, half-female, uniting in itself the active and passive functions. The Eastern Aphrodite was related to the sea and the element of moisture, and has been described as representing the fructifying power of water.

If we turn from the myth to the psychology of the individual who is compelled by his unconscious to seek sexual gratification from a prostitute, and who is not able to regard other women as possible sexual love-objects, we find a splitting of the mother-imago, as described by Freud and others, into an ideal and a degraded mother-imago. Where object-love has developed sufficiently to allow considerable reaction-formation, we find in consciousness an ideal mother-imago, comparable to the Virgin Mary conception, and a tendency to the adoption of a rôle of asceticism, united with a saving-phantasy, which covers an unconscious Christos identification. The repressed mother-imago is a degraded impersonal conception, usually identified with food and excrement, and the unconscious erotic and hostile phantasies are expressed in oral terms.

The degraded mother-imago is the prostitute-mother, and what this conception signifies exactly is most easily seen by studying the extreme case of the man whose sexuality is wholly enslaved by prostitutes, and who has not advanced sufficiently to object-love to have achieved much stable reaction-formation. The psychological relationship between such a man and the degraded feminine figure is in no way an object-relationship.

It is well illustrated by the dream of a patient who was working through this phase of his illness. He dreamt that he was given sour milk and wished to make a pancake of it, which could be used as an aperient. In association he said that there was a saying in the country that if milk were put under a marriage-bed it was butter in the morning. ' Pancake ' was a slang term for cows' dung. Prostitutes were called cows. A cowshed was a brothel. A further association was to a

certain author who was a genius and was said to live on pancakes. The wish expressed in the dream was to eat a substance resulting from copulation, that is something containing both mother and father elements. He brought a large number of dreams of eating animals, and parts of animals, which were identified with the mother and parts of her body, including the unborn child and the penis of the father. The parents were continually identified with fæces.

During this time he had conscious phantasies of perverse sexual play with prostitutes, in which rôles were reversible, and it was clear that his identification with the prostitute was a very close one. The degraded woman was plainly a projection of the introjected mother and father's penis, and the condition indicated a regression to the stage of narcissism characterized by the auto-erotism of the infantile masturbatory period; the component-instincts and pregenital zones were in the ascendancy. This regression evaded the two great fears arising in connection with the Œdipus complex, namely, the fear of castration and the fear of separation.

The depersonalization of the parents, with incorporation and the regression to the stage of omnipotence, appear to be the outstanding features of this psychological state. The libido is withdrawn from the objects and has returned to the ego, while the ego (in an extreme case such as I was referring to) remains relatively undifferentiated, persisting as the pleasure-ego of infancy. The introjection and depersonalization of the mother appears to be more complete and overwhelming than that of the father, who is represented by the penis in the mother or the child in the mother. The relative impossibility of exposing hostility to the father hides a greater fear.

I have said that the term 'goose' or 'Winchester goose' was applied equally to venereal disease, so that prostitute and disease are identified. In the case I have already discussed, venereal disease was associated with a pregnancy-phantasy; the enlargement of the prostate was the head of the child; the treatment of the disease, which included prostatic massage per rectum, stimulated passive homosexual phantasies. Freud states in his paper 'The Taboo of Virginity'[7] that man dreads becoming infected with woman's femininity. The fear is a form of castration fear, the castrator being the mother. In my case it was linked up with the fear and hostility excited by the mother's frequent pregnancies, and the association of these with her physical

[7] Freud, 'Taboo and Virginity', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 224.

sexual differences and with the part played by the father in producing them ; there were dreams of robbing and injuring the pregnant mother and the unborn children. It appeared that venereal disease represented a degradation and destruction of the pregnancies ; just as the identification of the woman with excreta and the anal tract represented a degradation and destruction (in the sense of depersonalization) of the mother-imago.

Before the knowledge of the existence of venereal disease is acquired, the fear and hostility is focussed on substances which can displace the omnipotent father and be capable of causing life (procreation) or death (castration) ; these are blood, urine, fæces, flatus, breath, milk, semen. Actually they supply the concrete terms of expression for the oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic wishes arising in the omnipotent stage of infantile development, and bear witness to the strength of instinctual tension in the id, and the weakness of the real ego.

Apart from his identification with the prostitute, there are other ways in which she protects a man from his infantile fears in connection with the Œdipus complex. The fear of the father is decreased by identification with the other men who visit her. It was not until the brothers banded together that they killed the father of the horde. A modification of the same idea is in operation here ; the fear of the woman's revenge for defloration is avoided by the fact that others have gone before, and the fact that the woman is owned by no one man means that the possessive right of the father has been overcome. There is an Irish superstition that ringworm (*Tinea Tonsurans*) can be cured by a glance of the seventh son born in succession. At the birth of the seventh son the midwife must put a worm in the palm of the hand of the infant, and he destroys it ; then the boy can cure ringworm by looking at the disease. Reinforced by the strength of the masculine line, he can overcome the power of castration which is the prerogative of the parents. By killing the worm he symbolically destroys the father's penis.

Another superstition is that disease can be got rid of in the following way. A rag is put in contact with the infected person, and then thrown away ; whoever picks up the rag will take the disease, and the original sufferer will be cured. In a dream my patient saw a purse containing money, an infected rag and a live animal ; he was afraid of picking up the purse because of the rag. The purse stood for a prostitute, and the above superstitition was given as an association to the dream. The prostitute is infected, and the infection passes from one man to

another *viâ* the prostitute. There is doubtless an unconscious homosexual phantasy attached to the transmitting function of the prostitute ; and at the same time this particular form of it illustrates well the hostile wish towards the man which accompanies the passive homosexual attitude. The man identifies with the mother partly because he regards her as the castrator, and therefore he may retain his revenge phantasy against the father.

The barnacle myth in 1200 B.C., when Aphrodite was worshipped, was not produced under the same ban as in the Middle Ages, but it is interesting to note that it was again in relation to religious practices that the degraded form of the cult grew up. The Church of the Middle Ages idealized woman as a mother, and degraded her as a sexual love-object. The idealized mother is never without the son, and therefore there is no fear of separation ; oral possession appears to be sanctioned, but only at the expense of a subsequent sacrifice of a victim, which the Christos identification depicts. It is of interest to note that parthenogenic and prostitution phantasies have been described by Helene Deutsch as typical feminine pubertal phantasies, and we meet with the prostitution phantasy in a large number of women's analyses. The striking feature in them is the strength of the hostile wish in relation to the man, which is covered by the prostitution phantasy ; this corresponds to the aggressive wish which is concealed in the man's passive homosexual attitude.

In conclusion I would affirm that the barnacle, the barnacle goose and the prostitute represent the projection of the oral fixation of the individual who, driven by the strength of instinctual demands on the one hand and the fear of separation and castration on the other, regresses wholly or partially to pregenital levels and attempts to regain the lost objects by incorporation of a united father and mother imago. The aggressive and hostile wishes as well as the possessive erotic desires are more obviously concerned with a degraded mother-imago, but this imago appears to be a combined parental prototype.

The fact that the barnacle, which was thought to have aphrodisiac properties, and the barnacle goose could be eaten, and that prostitutes were licensed, is indicative on the one hand of the strength of the condemnation from the super-ego represented by the Church (the degradation and isolation were so great that there was no need to preserve or protect) and, on the other hand, of the strength of the repressed needs of man under the ban of renunciation. The idealized mother-imago is

also isolated, but the communal reaction is one of common renunciation and not of common possession.

No attempt has been made to cover the ground of the important subject of the psychology of prostitution, as only one aspect of it has been brought forward in relation to the myth.

I wish to thank a literary friend for drawing my attention to the myth and supplying me with the necessary historical data.

SUBMUCOUS RESECTION AS A CASTRATION SYMBOL [1]

BY

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The physiological and pathological relationship between the nose and the sexual apparatus has been noticed from time to time in recent years, and there seems little doubt that certain processes in the sexual sphere, such as menstruation, sexual excesses and excitements, may produce a congestion of the nasal mucous membranes. The initial work of Fliess,[2] in 1897, on the inter-relationship of the nose and the female genital organs, which he claimed was limited to the nasal mucosa of the tuberculum septi and the anterior portion of the inferior turbinates, has been corroborated by numerous other investigators. Emil Mayer,[3] in 1913, summarized the previous work and reported the successful treatment of dysmenorrhœa in young women by the application of trichloracetic acid to the genital spots of the nose. Hubert,[4] in a study of the involuntary nerve supply to the nose, notes the previous investigations indicating a connection between the nose and the female genitalia, but he believes that suggestion accounts for the improvement of dysmenorrhœa through nasal treatment. Hubert's position implies that painful pelvic conditions in women may be removed by suggestive therapy, but he does not intimate why the nose should be the organ of predilection for such therapeutic influence. In psycho-analytic literature, the symbolic significance of the nose as a phallic substitute is common, and this unconscious psychological association, in reinforcing whatever physiological basis exists, may account for the efficacy of physical therapy.

From the symbolic side, I would refer to the work of a well-known theologian, the Rev. Laurence Sterne, in whose ever-fresh *Tristram Shandy* the phallic symbolism of the nose is very clear.[5]

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[1] Read in part before the fifteenth annual meeting of the American Psycho-Analytic Association at Cincinnati, Ohio, May 31, 1927; in part before the New York Neurological Society, January 4, 1929.

[2] Fliess: *The Relationship of the Nose and the Female Genitalia*, Leipsic, 1897.

[3] Mayer, Emil: *Journal of A.M.A.*, Vol. LXII, 1912, p. 6; also Brettauer, J.: *Journ. of Surg., Gyn. and Obstet.*, Vol. XVII, 1913, p. 382.

[4] Hubert, Louis: *Laryngoscopy*, St. Louis, Vol. XVII, July, 1922, p. 506.

[5] *Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*, Vol. II, Chap. XXXI.

A patient, whom we shall call Tim O'Brien, aged twenty-four, came to me in September, 1924, after an attempt at suicide by drinking about 2 ounces of iodine, which he threw well back into his throat because he was ' desperate and wished to make sure it would all go down in one swallow.' His older brother found him, and the patient asked forgiveness for the sin he had committed in attempting to take his life, sobbed that he could endure it no longer and blurted out, ' It's sex, it's all sex.' The brother rushed him to a nearby hospital, where he recovered in a few days. He had seriously contemplated suicide by drowning, at the age of nineteen, when he had voluntarily discontinued his studies at one of the Catholic colleges where he was preparing for the priesthood, in order to enter business. Already at that time his sexual difficulties determined this decision, for he reasoned that sexuality had no place in the life of a student, and especially none in a prospective Catholic theologian. His immediate suicidal attempt, therefore, had not been reached as a result of a sudden overwhelming impulse, but as a consequence of a psychic struggle beginning many years before and ' almost continuous reflection over his intolerable personal situation day and night for a period of three months '.

At the time of his first visit, while in a deep depression but not inaccessible, he explained that he had gradually become utterly hopeless over long-existing and insolvable sexual problems, which had culminated in impotence when he had finally attempted intercourse, at the age of twenty-two with a woman of thirty-five or more, and which had recurred with every subsequent attempt with her. His difficulty in coitus depended upon the very unusual circumstance that at each approach to a woman he became afflicted with an uncontrollable compulsion to sniffle and with the onset of the sniffling his erection disappeared.

Aside from this urgent and disconcerting symptom, he suffered from the feeling that his face and entire personality had undergone a complete alteration as the result of a surgically successful submucous resection of the nasal septum, which had been performed at the age of twenty-three because of a sensation of obstruction at the bridge of the nose. He thought that he had now lost his sexual appeal, inasmuch as his flattened nose gave his entire countenance a tough, coarse appearance, and that refined, gentle women, whom he had always considered far more passionate than common, low-born girls, such as waitresses and servants, could not be attracted by a rough-looking man, but suc-

cumbed to men with straight, firm-looking noses. If he could inspire air without making a noise or attracting attention, that is without sniffling, the erections would continue firm, but any audible nasal sound induced flaccidity of the penis and bulging of the stomach.

Since the age of nineteen he had been bashful about blowing his nose in public, especially at the dinner-table, and four years prior to the suicidal attempt, while at a party of boys and girls, he felt forced to leave the room to blow his nose when mucus appeared. Although other rooms were near at hand he sought the bath-room, because he felt such a secluded place was more appropriate for the act. Since about the same age, that is eighteen or nineteen, he had been afflicted with an embarrassing frequency of micturition, often four times in an hour and more marked when in female company. Here, too, he shewed unusual bashfulness in that he always wished to prevent anyone hearing him urinate. Of late years he noticed that when his sniffling increased in intensity the urgency of urination diminished very perceptibly, and about the same time a fear developed that he might urinate during intercourse should he ever be able to perform it.

Although the patient did not disclose the real reason of his desire for an operation to the rhinologist, it lay in his theory that an obstruction in the nasal passage prevented sufficient air from reaching his lungs and circulation, thereby impoverishing the quality of his blood. He had reasoned that better aeration would improve his blood and better blood would in turn produce better erections and better semen. Thus after repeated humiliating fiascos with the middle-aged woman already mentioned, submucous resection became imperative as a remedy. Soon after the operation, as a solace, he began to smoke very expensive cigars excessively, eight or ten a day, which was his practice when he first visited me. However, after the resection, the sniffling became infinitely worse than it had ever been before and life a veritable torture.

Tim O'Brien was born as the youngest child of an Irish-American working-man's family consisting, besides the parents, of one brother four years older and a sister six years older than himself.

The father, a steady, plodding boiler-room helper who has held the same position for forty years, always displayed profound deference for Catholic ecclesiastics and has been a disproportionately liberal contributor to church undertakings, noticeably attempting to ingratiate himself with the Sisters. The patient has always regarded him as a

handsome man with an intelligent expression and particularly straight, strong nose.

Tim has always considered his mother far more refined than other women of her environment and station, but in his youth felt that if she had been a truly good woman she should have entered a convent. She has spent her entire life in cheerfully drudging for the family, and in the patient's words ' is more religious than the nuns themselves '. The patient knows that he was especially loved as an infant and that his mother nursed him at the breast for seventeen months. She attempted to keep him babyish as long as possible and he wore curls to an age far beyond that customary in the Irish tenements. Throughout boyhood he longed to be alone with his mother, and even up to the age of nineteen he persuaded her to allow him to lie in her bed under the covers, so that he could press his face against her bosom.

He first became vitally and specifically interested in religion at the age of seven when he went to eight o'clock Saturday mass, but at eight years, the night before he intended to make his first communion and confession, sex thoughts flooded his mind. About this time he began to play church, using a ' big book for the missal, a celery-holder for the chalice, and a white petticoat for the surplice.' However, not until the age of eleven did he begin to feel ashamed of his solitary game, even though he had long realized that none of his boy companions indulged in anything similar.

His religious interest and intellectual precocity from earliest childhood evoked the undivided approbation of both parents. He became an altar boy, proud of his position and zealous in the performance of his ritual duties. However, on a Friday or Wednesday during Lent, when he carried the straight, short hand-cross, he would fancy that to make the ceremony more impressive and arouse the congregation to a greater pitch of religious fervour and reverence, some one should have dressed in a loose, flowing robe with a crown of thorns about his head, to march sombrely down the church aisle with a huge cross over his shoulder. This individual of his fancies should be none other than the patient himself, and as he passed along all the girls in the pews would whisper in awed veneration, ' there goes Timmy O'Brien.' The patient always prayed three-quarters of an hour or an hour, looking at the face of the Blessed Mother until his neck actually ached from the strain of gazing upward. He said only a perfunctory prayer for a moment at the altar of St. Joseph. He neglected almost completely the Blessed

Sacrament centre altar, even though it is considered by Catholics in general of far greater importance than the two side altars.

At thirteen he entered the preparatory school of a Catholic college. About this time he began to experience feelings of anxiety which he called a nervous breakdown, and his first embitterment toward God developed, for he felt that God was forsaking him in the struggle of life although he had been a ' cracker-jack altar boy ' and had the sincere intention of becoming a devout priest. Thereupon he left the school and obtained a position with a hardware house where he has been employed ever since, and at the time of the suicidal attempt he had advanced steadily from office-boy to assistant head of an important department at an unusually large salary for one of his age.

One of the patient's earliest recollections of a sex nature dates back to the age of five when a girl about sixteen years old used to stroke and pinch his cheeks. He is certain that this attention caused an erection and also a pleasurable sensation because he felt himself to be in her power. Shortly thereafter, when the children ' played school ' and an older girl acted as school-teacher, the patient would intentionally make some infraction upon the school-play rules, such as walking out of line, for the express purpose of inducing the girl to pinch his cheeks. He says that the agreeable thought at this time was, ' I am so small and she is so big and powerful and wonderful '.

An incident which developed into a far-reaching and intensive determinant of the patient's entire sex life is distinctly remembered by him and is placed at the age of five. On a rainy day his mother had taken him shopping, and as they were returning home he trudged wearily behind her. They entered a subway station and as she pulled him along his nose reached the level of her rectum, from which an odour, peculiar but distinctly associated in his mind with fæces, came to him through her damp skirts. It caused a warm, pleasant glow in the genitals—possibly even an erection. Soon thereafter he began a game—' playing praying '—which seems to have been instigated by the subway experience. He longed for a repetition of the agreeable sensation discovered during the subway episode and noticed that after his mother had remained seated for a long time on a plush covered arm-chair a rectal odour lingered on the plush, which could best be smelled if he knelt. Mother's favourite plush chair became his prayer altar and he would loiter around the room until she had arisen, when he would begin to ' play church ', during which he would smell the plush, kiss it and lick it with his tongue in wild excitement. If his

mother happened to return to the room she found little Tim innocently kneeling, his hands in a position of virtuous supplication, playing church, a game which she warmly approved with all the kindliness of her pious and indulgent nature. But the game contained an element of anxiety, for little Tim had already developed a sense of guilt in connection with this wicked church game. He would peer anxiously on either side of the arm-chair to forestall detection should his mother unexpectedly return to the room—changing instantaneously from a position of sensuality to one of sanctimony.

When one of the Sisters, in the parochial school he attended, would pause to sit on a school-desk in her rounds of the classroom, the patient experienced erections. At ten or eleven he developed the habit of sniffling—which became something of a tic or compulsion and continued with increasing severity up to the time of analysis. He regarded the tic as a practice disgusting and offensive to all people, and because of his powerlessness to curb it felt that he must keep his distance from all women, as the sniffling would repel them.

Although the boys in the street of the tenement neighbourhood had early informed him that intercourse always preceded the birth of a child, he steadfastly scoffed at the idea. Finally, at the age of twelve, when some of the boys again taunted him for his naive incredulity, he became convinced of the truth of this unbelievable fact. Overwhelmed with emotion, he rushed home at once, locked himself in the bath-room and sobbed bitterly for an hour. A sacred illusion had been shattered.

As already mentioned, he went to bed with his mother at intervals up to the age of nineteen. While he experienced no demonstrable genital excitation while lying with her, he reasoned that his mother should have understood his plight in craving sexuality and have offered herself in intercourse to him, since she and the church were responsible for his scruples. However, he made no attempt to communicate this feeling through word or deed to his mother, but contented himself with allowing his head to rest against her breasts. Perceptible conscious interest in his mother as a sex-object waned after this discovery, at the age of twelve, of her perfidy in submitting to his father ; but the fancies of sex relations with the nuns, who after all were still surely virgins, became more frequent and animated. Never, within his memory, had he indulged in actual physical masturbation in any of its customary forms—such as manipulation, friction or pressure.

Before long he began to elaborate most vivid phantasies of being

punished by the nuns. One of the favourite of these consisted of his acting as a pony, pulling a dog-cart driven by a coarse-featured Sister, who would flog him with a whip, forcing him to run until exhaustion overcame him ; and the harder she whipped, the greater the stimulation of his sex excitement, which finally ended in a climax, the equivalent of an orgasm, although these imaginations long antedated actual ejaculations which he first experienced about the age of fourteen. Then he would fall from exhaustion, usually on the hard beach sands. No one would be around, and the Sister would urinate and defecate upon him. The general motive behind this fancied act was that now that he had been reduced to such a pitiable state, the nun finally heaped this additional cruelty upon him. Then he would, in the fancy, plunge into the ocean and the orgy ended.

Another fancy, oft repeated, gradually assumed this form. He would imagine his legs strapped to the shoulders or about the neck of a certain nun, underneath her clothes, his head dangling down so that his nose entered her rectum, and his arms tied to her legs, the whole body thus being in the position of an inverted crucifix. When she would be seated, the nose would bore deeper and deeper into the anal orifice. All this would be done under the influence of some witch because he had committed an offence of disobedience, but he nevertheless felt a sense of satisfaction when thus subjugated. The emission of flatus or odours from the nuns would increase the sex desire, and ' at times he felt he wanted to crawl right up Sister Mercedes' rectum '. If he ' were small enough to fit right in ', he felt snug and secure and if he got as far as he could expect, a ' sensation of wild ecstasy overcame him '. The feeling of intensest satisfaction was connected with the idea of his own smallness and the large size, power and capability of the woman. Not a single fancy of sex activity which bore any semblance to normal intercourse occurred until very late in life, about his twenty-second year.

' The nastier the things I conceived, the greater the pleasure. When I see a big, heavy negress, I think of going to her home. She does not think of herself as a negress, but plays the part of a tyrannical, cruel queen and I am her devoted slave. I do not have intercourse with her, but merely minister to her and serve her. Then I feel that if she would sit on my nose the gratification would be complete, especially if I could burrow into complete immersion. I would only have to be small temporarily to enter the woman, but once I'd be within her body, I could expand to normal size, my legs in her legs,

my arms in her arms, moving as she moved—that was the acme of satisfaction.'

Or he would be a slave who was treated with contempt because he had committed some infraction, often a petty offence such as not returning promptly with a package and be brutally punished for it. At the time of these fancies, which continued from the age of twelve to twenty-one, he always imagined himself as a child of seven. This inconsistency in logic caused him great annoyance, because he perceived the ridiculousness of submitting to such subjection at the hands of a woman when he had almost reached maturity. However, when he attempted to imagine himself doing these same acts as a young man, he found this fancy clashed so negatively with the propriety of reality that sex-gratification was impossible or extremely slight.

The most distressing symptom of the patient consisted in an uncontrollable sniffling occurring about fifteen times a minute in severe paroxysms, even while the patient was distracted by his ordinary occupation. It had afflicted him in its unbearable form for over a year prior to his suicidal attempt. Perhaps its most extraordinary characteristic was the disappearance of erections when he made an approach to a woman and its replacement by sniffling. After analysis had been well established, the patient himself compared the sniffling to the growl of a person who wishes to attract attention. In his own words, his sniffling was equivalent to a plea or a protest that he was susceptible to sexual excitement of which he wished the woman to take note.

In the history, the over-determination of the nose as an erotogenic zone in early childhood has, I think, been definitely established, and also the incestuous fixation on the sexual love-object—the mother. The patient's mother, however, was a particularly exalted person to the boy, even more venerable than the average mother—a woman more pious than the nuns themselves. Sexual aggression against such a person became unthinkable, but it is noteworthy that the patient, influenced by his infantile mother-fixation, in young manhood reversed the usual values held by boys in regard to sensuality—namely, that refined women were more amenable and accessible sexually than common wenches. The next step in the psychic conflict reveals the abnegation of the immediate familial attachment with its transposition to a religious counterpart of the mother—the Blessed Mother, the Virgin Mary, whom the boy at one time considered inferior to his own beloved

mother. Subsequently he further debased his love-object for sexual purposes to the rank and file of nuns, more particularly those of large, coarse features and matronly appearance. The nose, which in early infancy had assumed the function of the penis, was in turn replaced by the whole face, the head and finally the entire body became the organ for re-entry into, reunion with, the mother-substitute.

In the extremely rare phantasy of re-embodiment, already given in detail, beginning as it did with the re-activation of infantile sexual stimulation and curiosity, one finds a corroboration of one of Freud's recent postulates on the origin of anxiety.

'The conditioning of anxiety connected with loss of object goes quite a step further. So, too, the next metamorphosis of anxiety, namely, castration-anxiety, which arises in the phallic period, is a separation-anxiety and dependent on the same condition. The danger here is a threatened deprivation of the genitals. An apparently justified thought of Ferenczi permits us to clearly recognize here the line of connection with the previous purport of the danger-situation. The great narcissistic valuation of the penis may rest therein that the possession of this organ acts as a guarantee for reunion with the mother (or mother-substitute) in the act of coitus. Deprivation of this organ amounts to a repetition of the separation from the mother and entails therefore a renewal of painful tension due to a need (*Bedurfnisspannung*), namely, of being helplessly exposed as at the time of birth. This need, which the individual fears will grow later, is by this time a specialized one, namely, that of the genital libido, no longer an indiscriminate one, as in the suckling period. I would like to add here that the phantasy of the return into the mother's body is a substitution for coitus in an impotent individual, who is inhibited through a threat of castration. In the sense of Ferenczi's idea, we can say that the individual who wishes to allow his genital organ to represent his desire for a return into the body of his mother, regressively replaces this organ through his entire person.'[6]

Although the patient had reluctantly and without full acquiescence accepted intercourse as a condition for conception, up to the age of fifteen he clung implicitly to the common infantile theory of birth and coitus *per rectum*.

In this case we have been able to trace with exceptional clearness that the nose replaced the genital organ, that this substitution in turn

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[6] Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, Int. Psa. Verlag., 1922, p. 85.

extended to the face, the head, and finally the entire person of the patient, and that the phantasy of rectal re-entry into the nun's (mother's) body (uterus) represents coitus.

The patient himself once wondered, during the analysis, whether he had originally entered the church as an expiation of his unconscious wish for maternal coitus. ' Entering the church ' may here also represent an unconscious coitus symbolism, for after he had become ' holy ', as he expressed it, he came to think that no woman less than the Virgin would be a fitting consort for him, ' the runner-up to Jesus ', as he quaintly expressed it. As a matter of fact, at the age of seventeen, during the second year in college, when he suffered from a brief ' nervous breakdown ' characterized by depression, weeping and a predominating fear that ' any small boy could defeat him with boxing gloves ' (castration), the fancy obsessed him that he had been ordained a priest, was suffering from a nervous breakdown due to sexual tension but could not indulge in intercourse because of his vows. Then his mother would offer to sleep with him, and this exceptional relation would be permissible because of his holiness and that he would thus be cured (saved). It was at this period, namely, when he actively began his studies for the priesthood, notwithstanding the environment which might have tended to facilitate religious sublimation, that the latter, shaken since childhood, tottered and shattered completely. Possibly the imminence of taking his vows in the face of a maturing and insistent sex urge may have accounted for the disruption which resulted in the depression. At this time he gave vent to certain evidences of wrath and resentment against God, which came out as furious blasphemy in his tremendous weeping upheavals during the analysis.

The early attempt at a fusion of the infantile religious and moral trends with the sexual urge is significant ; it will be recalled that at the age of five a chair of seduction turned instantaneously into an altar of salvation. But the two opposing tendencies could never become amiably reconciled—the conflict of the ego with the super-ego, as represented by the parents and the outside world, more particularly the Church, never approached a solution. Finally, after a heart-breaking, morally destructive struggle (during which the postulated death-wish within the id possibly added its force to the pressure which the super-ego exerted against the already sorely harassed ego), the need for punishment of the offending genital (nasal) organ could no longer be evaded. The sniffling had already assumed a double function,

namely, a public avowal of his own degradation and the prevention of re-entry by normal sex instruments into any woman—any mother-surrogate. In view of this intolerable situation, punishment in its direst form, mutilation of the offending organ, an operation, became the only logical way out. The nose being the penis, this submucous resection was nothing more or less than a castration. When accomplished, it resulted in all the helplessness of the castrated male, namely, a female. But even the symbolic castration did not completely remove the need for punishment, nor, for that matter, did it diminish in the least his sexual urge.

If the body represents a generalized penis, the suicide attempt may also be considered as a castration phenomenon, rendering useless or destroying the entire body-penis—an extension of the previous attempt of mutilation, castration through the submucous resection. This is not in contradiction to another interpretation that as a castrated male, namely, a female, in his manner of suicide (drinking iodine), he received the deadly fluid and the act constituted a pregnancy phantasy, for a bi-sexual ambivalence pervaded the patient's life. It may be added that the absence of any genital masturbation in this patient may be explained on the ground that the sexualization of the entire body precluded the biological erogenization of the genitals which takes place normally at puberty.

Freud has postulated that the roots of the fear of death are nurtured by the child's feeling of hleplessness at separation from the mother, the threat of a loss of love and a desire for her presence coupled with the fear that she may never return. In the oral-libidinal stage this security concerns itself largely with the hunger situation of the infant, for at this period of extra-uterine life suckling fulfils the most urgent libidinal needs. The close physiological association between the sense of taste and smell (suckling and sniffling) is well known. This patient not only remained at the mother's breast until seventeen months, while in the game of 'playing praying,' smelling, licking and kissing all combined indifferently to arouse a frenzy of pleasurable excitement, but in adult life he actually sucked the breasts and toes of women in lieu of coitus. Furthermore, cigar smoking (sucking) unfailingly relieved the sniffling. It seems not too great a strain on credulity to interpret the sniffling as a compensatory suckling equivalent, beginning at the time when the eventual deprivation of his mother's love dawned upon him with certainty (age twelve to thirteen). If the nasal activity is a substitute representing a longing for regression to the oral

(suckling) stage, it comes in close approximation to the desire for death through which a return to the mother and rebirth might be accomplished.

Often a diminution of despondency, even a marked hopefulness, follows an unsuccessful suicide attempt in depressed patients. It is as though the ego had made peace with itself after having attempted the supreme sacrifice in its efforts to reconcile and propitiate the super-ego. That no such rebound occurred in this case may possibly be ascribed to the fact that the whole life-struggle was so dominated by sexual components that the unsuccessful castration-suicide left the psycho-sexual situation unaltered.

In the patient's mind ran the thought that unless a man be born again he cannot live—Christ died (patient had identified himself with Christ) that mankind might live. So he said that ' in my case, I almost actually died that I might live—my ego had to die that I might live, and really I have had a different parent—for you, doctor, were mother and father to me ' in the analysis.

Unconsciously through his invitation of punishment he conquered a situation which made way for relationship with the mother. The coarse-featured nun—a debased Mother Superior, really his own Virgin mother of infancy—who brutally flogged him, personifies the wicked woman, and intercourse with the wicked, bad woman is permissible, whereas it would have been absolutely indefensible with the virtuous or virgin female. Therefore, through the phantasy of being flogged, he not only pays a penalty, but at the same time debases the nun who abused him, making her more available as a sexual object. Now we come to a further evidence of revenge against his mother in his suicidal attempts, namely, the prayer which he was wont to repeat over and over again with all the insistency of a ceremonial compulsion, ' Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. Blessed art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, Jesus (Tim O'Brien). Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death.' Thus his mother must suffer for her refusal of re-entry to the sinner, for Tim O'Brien, before attempting suicide, had pondered for years which sin would be considered greater, a violation of the Sixth Commandment, namely, Thou shalt not kill (himself)—or, the seventh, Thou shalt not commit adultery. In attempting suicide, through a single act he achieves punishment more severe than mutilation of the nose, namely, castration of the entire body, that is, death. Through death, both revenge against his mother

and the possibility of re-entry. Through re-entry he is placed in the position for a rebirth and ultimate salvation.

Technical Comment

The diagnosis in this case would furnish a fertile field for futile discussion for those who find amusement in this pastime. The schizoid mechanisms with the extremely bizarre, almost incredible, religiously coloured sexual fantasies, were obvious and noted from the beginning. Deep depression with mental retardation, self-accusation and hopelessness was a prominent symptom during the first six months. This picture, with the history of the previous attack, would have justified the descriptive psychiatrist in a classification of manic-depressive psychosis—depressed phase. Compulsive acts and thinking, such as the inability to touch the floor with bare feet, mysophobia, ceremonials in dressing, etc. would justify a classification of obsessional neurosis, whereas the conversion phenomena and intense anxiety might invite a label of hysteria. Any one of these diagnoses is acceptable. But neither the schizoid picture nor the depression were sufficient to deter one from analytic procedure in the face of adequate insight and immediately good transference.

The patient returned to work after his first interview with me, and in spite of the continued despondency and the distressing neurotic symptoms during the first year did not lose a day from his business occupation. After two years of analysis the patient had progressed so far toward normality that I temporarily interrupted his treatment when, because of an accumulation of work, it became necessary for me to drop two patients who could best stand alone. Last year he returned, and is now being seen once or twice a week. The sniffling has disappeared, the perversions (touching of genitalia) in the subway have been abandoned, the frequency of urination has decreased from four times an hour to four times a day. In business he has achieved success; in his progress toward heterosexuality he has been able to meet and attract many girls of his own social level. The ideas of suicide have not recurred for the past three years; his depression has been negligible for the past two years. However, he has not yet reached the point where he has been able to indulge in intercourse outside of wedlock, nor has he married, although he has had ample opportunity for both. His struggle with Catholicism is less acute, less absorbing and less constant, although much of the dogma of his early Catholic training still clashes mildly with his general philosophy of life. With

all his cursing of God, the patient feels that his Catholicism is enriched through analysis, as formerly he was a ' Catholic old woman, now at least a Catholic man.' Gradually his philosophy in religious matters seems to be assuming a form allied to and embodying the more liberal trends in Catholicism.

ON QUOTATIONS

BY

JOHN RICKMAN

LONDON

§ 1.—Introduction.

§ 2.—Three motives for making a quotation. Quotation and hypnosis. The difference between quotations and examples. The first quotation. Virtuosity in quotation. Exhibiting a new idea as a quotation. Compulsive quotations. Quotations in dementia præcox. Compilations. Improving quotations. Parody. Priggishness. Plagiarism, open and concealed. The aversion from quoting. The acceptance of quotation. Mimicry.

§ 3.—Conclusion.

§ 1. Some years ago I entertained the hope of being able to make the analysis of quotations from poets and novelists, but particularly from poets, into a new instrument for literary criticism. Lines are quoted to us that have impressed themselves on the minds of our analysands and are brought forward in a setting of associations which is usually free from the peculiar self-conscious atmosphere which æsthetic criticism frequently both generates and wilts in. My hope was that a significant connection would be found between the quotations from the great poets and important features in the patients' infantile experiences, but though I had a ' run of luck ' in this respect which nearly evoked a paper for the British Psycho-Analytical Society, my evidence over a longer period gave me no ground for thinking that we have in the correlation of quotations and recollections of early experiences an index of the poet's merit as it is usually judged. Owing to over-determination in the selection of passages it has not been possible to separate the æsthetic merits, the personal associations to the content, the respect for the poet and the mood or tone of the poem of which a part is quoted from one another with sufficient distinctness to form the basis for a definite statement. While disappointed that my curiosity about the *content* of the quotation and its relation to the patient's mind did not lead in the direction expected, I found more scope for inquiry when attention was turned to the *occasions* when a quotation is used.

§ 2. When we suspend the tram of our own thoughts in order to introduce those of another person we may well ask ourselves what motive we have for abandoning for the time being the pleasure in exploiting our own ideas. The motives can be reduced to three, either

to win over a listener or reader, or to overwhelm him, or through fear to conceal from him what we are really thinking, or in terms of the pleasure-pain theory of mental action the pleasure derived is due to the fact that the sense of helplessness is averted; we have risen to the occasion, albeit with the help of another. Just as the dream representing our wishes as fulfilled ministers to our need for the illusion that all is right with us and our world, so the quotation restores the sense of control over a situation that has been in danger of passing out of our grasp.

If we study the motives which give rise to the quotation we generally find that they are mixed in any given case, for instance when our patients quote Freud they are as a rule really thinking, 'I dare not knock you on the head but I *can* say that *Freud* says . . .' and thus they try to overwhelm us, and at the same time they conceal their own opinion about us and Freud and analysis. Again we find Freud quoted by psycho-analysts to each other, sometimes to win over, sometimes to overwhelm the listener. We may go further, and following Ferenczi compare the two motives, which often give character to the tone in which the words are uttered, with the two types of hypnotists' behaviour according as it approximates to the father-identification (commanding, severe and abrupt) or to the mother-identification (persuasive, soft and long-suffering). The outstanding difference between the hypnotist and the person who quotes is that the hypnotist exploits a father- or mother-identification which he himself makes quite unconsciously, whereas the person quoting is fully aware that he is taking upon himself the words of another; they are alike in that they are neither of them aware that these identifications are made to enable them to escape from psychical embarrassment, the hypnotist not venturing to be naïve with his patient through fear of him, and the speaker or writer not allowing himself to know that he has got out of his depth.

Just as the psychological processes of hypnotism are not fully comprehensible without a study of the mind of the patient, so those of the person quoting are not to be understood without considering the listener; the important common factor in all four persons is found in the survival of the positive libidinal bond between parent and child in the unconscious. To make this point clearer it will be necessary to consider the differences between a quotation and an example. The example is drawn from life, is usually objectively verifiable and invites further inspection; it suspends the train of the speaker's thoughts

only to give greater strength to his ideas and has the purpose of leading the listener back to his own experience of the outer world. A quotation has none of these qualities inherently; I admit that the distinction is sometimes hard to draw, as, for example, when in a medical paper someone else's published case-records are used to illustrate the topic treated; the main difference is that the essence of an example lies in its close relation to objective experience, of a quotation in its dependence on transference.[1]

Those whose experience in early life has led to a restriction in the disposition of their libido are particularly susceptible in many cases to a like regressive flow of interest in others, for though such regression may be attended by painful consequences it is better than supporting the discomforts and dangers of completely free libidinal desire; thus we find patients whose capacity for libidinal satisfaction is restricted are pleased either to succumb to or to resist the advances of the hypnotist, whereas those without castration anxiety and parental fixation find in his performances something odd and objectively interesting; in the same way those who are interested in a subject without restriction of imagination are not intrigued by citations from authorities but treat them as they treat everything—objectively. Some essayists are prized for their virtuosity in poetical quotations, the present explanation being that those who admire these exhibitions of scholarly discrimination prefer in their authors a guidance along paths made safe by inhibition rather than the impassioned leading of vigorous and original minds. In everyone there is something which beckons out the quotation as a relief from the strain of attending to ideas that are new, just as in everyone there is a pleasure in behaving like a child; but in most

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[1] When discussing the topic of transference in this connection with Major Daly, he suggested that at first quotations were confined to the classics, using this in its widest sense of Early Fathers, the Vedas, Holy Writings and Holy Sayings. This is probably correct and can be verified. If we throw up the reins and let imagination go gallop we may suppose that the *first* quotation was made when that ancestor (unknown but yet beloved by psycho-analysts), the youthful male of the pre-human horde, approached a group of females in the night. If he let his footfalls be the only herald of his approach they might regard him merely as one of those pestering youngsters whom they could box on the ears, but if he imitated the gutteral and determined notes of his sire he prepared their minds for a submission which may have spared him in the moments preceding his triumph considerable physical effort.

people there is a critical faculty which demands that the quotation shall be good enough to justify the temporary relinquishing of a current personal relationship, just as there is in most a critical faculty causing a doubt whether the pleasure of being treated as a child (being hypnotised) could compensate for the loss of adult relationships.

We may note in passing a widespread habit in social intercourse of congealing the free-flowing stream of conversation with a story; sometimes these narrations are prefaced with the name of the author, whereupon we are supposed to become immediately submissive; sometimes they recur and recoil with such frequency that the talk turns into a battledore and shuttlecock game, called 'capping yarns', and, as a game, is a substitute for the serious work of love-making or aggression, it is a sign of mental embarrassment when it becomes compulsive. Orientals are particularly prone to this form of conversation. In 'milder' cases of dementia præcox we occasionally find our every approach to the patient met with a quotation, a sign of supreme embarrassment. I think they are mistaken who regard these patients as having had their personality destroyed by the disease; the sufferers may be saying in this instance, 'I do not think you are worth talking to,' or else (less embarrassing to our vanity unless we are analysts), 'Such is my fear of betraying my inner feelings to the cold winds of your criticism that I prefer to hide my thoughts behind this mask of quotation,' or else they may be saying, 'Since my gestures, which you call stereotypies, and my persistent statements, which you call verbigeration, are not intelligible to you, take this quotation, which is *not* mine, into your consciousness and try to perceive that in spite of all your denseness and my pain I am trying to communicate with you.'

The readiness to take a deferential attitude to quotations is made use of by young or timid persons when they put forward their own ideas or epigrams in the disguise of quotation marks. Such action clearly comes under the third category of motives mentioned above—to conceal the writer's own thoughts or at least to conceal their paternity. A variant of this trick (having analogy with concealed plagiarism) is for a compiler of other people's ideas slyly to introduce some of his own thoughts into his Summary; in this way he can get a respectful attention to his views without having to stand up to the dangers of isolated statement. Thus the aggressiveness of the public and the scrutiny of critics and reviewers, which is always ready to spring up in the presence of youth or weakness, is tricked out of its satisfaction, and the author can hold up the world to secret ridicule by exploiting the hunger

adults display for repeating nursery attitudes in place of intellectual objectivity.

At the opposite pole to this rather impudent way of dealing with our weakness for quotation is the trick some conversationalists employ to misquote but improve on the original; it can be classed as a trick because by beginning with well-known words we are reduced to a more or less uncritical state, and then when weakened by transference a new idea is forced forward for our acceptance. By this device two aims are achieved at one stroke: the speaker has stolen the listener's affection for the author in order to give prestige to an idea of his own, and the author is humbled. It is a risky trick, because the listener may suddenly become vindictively critical of the new idea out of a revived loyalty to the injured author and resent the intrusion.

Another literary trick, which employs displacement of affection from an old to a new author and from a well-known to a new work, is parody; but in parody it is assumed by both writer and readers that no real malice is intended against the author. He may, in a gentle way, be made to look a fool, but he must not be made to say anything contrary to his ego-ideal; for instance, in the parodies of Hiawatha involved and repetitive nonsense can be indulged in to any extent without giving offence on any topic so long as it is not obscene; for since no one can associate Hiawatha with coarse, salty verse, the parodist must submit to the same censorship as was exercised in the poet's mind when writing the verses. When violence is done to a poet's verses by aggressive sexualization of them the reader is aware, in a peculiarly heightened degree, of the sadism of the parodist's game. However, the chief mark of parody is that it is quotation turned back on the person quoted with an ironical comment, as if the parodist said, 'I and all my readers really think this of you, that you deserve not to be taken so seriously, that you are nearly the clown these unflattering imitations make you out to be.'[2] The parodist leads an attack on the author which we are ready enough to follow; he expresses for us, but not too sharply, a resentment at having to acknowledge the superiority

[2] I sometimes wonder whether those extremes of 'good' behaviour, the priggishness of childhood and sententious moral uprightness of adult life, are not maintained with such enduring zeal because these exhibitions are regarded by the unconscious as loud-voiced parodies of parental injunction. Parents too can enjoy the parody so long as they are not aware that it is parody, hence grotesquely priggish behaviour can go on for generation after generation.

of the poet, the boldness and openness of the attack shielding us from any too conscious acknowledgment of humiliation at our perpetual submission before the masters of our language. It is quite otherwise with plagiarism, which excites the anger of the public nearly as much as parody excites its admiration.

Plagiarism is of two kinds, the open and concealed. In the open kind one author takes the expressions or ideas of another without acknowledgment; the concealed kind is technically not plagiarism at all, i.e. acknowledgment is made, but in a half-hearted way, by footnote or by a slight reference. Both are psychologically related to that character-trait of never under any circumstances quoting at all; the plagiarist does not want to quote either, but his painful sense of the weakness of his own ideas compels him to snatch those of another; for even though he will be disgraced if caught the impulse to win the admiration of his public overrides all his fears. It is literary kleptomania, the impulse being to steal something symbolic of the genital in order to restore the illusion of potency.

The case of the person who refuses to quote others at all betrays a great but unconscious submission to authority; the defiance is determined not by a wish to overmaster the authority, but to avoid contact with him. The fear of being passive accentuates in consciousness an activity in the direction of originality that is not sustained by object-love (desire for the mother, to win the approval of the public), but by object-dread (fear of the father). This type of personality may be set off against that of the individual who is willing, i.e. not afraid, to use quotations, namely, one who is concerned before everything to present his thoughts clearly, one who can tolerate a temporary dependence on another person without dreading to lose his individuality for ever. It bespeaks a degree of objectivity which castration [3] anxiety never permits, an objectivity extending even to the self. It is after all no disgrace to be out of one's depth in the realms of thought or to acknowledge the need for help in expression as well as classification of ideas;

[3] I have constantly to remind myself that repetition of a word never clarifies and usually diminishes its meaning; I think, as regards myself at any rate, that this caution is particularly necessary with such technical terms as castration-anxiety, castration-complex, castration-wish, castration-threat, etc.; and I suspect when I use them that I am making a pretence at being care-free and bold in using the most terrifying thought in the psycho-analytical armamentarium when really my mind is dodging its only duty, viz., plain thinking.

those who are fortified by an unshattered or restored self-confidence do not anticipate with dread moments of helplessness.

We find in mimicry a theme related closely to quotation, but with the accent laid on the personal attributes of the original, not on what he has written. It presupposes an affectionate relationship between the original and the audience, but not an unrestricted awe. As in the case of parody, we rise by identification with the mimic to a point of almost equal strength with that great being whom once we dreaded.[4] Further, we are pleased by the physical courage of the mimic who dares in his own person to challenge the powerful with his ridicule ; but we are quick to detect in the mimicry the signs of disarming submission and resent the spoiling of æsthetic pleasure which that involves. Masochism spoils more otherwise good art than does sadism. We always demand of the histrionic artists who amuse us the high courage we lack in ourselves—to submit our bodies to the ravages of emotional passion without yielding up our independence.

Those who dare not mimic for fear of being thought mere weak imitators are not at peace in themselves ; they fear to betray a restriction of libido-disposition because for them to acknowledge imitation is to admit their mental slavery to a past defeat.

§ 3. It is usual to try to authenticate a psycho-analytical paper by stiffening the thin framework of the ideas contained with an accretion of technical terms or else to give scraps of case-histories to which the theories refer. I have no apology to make in this paper of all others for not quoting more technical terms, which I regard in the present stage of psycho-analytical development as too frequently a hindrance to clear thinking ; and, in respect to the analytical case-material on which this paper is based, as I have drawn it from a source that is likely to be more convincing to myself than to anyone else I shall give no details—the person concerned is myself.

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[4] Mimicry of the weak arouses the reactions of anger and pity, anger at the mimic and pity for its victim.

ON THE ECONOMICS AND THE FUTURE OF THE SUPER-EGO

BY

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In the analysis of our patients we have come to regard the unconscious part of the super-ego, the need for punishment, as the factor chiefly responsible for repression, resistance, and in the end as the main obstacle to the patient's adjustment or readjustment to life. The impression grows that if the id impulses could have been controlled by something less inflexible, less severe, more adaptable, and yet less fantastic than the super-ego, the individual could not have been forced into the compromise of a neurotic character or of neurotic symptoms—a compromise that usually manages to get the worst of both worlds, giving satisfaction neither to instinctual desire, nor to the opposing claims of a moral self, making of the wretched patient, as one expressed himself to me, for ever a shuttlecock between Ormuzd and Ahriman.

The exact genesis of the super-ego is not germane to the question that is now to be considered. It will suffice to refer to the view of its structure brought forward by Ernest Jones,[1] that the hard and illiberal aspects of the super-ego are due to a fusion of the libidinal and the ego instincts. ' Part [of hate impulses] fuses with the libidinal impulses and helps to give them their sadistic character.' [2] Jones suggests that in general ' it may be that the secret of the desexualization of the libidinal impulses, perhaps also of the preceding regression of them to the anal-sadistic level, will be found in the influence on them of the hate impulses (ego instincts in general).' [3]

Battling with mental functions whose rigours are not due, or at any rate not wholly due, to difficulties imposed by the external world, by reality, but are the creations, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, of human effort and human weaknesses, it is small wonder that analysts look forward to the disappearance of the control exercised by the super-ego over the id and the taking over of this control by the ego, as the more hopeful line of progress for the individual and even for the race.

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[1] ' The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego ', INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. VII, p. 303.

[2] Ibid., p. 310.

[3] Ibid., p. 309.

This at first must seem very attractive; the regulation of the demands of the id (ego or libidinal impulses) will not be exercised by some code of morality or some institution inherited and handed down from a remote past, absorbed by the child and the new generation, regardless of its present-day adequacy or inadequacy. No, the demands of reality, the gradually strengthening ego, will be a sufficiently effective governor over any excessive and importunate id demands that might bring the ego into immediate or prospective danger. The ego would learn that it does not pay to cheat, to enslave others, to murder; the individual becomes a social being, not by repression or suppression, but by a gradually increasing apprehension of reality. Thou shalt not kill—not because the Lord thy God has so commanded it, but lest, by killing, you in turn, or those you love, be killed.

A knowledge of the super-ego is not only derived from analysis of our patients; from this mental formation mankind derives many of his most prized institutions. The question may legitimately be asked, if we grant the historic part the super-ego has played in the history of man and in the history of the individual, and granted the analytical condemnation, wherein has lain its survival value? The environment for man is an environment undergoing constant and considerable changes, changes that are for the greater part created by man himself. These changes demand in turn constant re-adaptations to the new conditions, re-adaptations that involve both for the individual and for the race difficulty and conflict. Whilst there is this constant flux in man's external conditions, man carries within himself an instinctual, immutable, unchanging or very slowly-changing mental formation—the id. Placed between the unchanging, archaic and insistent demands of the id and the equally insistent, but mobile and raw environment, the ego is in no enviable position. Freud says that the 'ego's position midway between the id and reality tempts it only too often to become sycophantic, opportunist and false, like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep his place in popular favour.' [4]

More than this, the politician is, in our case, uncertain of what the people demand, and only certain of the people's waywardness. It is to this waywardness, from the ego point of view, reality, that we can ascribe the utility, the survival value, of that modification within the ego—the super-ego.

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[4] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 83.

The super-ego has a ready-made reply to id demands: it meets these demands with an inflexible or a very nearly inflexible code—religion, ethics, superstitition, good manners. The super-ego is here the delegate of the ego, and prepared to deal with all instinctual impulses after an approved and stereotyped pattern. In the meantime the ego can prepare itself for new eventualities. It is very convenient for the ego to delegate its reactive immediate responses to a mechanism that is fixed and stable, one which takes no notice of the divergent circumstances, but reacts always in the same way towards like stimuli. The super-ego is for the ego a part of reality, fictitious but fixed.

At bottom, then, the super-ego is due to man's fight with nature, and his conquest over nature, and to man's pliability; the super-ego gives him, as it were, a breathing-space before setting out for fresh conquests, and it is just this function that gives the super-ego persistency and value.

Freud designates cannibalism, incest and murder as the privations that affect everybody, and therefore the oldest. 'With the prohibitions that cause them culture began, who knows how many thousands of years ago, to detach itself from the primordial animal conditions of mankind.' [5] It is easy to recognize how insecure would have been the prohibition against cannibalism had the question been left to the testing of reality during those long ages when man was in slow process of conquering a far more efficient source of food-supply than could be obtained from his own species. Removed from that test, delegated to the opposition of the super-ego, the instinctual wish received a check, whatever may have been the state of the food-market. This view of the mutual relationship of ego and super-ego is not lessened by our knowledge that under great stress the prohibition, for instance, against cannibalism may break down and human flesh be eaten. I will cause them to eat the flesh of their sons, and the flesh of their daughters, and they shall eat every one the flesh of their friends in the siege and straitness wherewith their enemies shall straiten them, prophesies Jeremiah. To-day when man under civilization is furnished with a sufficient food-supply, cannibalism is no longer a need of reality; that instinctual wish belongs nowadays to the sphere of psychopathology. This does not necessarily mean concurrence with Freud's view 'that the process of internalization of this prohibition (and other prohibitions)

[5] *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 17.

is to a great extent accomplished, if we leave out of account the unwelcome exception of the neurotics '.[6]

The super-ego is more powerful and more active in the neurotic than in others, and it would seem rather that the neurotic is less able, on that account, to come to grips with reality.

The contention that the super-ego has a claim to be regarded as a source, and an important source, of many cultural achievements, by providing a ready-made defensive mechanism to exuberant demands of the id, pending the slow and necessarily capricious development of the ego is the same kind of claim that Frazer advanced in his ' Psyche's Task ' for superstitition, where he prized highly superstitition as a contribution to the advancement of civilization. The admission of this claim does nothing to invalidate the contention that the super-ego is not only, as analysts discover, the chief obstacle to mental health, but also a handicap to the progress of civilization. We can recognize that progress in aviation owes much to the use made of flying in the war, without accepting the view that aviation could not have come to pass without a war or that the conquest of the air is well worth a few million lives. Like superstition, there is a tendency for the super-ego to cease serving purposes of civilization on its being found out ; when we have classified and docketed a bundle of beliefs as superstitition, when a Freud exposes the functions of the super-ego, its cultural value begins to be undermined. The super-ego, having once obtained its powers from the ego, strengthened in its mastery by the historical processes in which the super-ego originated, is not prepared to forego its control, even though it no longer meets the needs of the ego ; its activities then become a fertile source of maladjustment and of intra-psychical conflict. It is one of those disharmonies to which there are many parallels in the human physical organism. As Metchnikoff pointed out, structures once apparently useful to man at some stage of his development or survivals of such structures linger superfluous at the stage which he has now reached ; indeed, not only superfluous but positively harmful. The super-ego has become in part or wholly one of those disharmonies of nature within himself, with which man is to-day at war.

Psycho-Analysis pursuing its modest therapeutic aim and making no pretence to, nay, discarding, any ambition to reform society, yet cannot help but disclose the paths that lie open to the future

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[6] *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 19.

advancement of civilization. We discover the imperfections of the psychological institutions hitherto at our command, or rather that have hitherto commanded us, and can point out new and more helpful mechanisms. Psychology is apparently more fortunate than physiology in being potentially at least able to mould afresh (however slowly) instruments that have served man in the past. Helmholtz is said to have declared that the human eye was so imperfect an optical apparatus that had it been submitted to him he would have rejected it outright ; and the best that physiologists can do in the way of supplying human beings with wings is to give them an aeroplane. But the human mind is a more flexible and adaptable instrument than the human body ; human nature is infinitely variable. Freud assumes this possibility when he remarks : ' It would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out of the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human origin of all cultural laws and institutions. Along with their pretensions to sanctity, the rigid and immutable nature of these laws and regulations would also cease. Men would realize that these have been made, not so much to rule them, as, on the contrary, to serve their interests ; they would acquire a more friendly attitude to them, and instead of aiming at their abolition, they would aim only at improving them. This would be an important advance on the road which leads to reconciliation with the burden of culture.' [7]

Freud goes on to point out that these cultural laws—the super-ego in brief—contain not only wish-fulfilments, but also important memory-traces. The technique of analysis has now succeeded, so far as the individual is concerned, in dealing with these powerful, active repressing forces.

In the discussion of the relation of the super-ego to the ego and to the id, there has been implicit the view of direct inheritance by the ego and super-ego, and this view can, I think, be comfortably accepted. There will be no hesitation in accepting inheritance of the potentiality of the id's undergoing modification into ego and super-ego in the individual. Freud does indeed demur at accepting direct inheritance by the ego. He writes, ' The experiences undergone by the ego seem at first to be lost to posterity ; but when they have been repeated often enough, and with sufficient intensity in the successive individuals of many generations, they transform themselves, so to say, into

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[7] *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 73.

experiences of the id, the impress of which is preserved by inheritance '.[8] ' It is not possible to speak of direct inheritance by the ego.'

The evidence is lacking, it seems to me, that the id has undergone any change within historical times ; it indeed does not appear to differ in the various races of mankind living to-day under varying different cultural conditions, though the view may be tenable that the id has undergone changes since man's first advent on this earth some 300,000 years ago. But that the ego and super-ego impulses are vastly different among different races and have varied throughout history is of course a mere truism. The acceptance of inherited ego and super-ego trends raises no new difficulty, but solves many problems ; which trends are inherited and which are due to the clash of inherited trends with environment are special problems to be worked out for each individual and for the race. Analytical observation has shown that ego and super-ego manifestations—weak certainly but existing—are found at the most tender age, and there are indications enough that these are present in the suckling. It is a fairly obvious inference that the inherited part of the super-ego pertains to the Ucs, and is to be included in that part of the Ucs which is not repressed ; the part of the super-ego which is due to the reaction of the individual to his environment, according to Jones ' normally and predominantly derived, not from the love-object that has been abandoned, but from the parent of the same sex ',[9] that is, from the thwarting parent, belongs partly to the Pcs and partly to the Ucs by repression. It need not be assumed that the acquired super-ego cannot act upon and modify the inherited part ; there is some clinical evidence to the contrary.

The acceptance of inherited super-ego impulses need involve no fear of discrepancy with results obtained in other fields of biology. In the first place analytical observations rest upon evidence as secure as any furnished in those other fields ; analysis can claim the right to erect upon these observations its own theoretical structure. If there were discrepancies, we should have to trust to further observations to reconcile any apparent differences. But fortunately recent biological research exempts us even from a contention that would be irksome to many. The long-drawn-out dispute between the claims of Nature and Nurture is found to be a rather irrelevant logomachy. Jennings writes :

' The biologist is pained to find that the medical man resists the

[8] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 52.

[9] Loc. cit., p. 306.

introduction of the concept of hereditary into the domain of disease. This is because of the current fallacy that what is hereditary is certain, fixed, unchangeable. Very properly the medical man rejects that, in its application to disease. But with the recognition that to assert that a thing is hereditary signifies merely that the organism has received such a constitution as to produce it under given conditions, all such objection vanishes. . . . The individual who may produce an inherited defect under certain conditions need not produce it under others.' [10]

The relationship between the germ cells and the conditions of development do not cease at birth—birth is only one moment in the life of the individual.

Although human nature is potentially infinitely variable, although it is theoretically conceivable that such institutions as the need for punishment, the sense of guilt, the Œdipus situation and others that may have served man's interests in the past are now a menace rather than an aid, it does not necessarily follow that this super-ego function will be relinquished in favour of control by the ego ; results obtained from the analysis of the individual are one thing, the outlook for the race is another. The history of psycho-analysis itself does not induce a very optimistic frame of mind in this respect ; we have seen all the rancour and all the rigidity of the super-ego, of the neurotic super-ego, one might say, exerted in the name of science against those conceptions of Freud that tended to replace phantasy by reality, replacements in the very spirit of science itself.

Certain institutions, manifestations of the super-ego, are weakening. Heaven and Hell no longer conjure man with the potency of other days, but it does not require great discrimination to descry the rise of other institutions which may be not less tyrannical, and of no less universal appeal to human fears and weaknesses. The sceptic will doubt : will the super-ego do more than change its spots ? To this query the psycho-analyst will reply, *more suo :* Does your doubt conceal a wish ?

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[10] H. S. Jennings, *Biology and the Advancement of Man*, p. 63.

THE NEED FOR PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH-INSTINCT

BY

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The problem of the need for punishment leads us to the most remarkable aspects of the psychic life of man. It leads us to those actions, unintelligible to rationalistic psychology, which harm the agent himself, cause him pain and hurt, and reveal a plainly self-destructive purpose. These actions appear paradoxical to our ordinary thinking, because we are accustomed to assume, from self-knowledge and the observation of others, that actions are in general performed to avoid pain or to gain pleasure. Actions and other psychic manifestations clearly intended to procure suffering seem to contradict this general principle. The investigation of such occurrences, not subject to the pleasure principle, or not exclusively so, led Freud to the assumption of an instinct which operates in the direction of death, the aim of which is destruction. In his view it is of secondary importance whether this instinct is directed outward, sadistically, to the destruction of other life, or inward, masochistically, against the subject himself; in both cases it is the same instinct.

Freud assigns primary significance to the impulse towards self-destruction, the death instinct, and derives outwardly directed destruction from this primary death instinct. Other investigators, e.g. Jones [1] and Reich,[2] believe, however, that self-destructive human behaviour can be derived from the turning inward of the destructive instinct originally directed outwardly; i.e. masochism from sadism, and not *vice versa*. This second view dispenses with the concept of a death-instinct and contents itself with the assumption of a destructive instinct which can also, in suitable circumstances, turn inwards.

A great deal of psychic happening with a self-destructive purpose can certainly be explained—since the time when Freud grasped the meaning of melancholia—by aggressions directed inwardly which were originally intended for an external object and only later turned upon the ego itself. My present point of view will, perhaps, throw light upon some of the circumstances which tell in favour of a primary death-

[1] Ernest Jones, 'The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VII, p. 303.

[2] W. Reich, 'The Need for Punishment and the Neurotic Process', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. IX, p. 227.

instinct, apart from destructive tendencies which are *secondarily* turned within.

I should like to consider in the first place how far it is possible to understand the manifold expressions of the self-destructive or self-injuring trends in a purely psychological way, without any theoretical assumptions. These trends appear indeed in the most diverse manifestations. If we start from suicide, and go on to other phenomena in which self-destruction comes out less plainly, perhaps through mitigation by other trends, we can establish a scale of constantly-diminishing effectiveness of self-destruction. The trend shows particularly plainly and strongly in moral masochists and melancholiacs, whose life appears perpetually endangered by it. From a purely phenomenological point of view, a similar impression is produced by the criminal who is such from sense of guilt, and who intentionally gets himself into jail. The latter, however, already represents a special easy-going kind of moral masochist in whom the need for punishment clearly serves for the avoidance of pain. Both the action and the punishment free him from anxiety of conscience; they signify an unburdening for him, an economic gain in the pleasure-pain balance. In this obviously self-injuring behaviour, the contribution of the pleasure-principle, the striving for avoidance of pain, is clear. Naturally the pleasure-principle manifests itself even more plainly where punishment or suffering are bound up with pleasure; as in the masochistic perversion. Here the punishment scene, or the infliction of the pain, appears to be only a comedy; in certain cases indeed it is only a pre-condition of the sexual act performed normally. In one case I succeeded in obtaining confirmation of Freud's supposition that the masochistic perversion represents an eroticization of the same self-destructive tendencies which so seriously endanger the life of moral masochists.[3] The sexualization of these aggressions directed against the self makes them less dangerous, neutralizes their destructive efficacy.

Besides these strongly-marked expressions of the destructive instinct directed against the self, we know from daily life of a wide range of human actions and behaviour which consist in seeking out painful situations. Such behaviour is indeed to be found in everybody almost all the time. We have learnt from Freud of the development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle. The essence of this development consists in the ability not merely to endure instinctual

[3] F. Alexander, *Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit*, Int. PsA. Verlag, 1927.

tensions at times, but even to seek out directly situations of pain or suffering, in the interest of a future and assured pleasure gain, or of the avoidance of a greater pain. One is acting in this way, for example, when one submits to the painful operations of dental treatment, in order to save oneself still greater distress in the future.

It will, perhaps, be objected that I have no right to liken such a rational quest for pain in the obvious interest of the self to the self-destructive tendencies or processes previously described. The development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle is, of course, in the highest degree in the interest of the individual, whilst the procedures previously described are entirely against his interest. It is however, easy to show that the development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle enables us to find the transition to the paradoxical self-injuring actions already described, and so to understand more readily that complicated relation between ego and super-ego, the need for punishment.

Freud has described the reality-principle as the pleasure-principle tested and improved by reality. It stands for an intelligently organized conduct of the instinctual life directed by the aim of obtaining the greatest possible ultimate sum of pleasure and the smallest possible sum of pain. The way in which this is achieved is that the ego, with the aid of its testing of reality, confronts with one another external facts and possibilities and instinctual demands. In this function the ego is partially a representative of reality, even though at bottom it may sympathize with the instinctual demands of the id. Under the pressure of a more powerful reality, it has had, willy nilly, to identify itself in part with this, and now it demands in turn from the instinctual life due regard for this factor of paramount power. If then it voluntarily seeks out painful situations, it does so in the interest of a pleasure-gain, or, at least, of lessened pain. The ego thus originates from the id as a differentiation-product of the latter, through identification with external reality, but only for the purpose of thus securing a more complete satisfaction of instinctual demands. The differentiation of the super-ego from the ego, which comes later in the history of development, involves, however, a very similar process, an identification with a special part of reality : with social requirements. The relations of the super-ego to the ego constitute a parallel phenomenon to the relations of the ego to reality. Just as the ego arose from the id, in so far as the psychic apparatus, turning at least one of its parts towards external reality, acknowledged the distinctive characters of this, i.e.

came to resemble it, so the super-ego arose out of the ego through identification with social demands.

It is, therefore, also not surprising if the ego applies the same methods in relation to the inner representative of the social demands, the super-ego, as it had learnt to practise in relation to the external world. It gives in to the super-ego, where necessary, just as to external reality, and, if required, it takes suffering on itself in order that elsewhere it may thus be enabled to carry the instinctual demands through triumphantly. But upon the same principles rests the relation of the child to his educators, who behave to the child's instinctual demands in exactly the same way as impersonal reality. They inflict pain on the child if he does not obey, and reward him with pleasure prizes if he will make the needed instinctual renunciations. It is therefore only a matter of course that the behaviour of the ego to the super-ego will conform to the same principles as are at the basis of its relations to external impersonal reality and to its educators.

The behaviour of the ego to the super-ego is therefore in accordance with the *reality-principle*. We can best study this behaviour in the pathological states in which ego and super-ego are sharply opposed to one another, and in which the super-ego is like a foreign body within the ego. In such cases the ego must give way to the demands of its super-ego in exactly the same way as to external reality, and must subject itself to instinctual restrictions, and indeed even to direct suffering, in order to secure certain instinctual satisfactions. The remarkable principle of purchasing the right to instinctual gratification through suffering derives from the period of development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle. Here, and without as yet any moral rationalizations, the law is that pleasure is only to be attained through temporary endurance of pain. Reality in its indifference does not concern itself with our instinctual demands, and so we must take account of its characteristics. These characteristics are unfortunately only too often such that if we want to enjoy anything, it means a sacrifice, and this sacrifice consists always of pain. If the tourist wants to enjoy the fine view from a summit, he must first toil up perspiringly, and moreover he has to pack his knapsack full if he does not want to freeze on the top, nor to have to enjoy his view in a hungry state. And in the same way every enjoyment on this planet of ours is tied up to a heavily-loaded knapsack. The ego has learnt this proposition thoroughly and early enough never to be able to forget it again. It is only too understandable if the ego, in its struggle for pleasure gratifications, also

keeps on offering to the curbing super-ego (that internalized piece of reality) suffering and renunciation in return for pleasure, as it learnt to do throughout the development from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle. The need for punishment would thus be an anthropomorphic form of the reality-principle.

It is not to be wondered at if we have not immediately recognized the origin of the reality-principle in this anthropomorphic or, I could say, criminal form, in which the punishment expiates the sin and entitles to new pleasure-gratifications. One looks hopefully for some impressive situation of childhood which could be held responsible for this connection.

I do not believe, however, that this remarkable causal nexus of pleasure and pain can be explained by any one single situation, as for example by the situation of the infant during the period of sucking, which according to Radó's investigations would appear specially significant for melancholia. However important the experience may be that hunger is always followed by satisfaction, the affective connection that pleasure follows pain, and conversely pain pleasure, has a wider basis. It is supported by the entire development of the psychic apparatus from the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle. Indeed, this connection between pleasure and pain constitutes the foundation of the reality-principle, which in turn is the foundation of ego-formation. Precisely through the acceptance of this principle the ego has developed out of the id. From the moment of birth onward, the psychic apparatus is continually encountering the painful experience that the world is no longer shaped so exactly to its subjective demands as was the maternal womb. The sucking-situation is perhaps still the most similar to the intra-uterine one. The more independent the child becomes, however, the more he learns that the way to pleasure leads through endurance, renunciation and suffering. Whilst during the sucking period he only has to bear *renunciation* in the *passive* form of hunger, he learns later that he has often to seek out suffering *actively* in order to attain pleasure. And this active quest for suffering on tactical grounds, which often seems so paradoxical to us, is what is characteristic of the ego in its relations to reality and to the super-ego.[4] These relations, which

[4] In an article of which the train of thought coincides at many points with mine, Ferenczi holds with justice that we must grant the psychic apparatus the ability to estimate quantities of pleasure and pain (a ' mental reckoning-machine '). S. Ferenczi, ' The Problem of Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas ', INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. VII, p. 312.

I have already indicated in another place, are here set out in such detail because I have met with the reproach that I have indeed noted this deeply-anchored character of the mental apparatus, the inability to bear pleasure without pain, but have failed to give any causal explanation of the fact.

We have been able to trace back to the pleasure-principle a wide range of psychic processes having an intention injurious to the self. We need not, therefore, at once think of masochistic gratifications or of the destructive action of the death-instinct in the case of every action or piece of behaviour of a human being which in a seemingly irrational way causes him physical suffering or some other form of pain, since we have seen that even the need for punishment stands in the service of pleasurable instinctual gratifications. It is a matter of indifference whether the suffering is undertaken in the interest of reality-adaptation, or whether it serves to work off the inhibiting effect of the super-ego upon gratification. Our first question about such seemingly paradoxical self-injuring tendencies must always be whether they might not after all have such a rational meaning. It is not always easy, especially in the case of the complicated inner psychic relationships between ego and super-ego, to divine the economic meaning of the occurrences in question, i.e. to tell in which way the apparently self-injuring behaviour of gratification of the need for punishment serves instinctual gratification after all, or permits the lessening of pain. I have tried to establish this point of view for the neuroses and to shew that neurotic suffering is the general condition of neurotic instinctual gratification. The question is now how far one can get with such a point of view. The investigation of the neuroses has shown that neurotic suffering, apart from playing this economic part in the service of gratification, mostly signifies *in itself* a feminine-masochistic or passive-homosexual gratification. And the further a neurosis progresses, the more suffering becomes an end in itself. As Freud has put it, the ego strives to adapt itself to the neurosis.[5]

This readiness of the ego to turn the suffering at first forced upon it into a gratification and to exploit it masochistically must however give us pause. For a new principle thus enters into the otherwise so rational course of psychic events. In any case the suffering, which has thus become an end in itself and a gratification, has changed its original part. If we see the climber drag his heavy load even up

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[5] S. Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, 1926, pp. 45–6.

mountains where there is a well-provided restaurant at the top—and one may see many such climbers—we must tell ourselves that the original purpose of the knapsack has here undergone a material change. Whilst it is dragged up a deserted mountain for the purpose of avoidance of pain, in the present case it serves apparently only to make the ascent harder. Ought we in such a case to think immediately of a manifestation, even if harmless, of the death-instinct? Anyone who knows the mentality of the climber will soon guess that we are here dealing first of all with the gratification of the demands of the 'tourist super-ego': to stand firmly on one's own feet, as independently as possible of all help, and to defy the forces of nature. The case is really one of a narcissistic gratification, with neglect of the primitive bodily narcissism of the ego in favour of the higher moral narcissism of the super-ego, a transfer of self-feeling from the ego to the super-ego, a displacement of accent within the psychic apparatus, not altogether unlike Freud's description of what happens in the case of humour.[6] Only, in humour the super-ego is cathected in its generous, superior, benevolent character, whilst in the above spartan behaviour it is the hardness and discipline of the super-ego that makes itself felt. Even though the two procedures obey a similar principle formally, topographically and dynamically, their psychic contents stand in polar contrast. This spartan mentality drives one to despair by its stiffness, i.e. *lack of humour;* it constitutes in its content the direct antithesis to humour. It originates indeed from an opposite situation. Whilst by means of the superior solace of humour one raises oneself above a desperate situation, the spartan wantonly and needlessly goes in quest of a state of suffering. By means of humour one creates the semblance of a superiority not present in the situation, whilst the spartan-puritan attitude makes a show of superiority which is entirely superfluous in that situation. The heavily loaded tourist who pants up by the side of a mountain railway acts as if he were in a desert. Both reactions are paradoxical and not appropriate to the objective situation. In the one case, the seriousness of the situation is underrated, in the other it is taken more seriously than called for. In the case of humour one is laughing while waiting for the gallows, in the other one is beating a false alarm. In humour the life principle prevails in spite of the desperate situation, will not let itself be beaten and over-compensates

[6] S. Freud, 'Humour', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. IX, p. 1.

for the external danger, whilst in the spartan reaction a non-existing danger is simulated. Here the death principle makes its appearance, even if only in play.

I willingly admit that in the instance here considered we are concerned with the gratification of a super-ego demand of a narcissistic character. Obviously the sense of what he can do counts as more valuable for the climber than the bodily discomfort hurts him. He is acting according to the pleasure-principle. The only question is why he is choosing this irrational mode of gratification which is bound up with the endurance of needless suffering. A masochistic compliance of the ego may be sufficient ground for the choice of this peculiar gratification. In this masochistic readiness of the ego we are already looking in vain for a rational factor ; suffering has become an end in itself.

The operation of this factor which is independent of the rational pleasure-principle becomes still plainer when we discover our mountaineer engaged in perilous crag-work, where he is exposing his life to serious risks. The narcissistic gratification derived from one's powers of achievement may indeed still play a certain part here, but nobody will fail to see the impulse, completely independent of this narcissistic gratification, to play with death, to expose one's life to serious risks. Here we may conjecture something like a fore-pleasure in relation to the death-instinct.

If we take such observations as the remarkable attraction many people feel to situations of danger, or the fact of the masochistic readiness of the ego which even without any tactical purposes seeks suffering as an end in itself, do these facts necessitate the assumption of an endogenous death instinct ? This much emerges unequivocally from what has already been said, that the rational principle of undergoing suffering for the purpose of avoiding greater pain or gaining pleasure, operates even in processes in which one would readily assume a masochistic gratification or the self-destructive action of the death-instinct. It does not matter whether the case is one of obstacles in external reality or of inhibitions of the super-ego ; the ego is able to take upon itself active restrictions and suffering in order the better to overcome these inhibitions and obstacles. For these restrictions of the instinctual life, the ego utilizes the aggressive or destructive forces which have been defeated by the obstacles of reality and are now turned back against the instinctual life of the self. It is necessary to yield to the more powerful enemy at least at times or in certain places, but the

blind instincts have to have this tactical insight brought home to them by force. The dynamic picture is not altered because the suffering which the ego could not help taking upon itself is eroticized secondarily, because the ego puts the best face on the matter and tries to give a pleasurable turn to this arduous struggle. Freud's view as to instinctual fusion makes possible the concept of an admixture of erotic quantities even in destructive processes, and this should then explain masochistic pleasure.[7]

However, the fact of masochistic pleasure alone does not prove the endogenous character of these self-destructive processes. In any event, the latter issue in part, and in the opinion of many altogether, from the destructive strivings originally directed outward and then turned back. We are indeed made somewhat dubious by those cases in which that masochistic need of the ego plays an outstanding part, in which one does not get the impression that the suffering is only sought for tactical reasons, but rather that it seems itself to be a primary factor. An unequivocal answer to this question as to the presence of a primary death-instinct cannot, however, be obtained by the method of direct clinical observation. Even if it were there, it would always be fused with destructive trends which have been turned back secondarily, and we have no qualitative diagnostic procedure available for distinguishing them. Perhaps, however, an economic consideration will bring us closer to the problem.

We picture the improved pleasure-principle, the reality-principle, in this way: that the psychic apparatus only takes upon itself the precise amount of self-restriction and suffering that is necessary, just as much as is absolutely essential for the attainment of instinctual gratifications. If the external pressure or resistance of reality against our instinctual gratifications has no internal ally in the shape of a death-instinct, these externally imposed self-injuries should only amount to as much as the resistance of reality demands. If, however, there were present a constant endogenous factor such as the death-instinct, then its effect would have to make itself apparent in a larger amount of externally imposed self-injuries than the reality-principle demands. That would mean that human beings do not merely die of attrition against the resistance of reality, and that this attrition receives an endogenous support in the death-instinct, which in turn again hails

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[7] S. Freud, ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ', *Collected Papers*, 1924, Vol. II, p. 255.

an ally in the resistance of reality, because this supports its deadly work. An ego governed exclusively by the pleasure-principle and entirely dominated by the will to live, would have to behave like a Government which under compulsion by an external, more powerful enemy, formally punishes certain offenders who have acted from purely nationalistic, patriotic motives, but not a whit more than is just necessary to preserve outward appearances. The moment, however, that the Government goes further, it is already injuring itself. If we are negotiating with an opponent and objectively put ourselves in his place, we are betraying our own interests. If the ego pays greater regard to the demands of reality than is needed in the interest of instinctual gratification, it is betraying the interests of the id. If the ego turns its capacity for testing reality into an end in itself and does not merely apply it to the service of instinctual demands, if it looks for objective truth, it is giving up its original attachment to the instinctual life and placing itself on the side of reality. The philosophy of the young and vital American nation will not, from its pragmatic standpoint, acknowledge any other than a pragmatic truth, which is in the service of instinctual demands. Too much knowledge can be as harmful as too little knowledge. Too much knowledge means inhibition, and paralyses the aggressive vigour of the id.

This play of forces between the life instinct and destruction can readily be watched in its process of development. Every scientific theory is to begin with a crude approximation, an inadequate provisional battle-formation in the struggle for the domination of the facts. The facts and the critical negations representing them force us to supplement and complete the theory. And so scientific theory grows organically under the double pressure of the negations of the ego as representative of reality, and the affirmations of the id eager for conquest. If, however, the ' no ' came too early, if the investigator knew at the beginning the whole sum of the negative facts which become known in the end, he would never have had the courage to form a theory ; he would have broken down in discouragement under the crushing weight of the facts. On the other hand, however, without his boldness we should never have known the facts which later turn against him. We are only too familiar with the two types of scientists who in their development deviate one-sidedly from the optimum instinctual fusion of the life and death instincts. We know the romantic, usually young, in whom affirmation is predominant, and the critic whom the harshness of the facts has already made despondently

defeatist. Either alone could not survive in the struggle for the truth. The critic who seeks absolute truth independently of his own instinct to dominate reality is already offering death his hand. If this death-pact does not succeed, he owes this solely to the errors of the romantics.

Nur der Irrtum ist das Leben,
Und die Wahrheit ist der Tod.[8]

But not only in its tests of reality does the ego show the tendency to ally itself in greater measure with the external world than would be called for in the interests of instinctual life. We can see that its socially adapted part, the super-ego, may in suitable circumstances be able to represent the interests of the community against those of the instinctual life up to the point of destruction of the life of the self. The question is naturally again whether this identification with social reality is stronger than is unconditionally demanded by the interest of the individual. It is, of course, obvious that as against the community, the individual is the weaker party who must put up with certain restrictions, and that when the super-ego demands these, it serves in the first place the interests of the individual. But if it proves that the super-ego, although it belongs to the psychic system, often in renegade fashion acts more in the interest of the community than in that of the individual and is ready to sacrifice the latter to the former, this seems to argue in favour of the presence of the death-instinct.

The investigator's impetus towards the absolute truth and the self-sacrifice of an individual for the community point to the existence of the death-instinct, even if only by way of circumstantial evidence. It can, however, easily be objected to this circumstantial evidence that in these cases the psychic apparatus is greatly impoverished in narcissistic libido through the strong object-attachment to reality or to its fellow-men, and therefore succumbs more readily to the hostile pressure of the external world and of its own aggressions turned back upon itself. It would then love the external world more than itself and that would lessen its power of resistance. That again would thus not be a proof of the death instinct. Whilst Eros in the form of sublimated object-libido flows out into the external world and binds men to one another in a society, the inner arena of the psychic apparatus remains in far greater degree exposed to the effect of the destructive instinct which has been turned back, and this can now turn more strongly

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[8] "Only errors are life
And the truth is death."

against the original instinctual demands and in such a roundabout way further the growth of social institutions. Whether this process is supported by a primary death-instinct, which by its convergence with the resistance of the external world makes the individual more tractable for social demands, is again a question of relative quantities. We have to allow for four quantities : the *resistance of reality, the sum of the aggressions that have been turned back,* and the relative amounts of *narcissistic libido* and of *object libido.* The operation of the death impulse would only be proved beyond cavil if the equation between these four quantities failed to tally, if the self-destructive effect of the destructive forces checked and turned back by the resistance of the external world and by object-attachments proved greater than the calculation led one to expect ; and this too after taking into account the neutralizing effect of narcissistic libido. If it appears that in many cases men turn against themselves *in greater degree* than the pressure of reality and their love for the outer world demand, this will unequivocally testify to an endogenous self-destructive factor. Because of the impossibility of measuring psychological magnitudes, we begin to doubt whether we shall ever be able to solve the problem of the death-instinct empirically.

What can, however, be affirmed is that two factors condition the turning of the destructive instinct against the self : the resistance of reality, and object-love — the latter when anyone loves a part of reality more than himself, as the scientist loves truth. Through object-love the loved portion of reality is received into the enlarged circle of narcissism, and thus the hostile, destructive aims of the introjected portion of reality succeed in finding their way into the psychic apparatus. The super-ego of the small boy which develops on the basis of a narcissistic identification with the father includes also the inhibitory characters of the father. If the son wishes to be like his father, he must likewise take over his inhibitory characters, his prohibitions. And so the child makes a thoroughly bad bargain : the advantages of the identification signify a promise for the future, ' when he is grown up ' ; the inhibitions, however, enter into force immediately. Any identification with reality is a dangerous thing ; one is taking into oneself the obstacles and even the hostile tendencies of reality, at the same time. In this way a tendency of the external world directed against the psychic apparatus is internalized.

In a similar fashion, however, the death instinct postulated by Freud arose already in the formation of the first living molecule, from

the disintegrative nisus of those chemical combinations which were ingested and incorporated by the growing, living molecule. In its growth the living molecule is constantly taking in explosive combinations, charged with disintegrative tendencies, just as the psychic apparatus admits destructive tendencies from without by every act of identification. The living substance uses the energies originating from disintegration for further building up, but finally in death the disintegrative tendencies triumph, and the biological molecule dissolves into its elements. It certainly does not die solely by the external pressure of reality, it does so by the disintegrative nisus of its own constituents—just as the drop of liquid, which biologists are fond of regarding as the prototype or even as the precursor of the living molecule, breaks up not only under the operation of gravity, but because of its endogenous surface tension which strives for contraction of its surface.

I am aware that the psychological side of my demonstration only has the value of circumstantial evidence. For the disputable death-instinct, and the destructive instinct broken against the resistance of reality and turned back, operate in the same direction, so that it is impossible to distinguish them. The only strict demonstration would, as stated, be to shew that the self-destructive activities are often more intense than the resistance of reality and object-love demand, that we cannot explain the intensity of every observed self-destructive process from the counter-pressure of reality, without assuming an endogenous force acting in the same direction, viz. the death-instinct. To put this in the language of psychology: it would have to be shown that the sadism of the super-ego, which is of course the internal representative of the dynamic pressure of reality upon the instinctual life, is not sufficient, without a primary masochism, to explain suicide and many other self-destructive processes. We have no scales in psychology, and never shall have any. If biology does not come to our help, we are dependent on estimates. It is true, however, that these estimates tell in favour of the existence of a death-instinct.

When we watch the severe self-aggressions of the melancholiac, we can indeed often interpret them, in accordance with the causal pleasure-pain nexus here described, as *tactical preliminaries* for the outbreak of mania, as attempts to disarm the super-ego, but we must not forget that many melancholias are not punctuated by manic phases and that many melancholiacs actually carry out suicide. The so obstinate involutionary melancholias of advanced age likewise do not appear to

us as such psychologically conditioned preliminaries for a manic phase. In these the picture is dominated by the enhanced effect in old age of the endogenous death-instinct. Biological considerations, however, demand the assumption of a death-instinct in an unequivocal way. From the beginning of life the disintegrative nisus of the elements of the highly complex biological molecule is active within it. It constitutes the core of the self-destructive tendencies upon which the later ones of the ego and the super-ego are deposited. It is then merely a question of convention from what point onward one talks of a death-instinct.

The controversy about an endogenous death instinct reminds me of the discussions whether the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was due to the pressure of the external enemy or the disintegrative nisus of its many heterogeneous parts. Under the magnifying glass of sociology, the problem is easier to solve, and no one questions the answer that both factors were operative. The continuance of the psychic apparatus, exactly as of a state, is the more endangered the more complex it is, i.e. the more identifications it has carried through without organic union of the identification-products.

Psychological experience shows that the super-ego, this last product of identification with reality, marks the greatest source of danger for the continuance of the psychic apparatus. It has not yet been organically absorbed into the ego, and, highly charged with the aggressions of the external world, it betrays forcibly that it belongs to external reality. 'The super-ego is the part of the psychic apparatus which displays least solidarity with it. But the ego, too, represents such an identification-product, originating from the id by partial identification with reality, and in part taking into itself the resistance of reality in relation to the id. This internalized resistance manifests itself as the primary masochism of the ego. Still deeper down there is the disintegrative nisus of the body, active since the beginning of life.

The surface tension which arrests the growth of the drop of liquid and disrupts it, the decomposition of the biological molecule into its elements during the katabolic phase of metabolism, the self-destruction of the psychic apparatus, the breaking up of states and cultures: all these are expressions of the same regressive dynamic principle, which counteracts growth and life just as the momentum of inertia opposes the formation of higher dynamic units, and which we should all so much like to forget or deny in its biological manifestation as the death-instinct.

THE IMPATIENCE OF HAMLET

BY

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One can, perhaps, best pay tribute to the strenuous labours of the leader of the psycho-analytical movement in England by following a path where he has led. In the field of applied psycho-analysis, Ernest Jones has made works of creative art yield up significances inaccessible before the advent of psycho-analysis. His essay upon the tragedy of *Hamlet* lucidly and comprehensively makes clear the unresolved Œdipus conflict which is the fundamental problem in the play.

There is nothing further to contribute to this theme; but this having been so clearly elucidated, one is left free to gather from the play the lighting-up of the regressive movement of the libido due to the retreat from the central Œdipus difficulty. The study of the particular nature of the regression gives us an understanding of that '*Hamlet*' quality which makes the Œdipus situation in his case so peculiarly fascinating and individual. The problem of his procrastination receives further elucidation in the light of evidence of pre-genital fixations, and the subtlety of his behaviour becomes more understandable.

The tragedy of *Hamlet*, I submit, is not a tragedy of procrastination, but, on the contrary, a tragedy of impatience. This is true, at least in varying ways, in varying circumstances, of *Romeo and Juliet*, *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *King Lear*. At crucial moments in these plays the heroes exhibit an impatience, a precipitation of action, that brings life tumbling about their ears like a pack of cards. They cannot wait. This seems paradoxical in the case of *Hamlet*, for the play is one long-drawn-out delay in doing a deed for which the stage is set at the beginning. Yet blind, impetuous action betrays Hamlet in the end, not procrastination. The following is an attempt to unravel the meaning of this.

Hamlet is presented to us at the beginning of the tragedy as the son who has been bereaved of his father, the King. He has lost a loved object by death. He has experienced an emotional trauma in his mother's speedy marriage. (Impatience is to be noted at the outset.) At this juncture, or shortly afterwards, Ophelia refuses Hamlet audience at her father's bidding. Hamlet then has lost his

father, his mother and his lover. He is rebuffed by Ophelia when he most needed a stronghold in the reality-world. She fails him too.

The death of a beloved father alone would mean a natural withdrawal from the world and a period of mourning. The emotional loss due to his mother's immediate re-marriage, the withdrawal of Ophelia, immensely complicate the task of mourning. To this must be added the knowledge he has gained that his father was murdered.

Freud and Abraham have elucidated the work of natural mourning, and have correlated with this the mechanism of melancholia. The mourning of Hamlet was consequent on the loss of his father; the melancholic trends followed the loss of his mother and Ophelia. In mourning, the external world is robbed of interest.

'This goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory':

'Man delights not me: no, nor woman neither'.

In melancholia the feeling of loss becomes an internal experience. Self-depreciation and self-reproach impoverish the mind.

'I could accuse me of such things that it were better my mother had not borne me';

'What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven?'

The play abounds with meditations of this type. We know from psycho-analytical researches what this mood means. It betokens a narcissistic withdrawal of libido from external objects. Hamlet's hold on reality remains in his narcissistic interests and affections. He lights up with eager interest at the coming of the players. He turns in his distress to Horatio.

> 'Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
> And could of men distinguish, her election
> Hath seal'd thee for herself';

This narcissistic withdrawal, as we know, is consequent upon the introjection of the lost love-objects. The accusations made against the self are really accusations meant for the lost love-objects. They have become identified with the ego. The ego, thus identified, becomes the object of the sadism of the super-ego, and peace will come when these introjections are cast out, ejected, killed. Then again the ego can be approved by the super-ego.

The interplay of these institutions in the mind becomes clearer if one reads the tragedy as a creation of Shakespeare's mind; if one views it, that is, as a projection of the *author's* conflict in dramatic form. One needs to think in terms of the creator, not in terms of

Hamlet. From this point of view Hamlet himself is the focus of the play, but the other characters provide that dramatization of the conflicting institutions in the mind of the author. For Shakespeare dramatized in *Hamlet* his own regression after his father's death. Some authorities state that he lost Mary Fitton at the same time. In externalizing the introjected objects in dramatic form he delivered himself from ' the something in his soul '. He freed himself through a sublimation, in a way that bears analogy to the ejection, killing, of the introjections made into the ego.

The poet is not Hamlet. Hamlet is what he might have been if he had not written the play of *Hamlet*. The characters are all introjections thrown out again from his mind. He is the murdered majesty of Denmark, he is the murdered Claudius, he is the Queen, Gertrude, and Ophelia. He is Hamlet. He has killed them and himself by writing the play. He has ejected all of them symbolically and remains a sane man, through a sublimation that satisfies the demands of the super-ego and the impulses of the id.

The internal drama of the poet's mind seems to be externalized in the following way.

Ambivalence throughout the play is conveyed by the coupling or contrasting of characters.

The dead King is a foil to Claudius. The loving attitude to the father is direct in Hamlet's rapturous eulogy.

> ' See, what a grace was seated on this brow ;
> Hyperion's curls, the front of Jove himself,
> An eye like Mars, to threaten and command.'

Claudius, this King's brother, represents the wicked aspect of the father, towards which Hamlet's hostility is directed.

> ' O villain, villain, smiling, damned, villain ! '
>
> ' Like a mildew'd ear
> Blasting his wholesome brother '.

The ghost that walks represents this ideal father-imago. Claudius is the embodiment of that wicked father who frustrates him and stands ' between the election and his hopes '.

When the ghost becomes a denizen of the nether world, he is ' the old fellow in the cellarage '. There he is suffering for his sins, and the reproaches he makes against himself are in line with the self-reproaches that Claudius makes and are to be identified with Hamlet's own. Thus we have the entombed ghost, Hamlet and Claudius identified.

This is representative of the incorporation of the wicked father into the ego. The ghost that walked is symbolical of the super-ego whose sadism is directed against the ego, externalized for us as Claudius.

This theme repeats itself in another setting as the tension due to super-ego sadism increases. Laertes carries on this rôle. He has a father killed and sister lost. He represents the gathering urgency toward precipitate action in Hamlet's own mind.

> ' The ocean, overpeering of his list,
> Eats not the flats with more impetuous haste
> Than young Laertes '.

Hamlet says earlier :—

> ' With wings as swift
> As meditation or the thoughts of love,
> May sweep to my revenge '.

Hamlet (in ego rôle) says to Laertes (in super-ego rôle) :

> ' Was't Hamlet wrong'd Laertes ? Never Hamlet :
> If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away,
> And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes,
> Then Hamlet does it not.
> Who does it, then ? His madness : If't be so,
> Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong'd :
> His madness is poor Hamlet's enemy '.

In the final debâcle Hamlet is killed by Laertes, that is, super-ego kills ego. He is hoodwinked to his death by Laertes, by his own super-ego. Here one remembers that Laertes acts on the suggestion of Claudius, and we see in dramatic form what Freud has formulated in psycho-analysis, that in the unconscious the super-ego and the id have their own alliances.

Punishment falls on Hamlet at last. He voices it as being the desert of every man.

> ' Use every man after his desert, and who shall 'scape whipping ? '

At that moment, he disentangles himself from the introjected object and kills Claudius.

The occasion of Hamlet's betrayal to death is the challenge to a duel with Laertes, a sadistic challenge that he cannot resist. He is at the mercy of his own super-ego sadism. He is unconscious of it. He is taken off his guard.

> ' He, being remiss,
> Most generous and free from all contriving,
> Will not peruse the foils '.

It is this urgency of the sadism of the super-ego that leads me to assert that fundamentally the impatience of Hamlet, not procrastination, is the central problem of the play.

Mourning needs the factor of time. Melancholia needs longer still. Hamlet could not tolerate this waiting time, the self-depreciation, loss of love and impoverishment of spirit implicit in this state. To penetrate to the root of this fundamental impatience we must turn for help to the dramatic representations of the other love-objects, the mother and Ophelia.

Ophelia presents to us precisely the same problem as Hamlet. It is the same *motif* in the woman as in the man. She has a father killed. Hamlet's death is a dramatized suicide, super-ego and ego rôles being allotted to different characters. In Ophelia the different institutions of the mind are not separated out. We are given the facts. Her father is killed; she goes mad; she drowns herself. That is an epitome of the elaborated dramatized suicidal theme of the whole play. It implies what is explicit in the play, namely, a narcissistic withdrawal after the father's death, the incorporation of the lost love-object, the reproaches against this loved one directed to the self, and the swift nemesis brought about by the super-ego sadism turned against the ego. The reproach against the father (Polonius) was clearly that of frustration. The living person towards whom her suicide is a hostile act, the person from whose heart her death will wring pity and remorse, is the Queen (the mother-imago). To the Queen, Ophelia turns first in her madness.

'Where is the beauteous majesty of Denmark?'

The Queen says

'I will not speak with her'.

Ophelia puts on a garland of crowflowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples,

'That liberal shepherds give a grosser name,
But our cold maids do dead men's fingers call them'.

In the water, symbolical of the mother's womb, she is

'Like a creature native and indued
Unto that element . . .'

Her garments are 'heavy with their drink'. She has returned to the mother, the separation from whose breast was the pattern on which all later frustrations, with their unsolved problems of anxiety and hostility, were built.

The theme of ' madness ' in the Hamlet rôle is worked out completely in the Ophelia rôle. Hamlet assumes ' an antic disposition '. But there is no ' assumption ' of it when Hamlet speaks to Laertes ; he confesses that he has partially lost control.

> ' If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away,
> And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes,
> Then Hamlet does it not '.

In Ophelia the madness is manifest, whereas in Hamlet we see the struggle being waged. This madness is an urgency to self-destruction. Hamlet's procrastination is a vain endeavour to stem the tide of this urgency, an ekeing-out of time. It is an elaborate slowness to combat swiftness, against which he is battling for self-preservation. Ophelia is then the feminine aspect of Hamlet. Speaking of Hamlet, the Queen says :

> ' Anon, as patient as the female dove,
> When that her golden couplets [1] are disclos'd
> His silence will sit drooping '.

Hamlet speaking of himself, says :

> ' Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice '.

The meaning of the feminine identification is clear in the text. The mother is the castrator. The play abounds in symbols of this type.

> ' the sepulchre
> Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws,
> To cast thee up again '.

> ' 'Tis now the very witching time of night
> When churchyards yawn '.

Queen Gertrude has a second husband. The player Queen says :

> ' A second time I kill my husband dead,
> When second husband kisses me in bed '.

The feminine identification achieves the castration of the father in the feminine way. We have every evidence of this in the play. The theme of a ' trap ' occurs constantly. Polonius sets a trap to pry on his son. Hamlet catches Polonius in a trap, when he hides behind the arras. Claudius makes a trap for catching Hamlet in sending him to England. Hamlet is trapped into a duel with Laertes. ' Springes to catch woodcocks ', says Polonius to Ophelia, referring to Hamlet's

[1] Couplets = eggs.

overtures. ' As a woodcock to mine own Springe ', says the dying Laertes. Denmark is a prison. Hell is a trap. Death is ' an eternal cell '. Says Hamlet to Ophelia :

> *Hamlet :* ' That's a fair thought to lie between maid's legs.
> *Ophelia :* What is, my lord ?
> *Hamlet :* Nothing '.

The climax of the play is the performance by the players of the Murder of Gonzalo. It is the quintessence of the story. Hamlet arranges for it to be played. He names it himself ' The Mouse-Trap '. It is designed to ' catch the conscience of the King '. That is, Hamlet in the feminine rôle plays the part of the entrapper, the castrator of the father. This brings us directly to the reproaches which he makes against his mother. The first of these is haste, urgency.

> ' the funeral baked-meats
> Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables '.
>
> ' A little month, or ere those shoes were old
> With which she follow'd my poor father's body,
> Like Niobe, all tears . . . '

This reproach against his mother for the speed with which she married again is to be understood further in the light of the infantile phantasies of sexual intercourse that are revealed.

> ' She would hang on him
> As if increase of appetite had grown
> By what it fed on '.
>
> ' So lust, though to a radiant angel link'd,
> Will sate itself in a celestial bed
> And prey on garbage '.
>
> ' Have you eyes ?
> Could you on this fair mountain have to feed
> And batten on this moor ? '

Claudius is a drunkard.

> ' The King doth wake to-night and takes his rouse,
> Keeps wassail . . .
> And, as he drinks his draughts of Rhenish down . . . '

In the final scene the Queen precipitately drinks to Hamlet's fortune. Claudius tries to stop her.

> ' I will, my Lord. I pray you, pardon me '.

We reach along this route the furthest regression of the libido to the oral zone, to the phantasies of the relationship between the parents

in terms of the earliest Œdipus setting, that of mutual feeding. The frustration at the breast, the loss of love, the reproach against the mother lead to an identification with her, for she feeds on the father.

That the fundamental problem is the oral sadism attendant upon oral frustration is clear enough in the text of the play.

> ' I should have fatted all the region kites
> With this slave's offal '.
>
> ' Now could I drink hot blood '.
>
> ' We fat all creatures, else to fat us '.
>
> ' The ocean
> Eats not the flats with more impetuous haste
> Than young Laertes '.

Oral frustration, oral impatience, oral sadism are inseparable.

The super-ego sadism turns upon the ego and destroys it when that ego is identified with the frustrating love-objects. Yet the sadistic super-ego, as we know, being unconscious, has its alliances with the destructive, hostile, aggressive id-impulses that in the oral stage manifest themselves in eating phantasies directed against the parents.

> ' Now could I drink hot blood '.
> ' Woo't drink up Esill ? eat a crocodile ?
> I'll do't '.

In this oral stage the loved object is a property. The mother is a breast, the father a penis, both of them adjuncts only to the baby's need for food, love, protection. The necessity to keep them as personal property is rooted in the anxiety that hostility causes when frustration occurs.

The theme of personal property is not only to be found in the Hamlet theme, but we find that also for the murdered King and for Claudius the Queen is a ' possession '.

> ' Thus was I, sleeping, by a brother's hand
> Of life, of crown, of Queen, at once despatch'd '.
> ' Since I am still possess'd
> Of those effects for which I did the murder,
> My crown, mine own ambition and my queen.
> May one be pardon'd and retain the offence ? '

There was a popular superstition in Shakespeare's time that spirits returned to earth to guard hidden treasure.

Horatio, in addressing the ghost, says :

' If thou hast uphoarded in thy life
Extorted treasure in the womb of earth
For which, they say, you spirits oft walk in death,
Speak of it '.

The ' prostitute ' theme swings to and fro between the man and woman. Claudius is ' the bloat King ' who ' paddles in your neck with his damned fingers '. The Queen ' battens on this moor '. Proud Death holds the final feast in her eternal cell.

The ' prostitute ', male and female, is rooted at the oral level, where mother and father are merged into one figure. ' My mother : father and mother is man and wife : man and wife is one flesh : and so, my mother '.

From this parasitic dependence we see the constant struggles towards freedom.

' Duller should'st thou be than the fat weed
That roots itself in ease on Lethe's wharf,
Would'st thou not stir in this ? '

' O liméd soul, that struggling to be free
Art more engag'd ! '

Hamlet's other self is Horatio. He is what Hamlet wishes to be.

' As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing '.

He is not

' A pipe for fortune's finger
To sound what stop she please '.

As Horatio takes the poisoned cup to drink it, Hamlet dashes it from him.

' As thou'rt a man
Give me the cup : let go : by heaven, I'll have't '.

' *As thou'rt a man* '. Horatio must speak for Hamlet ; Horatio must do what Hamlet has not been able to do. The whole story of the tragedy lies in Hamlet's injunction to Horatio :

' Absent thee from felicity awhile
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain
To tell my story '.

This absence from felicity, the breath of pain in a harsh world, Hamlet could not bear.

' Had I but time—as this fell sergeant, death,
Is strict in his arrest—O, I could tell you—
But let it be ! '

The tragedy of Hamlet is one of impatience. Fortinbras takes the stage. He succeeds to the kingdom left by the deaths of Claudius, Gertrude and Hamlet.

> ' I have some rights of memory in this kingdom,
> Which now to claim my vantage doth invite me.'

So Shakespeare, having externalized and elaborated the inner conflict on his father's death, kept the course of sanity. It is perhaps the range and depth of this power to dramatize the inner forces of the soul that made him at once the world's greatest playwright and a simple normal man.

To read Freud and Abraham on the subject of mourning and melancholia alongside with *Hamlet* is to be impressed again with the majesty of human achievement. Science and art here fit exactly; they are completely wedded.

In the endeavour to probe the working of the human mind, science and art are both indispensable. Scientists will fail unless there is fused with science something of creative art; the artist will fail unless he has the detachment and objectivity of the scientist. Psychoanalysis is both science and art. Freud, and the followers of Freud with something of courage akin to his, lay bare in their own minds and the minds of others the dramas that the great poets project on to the world's stage.

THE FLIGHT TO REALITY

BY

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Phantasies are always better or worse than reality—a truism, perhaps.

Yet we may ask ourselves why, in speaking of them, we tend to think first of the ' better than reality ', the day-dream type (I do not think I am libelling my fellow-analysts in making this assumption) ; and why in this thought-region where the pleasure-principle holds undiminished sway [1] terrifying phantasies should play the very large part which they undoubtedly do. The ' day-dream ' phantasy says, ' this is what I should like '. But of the ' worse than reality ' type no such simple statement is possible. These are in no circumstances whatever what ' I ' should like : they are distinctly what ' I ' should not like. If they were carried out in reality ' I ' should be seriously damaged or should even cease to be at all.

I will suggest some solutions.

(1) These are disguised phantasies of castration. But this is obviously no solution, and even presents us with an additional problem : why disguise a phantasy of disaster by that of a worse disaster ? I am thinking particularly of phantasies of being cut, eaten, burnt up, of wholesale destruction.

(2) These show the presence of a masochistic factor. Undoubtedly. Little Hans, for instance, in his fear of being bitten by the horse, gives some expression to his wish for a love-bite from his father. But this does not at all explain why ' sexual masochism ' should place the ego in fear not merely of hurt, but of complete destruction. The mention of ' sexual masochism ', however, reminds us that there is also the factor of ' moral masochism ' : little hans thinks his father would bite him because of his own evil wishes towards him.[2] Thus my third suggestion is :

(3) that in these phantasies id masochism is reinforced by super-ego sadism [3] ; and

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[1] Freud, ' Formulations regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 161.

[2] Freud, ' Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 267.

[3] Freud, ' The Economic Problem in Masochism ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 267.

(4) that the first type of phantasy is the ' because ' of the second. That is, a ' better than reality ' phantasy-wish runs the risk of a ' worse than reality ' phantasy-result. The two types of phantasy are by no means distinct, and analysts are right in thinking first of the wish-phantasy, since what we may now call the punishment-phantasy is secondary, the result of the wish.

In fact, we may say that the phantasies always go in pairs, just as in children's games: the playing of a wish-situation, e.g. making a 'bus and acting the rôle of conductor, is always associated with some anxiety-situation: e.g. that they will not be able to get out of the 'bus, not be able to stop it, that the 'bus will run over them, etc.

Now it is clear that we have as much right to give the name of phantasy to these punishment-situations as to the wish-situations with which they are connected. One is as remote from reality as the other, from *material* reality, that is: both have equal *psychic* reality; on that it can hardly be necessary to insist. The little boy ' conductor ' who wants to possess and control his mother's body, its exits and entrances, does ' really ' want that, but is in no ' real ' danger of being shut up inside her (eaten up or castrated), forced by her to dangerous cohabitation, or killed by her or his father for his naughty wishes; though he ' really ' feels as if he is. Our chief difficulty does not lie there. It lies rather in understanding how it has come about that the realm of phantasy, split off from full ego-control for retention of pleasure-principle in thought, should be equally accessible to super-ego punishment as to id pleasure-mechanisms. Some answer may perhaps be found, as we said before, in the fact that id masochism provides some pleasure-basis for the super-ego sadism. But this cannot be the whole story, because play, interrupted by anxiety-situations, such as I have indicated, will be happily resumed on interpretation of punishment-mechanisms: ' You are afraid that such and such a thing will happen to you because you wish to do such and such a thing to mother '. Thus super-ego sadism and not id masochism must play the main rôle. Why then should super-ego have such sway in the world of phantasy?

Ernest Jones, with his outstanding power of critical investigation and exposition, called attention to some of the doubtful or weak places in our knowledge of super-ego structure [4] in the paper he contributed to the Special Numbers of the psycho-analytic *Journal* and *Zeitschrift* in

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[4] International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. VII, Parts 3 and 4, p. 303.

honour of Professor Freud, 1926. It is a stimulating paper, and it is fitting that some small and perhaps slightly indirect result of the stimulus there given should find a place in Dr. Jones' own Special Number. The point to which I am specifically referring is his query as to the super-ego's double relation to external reality and to the id. ' The ego is the part of the id that is altered by the influence of the outer world, and the super-ego is a differentiated part of the ego, again one brought about under the influence of the outer world. On the one hand, we read that the super-ego stands nearer to the id than does the ego, is independent of the latter and represents to it the demands of the id, though the id can also influence the ego directly as well as through the super-ego. On the other hand it is just through its connection with the outer world, the reality-demands of which it represents, that the super-ego gains its power of affecting the ego. The full explanation seems to be that the super-ego in some obscure way combines influences from both the inner and the outer world, from the id and from external reality, and that these are then directed towards the ego.'

This then gives the answer to our query. The wish-fulfilment rôle of phantasy is still operative in punishment-phantasies because the super-ego retains its id pleasure-mechanisms, and enjoys its sadistic rôle of threatening and terrifying the ego, or better, because in so doing the sadism of the super-ego is satisfied. It is obvious that when this is very marked, some very high cathexis of the super-ego from id libidinal sources must have taken place. It is tempting to go further into this question and to take up the challenge of Dr. Jones' words, ' in some obscure way ', but this lies outside the scope of my paper. Here I must be content if I can to any extent clear the ground for the attempts which must certainly be made in due course.

The point now reached is this : in the primary wish-phantasy the id derives its pleasure from the internal instead of from the external world ; in the secondary or resulting punishment-phantasy the id derives its pleasure indirectly through the super-ego in employing its sadism against the ego, against the internal, instead of against the external world. Thus external reality stands in a position mid-way between the two sets of phantasies, as my opening sentence stated in a slightly different form. It is worse than the one and better than the other. But external reality is not homogeneous in either length or breadth. It differs for each individual at different times ; it differs at any one time in different parts of itself. That is, for every individual

it stands nearer to the one and further from the other type of phantasy at different times of life and at different points in the same time of life. At the different times and places at which external reality approximates least to the wish-phantasy and most to the punishment-phantasy, there in general the neurotic's flight *from* reality becomes most marked. This is familiar enough and hardly worth restating. It is the corresponding and only less important fact which seems to me to have received scant attention. Where, for whatever cause, punishment-phantasies are very intense and external reality sufficiently accommodating, there is a flight *to* reality from the punishment-phantasies. But since the intensity of punishment-phantasies bears a direct relation to the intensity of wish-phantasies, it is possible in favourable circumstances to watch the two phenomena of flight from reality and flight to reality acting together, alternating or interacting. This is clear in every-day life ; it is, I think, an important source of the over-determined phenomenon of ambivalence.[5] The mother may stand equidistant from both phantasy-situations. She does not give herself sexually to her child as the wish-mother would do ; neither does she punish the child (for its wish to be revenged on her for this frustration) in the wholesale manner of the ' strict mother ' of the punishment-phantasies ; her worst punishments are far removed from these, which quite regularly show father or mother cutting, burning, eating up the bad child, etc. Thus in a moment, with a very small reality-change, she appears to make the tremendous change from the wish-mother to the ' terrible mother '. I have never had the opportunity of analysing a child treated with deliberate and long-drawn-out cruelty ; the closest approximation to the ' terrible parents ' of phantasy which I know personally, consists in the lengthy withdrawal of love : temporary,

[5] Only since writing the above have I read Radó's observations on the same subject in his paper ' The Problem of Melancholia ' (This JOURNAL, Vol. IX, pp. 431–432). Agreeing in much, we disagree in thinking that even a very little child's ego is so weak as to believe *there really are* two distinct mothers, good and bad, and that only education can help the child to a synthesis of these into one person. Bunny, when aged two and three-quarters, might regard me at one moment as a good, at the other moment as a bad parent ; but he never really *thought* I was two different people from one moment to the next. The child's problem is to account for the puzzling difference between the way things *feel* and the way they *are*.

Hence Dr. Radó and I also disagree as to when we should begin to call these varying attitudes in the child signs of true ambivalence.

even severe punishments, particularly when they are spontaneous, are far more bearable than this. For example, a patient who for some time when a child lived in a very lonely spot without maids, was once ' sent to Coventry ' by both father and mother consistently for several days. But the punishment-phantasy was of being abandoned for ever, stripped and starving. There were others, but this was the most anxiety-laden, because reality offered her no refuge from it : she had heard a tale of actual ill-treatment of a child by its mother along somewhat similar lines, and a cynical uncle in her hearing had said that it probably served the child right. The phantasy had such psychic reality that in any kind of solitude the patient suffered the extreme of torture for years. Yet even here, external reality was a long way behind the phantasy : neither parents nor uncle were of the type who would do anything of the sort, and but for her unconscious need for punishment she would have known this.

Now here comes to our mind a familiar situation in which parents and nurses definitely step into the rôle of a reality-refuge from phantasy, particularly in child-phobias and night-terrors. They say to the frightened child, ' Look, it won't hurt you ', and it doesn't. ' There isn't really anything there to be frightened about ', and there isn't. ' Don't be silly, you are quite all right really ', and supported by this measure of love and understanding the child magically feels ' all right '. This is, of course, a very long way from being the wish-parent of full understanding ; and the help, such as it is, has constantly to be repeated, since the magic does not last ; the anxiety has been allayed, not dispelled. The same result comes about by a different mechanism when the child is admonished angrily. Then the fear of the parent's anger may be sufficient addition to the child's previous efforts to master its anxiety, and once again the ego has been strengthened in its task and has found the help in reality. This situation both child and adult patients then recreate for themselves. They tell themselves not to be silly, they couldn't possibly think anything as absurd as that ; or, *via* the mechanism of projection, tell the analyst not to be so silly and childish ; or shout their terrors with wild repetition in the hope that, as in childhood, they will find a strong re-inforcement of their own ego-attempts in a forcible and angry demand that they shall not be foolish. I am now accustomed to exploit to the full that intermediate position towards both realities, psychic and external, and towards both phantasy-positions which gives the analyst the unique possibility of solving the difficulties of his patients. There are times

when both for children and adults it proves useful to say, ' Yes, it is quite true that it *feels* like that; and yet it is also true, as you used to be told when you were frightened, that there really *is* nothing there to frighten you '. One thus takes on oneself all the virtue of the re-assuring parents' appeal to the reality-sense, in addition to that further reassurance of the validity of the psychic reality which no parent could give. In this way the flight to reality, which is necessary when phantasies are too anxiety-laden, becomes a help and not a hindrance in analysis. Again, while the analyst does not in actuality become the imago-parent of the sexual wishes, he yet does become the still more important imago-parent in the way of understanding, coming to the support of the ego in its struggle, and is very far removed from the imago-parent of the punishment-phantasies. This fact gives the patient the possibility of weathering the disappointment due to the non-fulfilment of the sexual wishes. What he needs is relief from anxiety, and this comes when the weak ego feels assured that another ego, really knowing what the dangers are, has come to his assistance.

This set of circumstances is displayed over and over again with the utmost vividness in children's play. While happy play is obviously in the service of the id-libidinal phantasies and is a denial of, or an attempt to alter, reality,[6] there also appears the anxiety due to punishment-phantasies inseparable from the id-wishes expressed in the play; and thus there will at times appear the utmost concern that the play should be as ' real ' as possible. These ' times ' prove always to be the points where the punishment-phantasies threaten to emerge. For example, to return to the ' 'bus ' play: just when the child's self-made ' 'bus ' is behaving in the most ideal manner, and I am playing with him in any rôle he may wish, there may appear a desire for re-assurance that this or that is what a ' real ' 'bus would do, that this or that detail is like a ' real ' 'bus, and so on. This, be it remarked in passing, is only when the anxiety is not too great; otherwise anything may happen, from the mere abandonment of the game for another until the same situation reappears, to an outbreak of violence because nothing can do away with the feeling of reality of the punishment-phantasies; then I and everything around become full of menace. But in milder anxieties this appeal to reality may temporarily be sufficient, because after all real 'buses do not suddenly run away with one, or prevent one getting

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[6] Melanie Klein, ' Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children ', *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. VII, pp. 187–188.

out when one is once in, or even run over one unless one gets directly in their path. (With increase of experience, one does not wait to test the sufficiency of this reality-appeal ; where anxiety is indicated, there is the moment for interpretation, as Mrs. Klein has often said, repeating in another form Freud's dictum that the business of the analyst is the analysis of the resistances.)

Instances could be multiplied, but a particularly telling one is that afforded by three-year-old Bunny. I have an electric stove in my room, and for quite a considerable period he would at intervals, directly he came into my room, ask for an explanation of the way it worked ; this I always gave in a simple form, and it apparently satisfied him. When his play gave me the additional evidence and the opportunity, I interpreted his wish to know ' how it worked ' as his wish to know how Daddy's ' peter ' had been working in Mummy during the night. The interpretation seemed satisfactory, and yet at intervals the opening question recurred. His own play later showed the difficulty in the clearest light. I had to be ' strict Daddy ', and when Bunny said to me, ' I'm going to take your fire away, I'm going to take *all* your fire away ', ' strict Daddy ' had to say, ' *What's that, what's that?* ' and make some mock-threatening movement towards him. I was very fully instructed in the part I had to play. After this—and the play was repeated on two or three occasions—Bunny either turned off the stove or part of it, or threw water at it. Then expressing a wish to urinate he took out his penis, defiantly showing me that he had an erection ; that passing, he urinated, with signs of anxiety, and of his wish to do so at me. Now we see more of the situation. The id-wish was clear first. By my explanation of the working of the stove I became the wish-father explaining ' how it was done '. He wanted to take away and destroy all Daddy's ' fire ', and the punishment-phantasies were correspondingly intense : Daddy would be a very dangerous Daddy. He played this game ensconced in the depths of a big couch, I a good distance away ; he might come to me, I was not to go to him. Still later, when his anxiety was further diminished, he moved the stove on one side, or rather, asked me to do so for him—' taking away Daddy's fire '. Then he burnt up some pieces of paper, saying that he was strict Daddy burning up bad Bunny. Now we have the whole of the punishment-phantasy, or at least that part of it which concerns the father. He wanted to take away Daddy's ' fire ', i.e. the hot or erect ' peter ', and have it for himself, which in his phantasy was what happened when he himself had an erection ; then this ' fire ' might

prove dangerous to him and must be destroyed, put out or *washed away*—an important point in enuresis. Further, not only Daddy's ' fire ' but Daddy himself would be dangerous ; strict Daddy would burn him up, and even the wish-mother-couch might not be a safe refuge. Hence the opening requests for reality explanations. The ' real ' fire only warmed the room comfortably ; he could, within wide limits, turn it off and on himself. It was quite safe to inquire as to its working. It was not nearly as good as his ' wish ' fire, but it was a very great deal better than his ' feared ' fire. I again was not, at best, as good as the wish-father : I did not say to him ' Yes, Bunny, this is yours for good and all ; take it and break it, and you shall have no risks to run and no inconvenience to suffer '. But I was, at worst, a very great deal better than the ' feared ' or ' strict ' father of phantasy. We see a similar ' flight to reality ' in the ' taking away ' play with its very exact reproduction of the serio-comic father, i.e. the *real* father (as compared with the phantasy ' strict father ' who would burn him up). I do not, of course, mean that he had never met with a stricter father in reality than this play father ; that is obvious. But in Bunny's case it would be but seldom ; this was his father's predominant way of dealing with his small son if he were tiresome : I think it highly unlikely that he had ever seen his father very seriously angry, or more than annoyed. Again, in his questioning I had been the real analyst, understanding and patient ; in the game he makes me strict and threatening in a way the analyst never is : if interpretations have not been sufficiently to the point to relieve anxiety and actual prohibitions have become essential, they are always preceded by a request to ' do it some other way '.

This part of the play does, then, contain some elements of flight from reality, e.g. the stricter father of fact, but far more marked is the flight *to* reality, and *from* the strict father of phantasy. It is only in the last, burning, play that there is no flight to reality at all as far as phantasy is concerned ; the child can tolerate the full force of the punishment-phantasy, albeit with some still unresolved anxiety.

The point about the exceedingly careful investment of the play ' strict father ' with his actual words, tones, gestures, etc., strikes me as interesting. I recall dreams in which the dreamer has been struck by the extraordinary fidelity to fact of a dream person in speech, manner, individual traits, and so on, accompanied in the telling by the remark, ' but that is just like him ', ' exactly what he would really say '

or ' do '. And I feel convinced that it is evidence of this same ' flight to reality ' and away from some phantasy-situation of terror.

It is, of course, quite evident that such a ' flight to reality ' presupposes a well-developed reality-sense in some directions. And actually little Bunny, for all his severe phobias, had, like little Hans, in other respects a well-developed ego ; he was very intelligent and gave a general impression of normality. One does not find the mechanism at all marked where the reality sense is feeble, unless possibly in the sense of the reality of the body. I mean that the flight to physical illness may contain some elements of the same mechanism : one recalls the comfort of the feeling that the physical pain or illness is ' real ' as compared with the disturbing shadows of mental suffering. But in the general sense of a flight to external, other-than-self reality, all those adult patients in whom this is a predominant mechanism have unusually good capacities ; they have in actual life realized a large part of their ambitions, and their anxieties have been satisfactorily cloaked, indeed, generally apparently absent, until through some cause or other the mechanism has partially failed. Only analysis could discover the part it plays in the lives of successful people who have never broken down, but one surmises that it must play an important rôle. One is tempted to say that life can be one vast rationalization. All rationalizations are, of course, evidence of this same flight to reality. In general I am in agreement with Kapp [7] that mankind turns to reality in a flight from sensation, if sensation means (1) pain or discomfort arising from instinctual tensions (in which case the statement becomes a truism) ; (2) sensation become dangerous because of associated punishment-phantasies. But I do not think that this throws any light on the philosophical question as to whether there is an independent reality to which to flee, or whether ' sense-data are only the result of externalizing the knowledge of occurrences within our bodies '.

A not unrelated train of thought brings us to the psychotic's final hold on reality in the form of words, and his intense cathexis of words in attempts at recovery.[8] They are after all ' only words ', and therefore not to be feared. The sublimated form of this is, as we know, the

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[7] ' Exognosis ', a paper read to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in November, 1927. Summary in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. IX, p. 277.

[8] Freud, ' The Unconscious ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 136.

poet's delight in words as things. If my very psychotic seven-year-old patient began to quibble over the meaning of a word I always knew that serious trouble was ahead unless I could by interpretation relieve his anxiety. It is, of course, also a very useful danger-signal in adult cases.

I have come round full circle from the importance of this mechanism in apparently normal successful people to brief mention of it in the most abnormal, and in so doing have passed over many enticing questions of its exploitation in various spheres. Ella Sharpe, in a paper on ' History as Phantasy ',[9] gives a fascinating and detailed account of a delusional case in which intense interest in history, chiefly in the form of interest in the lives of certain historical personages, proved one of the main strongholds against terrifying phantasies. Indeed, we should not be altogether wrong if we were to look at sublimation in general from this point of view, since it is possible only where reality is not too highly libidinised, i.e. where it remains reality, secure from the dangers of phantasy. Obviously sublimation is not to be understood merely as a flight from phantasy, since it may take the form of the direct use of these very phantasies (art, psychoanalysis from one aspect), and since also we see sublimations becoming more secure and satisfying as the power of the punishment-phantasy is lessened. It would make a fascinating piece of research to inquire into variations in different types of sublimations as the anxiety connected with them is reduced, and they become less compulsive, partaking less of the nature of flight. But it would take many papers to deal adequately with this whole subject.

I want in conclusion to return to the question of the reality values of words. Ernest Jones some time ago developed into an interesting paper [10] previous work by Freud [11] and Ferenczi [12] on the danger of affect-laden nursery and obscene words in general, and the consequent avoidance of them. Jones suggests (p. 397) ' that the development of the outstanding English trait of propriety has been fostered by the peculiar nature of the English language, one resulting from the success of a Norman adventurer some thousand years ago '—the possession of

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[9] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, March, 1929.

[10] ' A Factor in English Characterology ', *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*.

[11] *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten*, S. 105.

[12] *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, Ch. IV.

a 'double stratum' of words, vivid robust Anglo-Saxon and more 'refined' Norman-French. That is, I suggest that an historical accident provided the English with a special refuge from phantasy in the form of choice of words. The desire behind this latter phenomenon may, it seems to me, be regarded as the desire to find words that shall be only words, representing things that shall be only real things: again, this same flight to reality away from phantasy. The use of scientific terminology has this value: it goes to promote the possibility of affect-free discussion. Yet we are accustomed to say of any science that a man is only master of his subject when he can present it in simple, non-scientific language, and to say, very logically, it is a successful sublimation only where it is free from anxiety, and when, therefore, the use of scientific terminology is not a compulsive flight to reality. This is, of course, at least equally true of our own science. Freud's *Introductory Lectures*, and some of Jones' and Abraham's papers, to choose among many, are outstanding examples of the power of expression in non-technical language. But I am inclined to go further, in spite of the obvious fact that for analysis, as for every other science, the use of a certain amount of technical language always will and always must have its own advantages. We cannot reap the full benefit of these until we can also express our thoughts in terms, not merely of ordinary adult language, but of earliest intelligent child language. And this for two reasons: (1) Analysis, unlike every other science, employs as its tools not only adult intelligence, but also the most primitive part of the mind, the unconscious with its infantile phantasies. It is in this respect that in addition to being a science it is also an art. Since therefore one of the tools is infantile phantasy-life, its satisfactory use requires that it shall be possible to express all theories in terms of the earliest available infantile forms. (2) Since psycho-analysis is a strictly empirical science we are only sure of the correctness of our theories by the effect of their application. Since our theories are founded on the importance for adult development of the first years of the child, their really ultimate test lies in the possibility of their formulation for and application to the small child. In this way we not only prove their truth by their effect, we also prove to ourselves that there is no possibility on our part of a flight away from the psychic reality to the reality of mere language. Along this path alone lie the possibilities of complete agreement among ourselves on all the aspects of our theory.

For example, the little child does not feel that it constructs a super-

ego, incorporates the parents. In danger it wants to keep the ideally loving and loved parents always with it, with no fear of separation; at the same time it wants to destroy in hate the unkind strict parents who leave it exposed to the awful dangers of unsatisfied libidinal tensions. That is, in omnipotent phantasy it eats up both loving and strict parents. And then, hey presto! there is the ideal love and strictness inside and you have your super-ego.[13]

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[13] See Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, pp. 35 *et seq.*, and Klein, loc. cit.

THE THERAPY OF THE NEUROSES AND RELIGION [1]

BY

THEODOR REIK

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In contributing to this discussion, it is only with reluctance that I have made up my mind to gainsay the views expressed, since we know ourselves to be at one in all fundamental questions of analytic theory and practice. Will you permit me, however, to start from a somewhat wider basis ?

The dangers threatening analysis are twofold : it may be discussed as a therapeutic method in the appendix of clinical manuals, or it may appear as the shallow, rehashed *Weltanschauung* of journalistic philosophers or philosophic journalists. (I beg you to decide for yourselves in which of the two categories you wish to put Herr Prinzhorn [2] and his ' second aspect of psycho-analysis, the one concerned with a general philosophy of life '.) I perceive a tendency in the direction of the first danger in those analytic writings which consist chiefly of physiological and neurological theories, many biological points of view, and even some psychological remarks. To continue the course in either of these two opposite directions—restricting the field, and reducing it to superficiality—would lead to the end of psycho-analysis, as we understand it. The continued existence and the deepening of psycho-analysis can only be safeguarded against these risks if its character as psychological science is set in the foreground. Over-emphasis of the therapeutic side leads with logical necessity to unjustified restrictions of the significance of psycho-analysis, and in its further consequences to loss of its deepest scientific achievements. He who falls a victim to therapeutic ambition must be ready to sacrifice to it a certain amount of possible knowledge ; one has only to think of people who are otherwise as diverse in the character and motivation of their change of attitude to psycho-analysis as Jung, Adler, Rank and Stekel. The other side, which treats psycho-analysis as a special kind of *Weltanschauung*, makes it shallow and superficial, and leads away from everything empirical towards catchword-mongering. As you see, the final outcome is the same. You will understand why the results can coincide, since both the opposed tendencies are dominated by an impulse towards immediate exercise of power.

[1] A contribution to a discussion at the Technical Seminar of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society in May, 1928.

[2] Prinzhorn, *Krisis der Psychoanalyse*, Leipzig, 1928.

Assuredly, neither you nor I will deny that all mental work represents a definite kind of striving to take possession of the world (' knowledge is power '), but the type and time of exercise of this most sublimated form of appropriation are of decisive significance. Even in analytic circles there is still too little appreciation of the ability to renounce direct and immediate effects in favour of later but deeper-reaching ones, of the psychic power of waiting till one can pluck ripe fruit, the ' long breath '. Therapeutic ambition on the one hand, the ambition of the philosopher or social reformer on the other, greatly over-estimate the tempo of psychic changes in individuals and in the mass. The durability of effects is in a high degree dependent on their depth. Once more : the therapeutic like the philosophic exaggeration (to adopt a brief designation for both tendencies) leads to abandonment of the essential achievements of psycho-analysis. You will guess my *ceterum censeo : psycho-analysis must be a psychological science, or it must cease to be.*

I beg you not to become impatient ; I am coming to the points which are in dispute between us. You are interested exclusively in the therapy of the neuroses, from which psycho-analysis took its start, and you wish me to limit myself to this subject. But you agree with me that this therapy is not possible without knowledge and understanding of the repressed and repressing instinctual factors ? The study of them seems indispensable to you too. The conflict between sexuality and cultural demands, the most important basis of the damming-up of libido, ranks for us as an essential condition of the genesis of neurosis. An animal living in freedom could not become neurotic, so long as it was spared the demands of culture. Just as little could a God do so, as the great monotheistic religions characterize him, since he is not subject to instinctual claims. Neurosis is surely reserved, is it not, for the laughable and pitiable animal that wishes to be a God but cannot ?

It follows from what has been said that scientific comprehension of these cultural demands, their origin, their modes of operation, their ' depth-dimensions ', are a *conditio sine qua non* for an understanding of the neuroses. How can you make any statement as to the course of a duel if you only know one of the antagonists ? It is the cultural demands made by the external world upon the still feeble ego to which it submits and which later bring it into conflict with instinctual claims. These demands have become sacrosanct, not only through the persons of parents and educators. They appear beyond this in the abstract

form of morality and religion as collective formations (deposits of the demands of many generations, increasing and becoming more and more deeply embedded in the psychic life) ; that is to say, as psychic forces of peculiar and enduring efficacy. In this organised form of cultural institutions they react upon the earlier demands, solidify them, cement them together, and endow them with a special resistance to the processes of disintegration. Particularly so, moreover, because they are able to operate unconsciously like the repressed instinctual forces themselves. The child who under the pressure of his instinctual impulses wishes to give himself up to his first strivings for freedom, and tries to detach himself slowly from authority, finds religion confronting him as a substitute in which the paternal authority is raised to a higher power. But it is by no means true that religion *only* appears as a surrogate for parental authority. In this phase of child-development, society as a whole, the people round the child and their views, are already beginning to exercise an effect. The environment has expanded. The child might perhaps have maintained a critical attitude against a single person. Any such success is denied to him as against the compact, solid majority of adults, among whom are included those dearest to him. A pressure that is overwhelming, an authority that operates incomprehensibly but all the more profoundly, a compulsion that is not the less powerful for being gentle : these will force the child to subdue his instinctual impulses. Every breaking-through of instinct will arouse in him a feeling of guilt, which will gain additional strength through comparison with the opinions often expressed by those about the child. Religion (and the moral ideas linked up with it) acts therefore more powerfully at this period than paternal authority, which it replaces on a different plane. It acts the more profoundly because it appears as a social formation, which, as a common fixed possession of imposing aspect, forms a bond that seems indissoluble to the still feeble ego.

You wish me, however, to turn at last to the therapeutic side of the question ? Very well, you all know how important it is to bring this struggle in the dark into the light of consciousness. This has been even more forcibly impressed on us since Freud has taught us to appreciate the significance of the unconscious sense of guilt for the deeper effects of neurosis. You will remember how frequently in the early days of psycho-analysis we pointed to the poets who had intuitively grasped many of the results gained laboriously by analysis, and had so often exhibited in their works the action and the nature of unconscious love-

impulses which strict science had superciliously overlooked. Now I maintain that the existence and psychic significance of the unconscious sense of guilt, about which we really still know so little, was familiar earlier and was more deeply grasped in the religious field than in that of the study of the neuroses. Here some three thousand years of living religion have prepared the ground for science, and theology has been the precursor of scientific psychology. If we should succeed in grasping empirically and representing scientifically the psychological divinations which religion offers in a bound normative form, in freeing the psychological core from all its wrappings and comparing it with our observations upon neurotics, do you not think that we should then understand more about the unconscious sense of guilt, its genesis, the peculiarities of its operation and its importance in the mind ?

No analyst denies that a deep-reaching understanding of the nature and operations of the instinctual forces which rest on a biological foundation is necessary for the therapy of the neuroses. But few among analysts understand yet that the study of the origin and development of religious (and moral) concepts is of the greatest significance for *therapy*. You will point out that it is a question of secondary formations, and that general concepts, philosophic problems, which have nothing to do with therapy, are here being needlessly dragged into the discussion. And yet your analyses might have shown you that the therapy of the neuroses depends in large measure on the question whether you succeed in bringing these factors into your reckoning. I have often had the impression from our discussion that in the case of many of you there is involved a kind of ' scientific superstition ' to which natural scientists are specially liable. The under-estimation of the effects of these collective formations in the therapy of the neuroses shows, as I think, a special kind of latent respect for them. It looks almost as if there were an attempt at rationalization only superficially determined by the ' free thinking ' of the natural scientist, in order not to have to question or probe into concepts which have been unconsciously retained and sanctioned. You will say indignantly that you are, of course, always ready to recognize and appreciate these influences in the neurosis, but—please believe me—this is by no means enough. Only serious scientific attention to them, only their analytic study, will take us further. It is easy to put all my reflections contemptuously aside and to consider them disposed of by pointing to the person of the father as the model for the super-ego. But the future will show how little such a premature rejection would be justified.

One has only to consider that after all the person of the father was also dominated by definite religious and moral views, which have made an ineffaceable impression on the child.

The apparent approximation to many views of Jung's must not prevent us from perceiving problems where he has timidly shirked them. Are you going to shrink from a promising ascent because others have had a fall there? Assuredly not; you will provide yourselves with better equipment and set about the ascent more cautiously and carefully. The memorial tablet at that place is not intended as a taboo upon the whole district, but as a warning.

We are indeed agreed—in contrast to Jung—that there is no better way, perhaps no other way that is analytically practicable at all, of getting to understand the origin and development of religious and moral concepts in the mind than individual analysis. But this is not identical with judging these cultural concepts to be merely individual creations. Collective influences here penetrate into the individual, and the mingling of the two manifests itself by an enhanced effect. Here, beyond all individual differences, ancestral influences make themselves felt. The analysis of a Viennese brought up by parents whom one might call casual Catholics, and that of an American from New England whose parents and friends were intolerant Puritans, will exhibit considerable differences within the same type of neurosis, differences in defences against instinct, in depth and intensity of the sense of guilt, and even in the transference-situation. The parents of the two patients have let the education of their children be influenced not only by their personality, but by all that they have taken over as a heritage and legacy from many generations. The influence of the collective formations in question cannot be denied and will come to plain expression in the diversity of the difficulties arising in the therapeutic work. If one treats as trivial the significance of these collective formations and bonds, which secure so powerful an influence through the permeation of personal by ancestral experience, one may have to pay for this by a variety of blunders in therapy. The genesis, action and dimensions of these secondary cultural forces can thus only be studied through individual analysis and by applying the psychological insight gained there. But does this then mean that their effects are only determined by the individual and his experience? Not at all; on the contrary, complications arise in these cases, especially in the way of summative effects, which correspond to those Freud has defined as characteristic of the group mind.

A sidelight worth consideration is also thrown here upon our old problems of analytic therapy, since the alteration of a mental attitude through psycho-analysis must necessarily lead to a new attitude to the old cultural bonds, and this can never come about entirely without conflict.

I maintain, therefore, that the study of the genesis, development and mode of operation of religious (and moral) ideas is of extraordinary significance for the therapy—let it be noted, for the *therapy*—of the neuroses ; and this particularly in two directions : for the evaluation of the repression-resistances, and for the evaluation of what I have called, in my ' Compulsive Confession and Need for Punishment ',[3] the depth-dimension of the neuroses. But in saying this I am implying that this study is essential for the psychology of the neuroses. The unconscious sense of guilt is perhaps merely the most important part of what we can study better in this field than in others. There are other questions of a not less significant kind on which a surprising light may be thrown from there, and we shall soon have occasion to discuss them.

I have here emphasized the strongest repressive force which exists in the shape of organized cultural institutions, and in accordance with your wishes, it is only in the direction of its importance for psychotherapy that I have carried the discussion a stage further. Why not the other great cultural institutions ? They hardly come into question here : art sets no norms for the actions and thoughts of men, and science as little. Law and morality, however, place themselves under the standard of a higher authority, and lead back to religion, as the history of culture shows.

You will understand that you will now hardly be able to go on professing the view which most of you have previously expressed : viz. ' The study of the psychic origins, development and effects of religious concepts is no doubt very fine. But how does that concern us practical physicians and psychotherapists ? Just as much and just as little as, for example, an analytic study of a work of art, an invention, an astrologically interesting phenomenon, some linguistic usage, etc. It is no doubt very interesting, but it is outside our particular circle of interests. We are after all psychotherapists, and do not want to be anything else '. Not so fast, gentlemen ; life has seen to it that it does fall within the circle of your interests, and in quite another fashion than just any sort

[3] *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925.

of work which belongs to the ' application of psycho-analysis to the moral sciences ', e.g. some study of a poet or a poem. Here we are dealing with a cultural force, the effect of which cannot be escaped by anybody living to-day and which has exercised a deep-reaching influence, in a definite way that can be exactly described, upon the life of the patients treated by you.

You say that the study of religious (and moral) views seems to you of no importance for the special tasks of therapy ? Well, we will not quarrel, but permit me the question : you are practical physicians, are you not ? Your attention is directed to the practical, active side of life. May I now beg you to instruct an unpractical person like myself !

I know of a person suffering from a severe neurosis, on the other side of the Atlantic, grown up in the region where they genuinely fear God, and where the ministers of a thousand sects thus apostrophize their hearers : ' Where will you spend eternity ? ' or ' Would Jesus play poker ? ' or ' Wake up, Mr. Devil ! ' For obvious reasons I cannot give you a full account of the case, but you would hold, like myself, that there would be a great prospect of recovery if the patient found his way to psycho-analysis. He has indeed heard about analysis, acknowledges that it has manifold merits, and has the necessary time and means to undergo a thorough analysis. Do you know why he will not entertain analysis ? He and his family have heard that analysis contravenes religion ; he is afraid for his salvation. You say that any one so timid can hardly be very firm in his faith ? I quite agree with you, but we were surely only going to concern ourselves with the practical aspect of the question ? How can you help this patient, how can you help thousands who feel as he does ? Shrugging your shoulders is not an adequate reply. I want to bring you to admit that religion, as a collective repressive force, plays an important part in neurosis.

Here is another case : a patient with a severe obsessional neurosis had bound himself by a religious vow not to talk about certain things. During the analysis he had sent for a priest, who was to release him from his vow. The priest did this, but the patient felt that it was not enough, and insisted on the execution of other, very complicated religious stipulations which could not possibly be fulfilled. It was necessary to decide to wait. Later on, over his despair about some blasphemy that emerged in his thoughts, he vowed to himself not to speak for some days ; this turned into weeks, into months. Well, now, does the study of religion still seem to you meaningless for the understanding and therapy of the neuroses ? You say that this is a case of

severe resistance, which would in any event have found expression in some other form? Quite agreed, but do you really think it of no account that onanism was depicted to the patient when a child as a grave sin against God, and that his reaction to every relapse into masturbatory activity took the form of onerous vows? Do you consider it unimportant that his vows and solemn oaths were and are linked up with the values which rank as the highest for him and those round him? You say that I should have waited till the transference was great enough to overcome these resistances with a religious accent? Now listen to this: I did wait, I waited with an endurance that should have reminded my devout patient of the pillar-saints of his religion; I waited months, years. The Galilean conquered.

A further case: a patient belonging to an aristocratic family, which had always been a buttress of throne and church, had lost her loved sister in early girlhood. At the coffin she had in some mysterious way gained a conviction of the immortality of her sister's soul, and from this starting-point her thoughts were turned to certain esoteric doctrines of the far east. Her severe obsessional symptoms, a close network of commands and prohibitions, stood in the most intimate relations with these trains of thought. I never got so far as to clear up analytically the origin of that '*conviction spontanée*' about the immortality of her sister—one of the most important starting-points of her system—for as soon as the analysis moved into the mere associative proximity of this belief, which she treated as a revelation, she would not on any account go on listening, because she was not willing to let herself be robbed of her sacred faith. (You will certainly have guessed that a reaction to intense unconscious death-wishes was involved.) The patient soon left me, because she suspected me of being one of those abominable atheists who frivolously make game of holy things. Undoubtedly, she would in any case have dropped the analysis prematurely, but this case too, like so many others, gives cause for reflection about the significance of religious ideas for analytic practice.

So much then for individual analytic therapy. Do you remember, however, that we once discussed the question whether individual therapeutic and pedagogical work will in fact be in future the most important task set before analysis? I put forward the thesis—in opposition, I know, to you all—that individual analytic therapy would diminish in importance as against other modes of action, among which collective therapy and prophylaxis, or if you like, psycho-social hygiene, seemed to me particularly significant. (Individual analysis

will, of course, always remain the empirical basis for these other undertakings.) Do you remember that saying of Freud's that he had to recognize ultimately that he had the whole of mankind for his patient ?

I am well aware that I stand alone in our group with my views, but I have continued to adhere to my thesis that the individual therapy of the neuroses will in the near future be surpassed in importance by this collective therapy. It is possible to assert this without having any peculiar prophetic gift and without pluming oneself on any special sense for coming things. There are enough palpable and visible signs around one. You know them as well as I do. Do you believe that analysis is as well equipped for those future tasks as for the present ones ? Do you believe that the study of the genesis, of the psychic dynamics and mechanisms of religion and morality will be superfluous for these tasks ? Whatever you like to say about '*Weltanschauung*', I am going to hold you to your therapeutic point of view ; therapeutic questions are at stake here. What protects and fortifies sexual repression more powerfully than religion, and the moral tradition so intimately bound up with it ? What repressive forces act more deeply and lastingly both upon the masses and also upon the upper classes ?

A strong reaction against psycho-analysis is inevitable. It will be conducted in the name of religion. A century ago one of the most eminent of naturalists, the English geologist, Charles Lyell, summed up what typically happens on such occasions in words which still apply to-day : ' The same thing will happen as always when a new and surprising truth is discovered. People say at first : " That is not true ", then " It is contrary to religion ", and finally, " Oh, we knew this long ago ".'

You will perhaps say that your concern is only with your individual cases, that you certainly regret the prudery and hypocrisy of the world, but that you do not feel called upon to enter the lists against it. But yet you are doing so, and indeed not only in relation to your patients. You know as well as I that in fact you have not only your patient, but everybody about him, his relations, friends, and his whole social circle, as opponents. In individual analysis, you analyse a whole circle of people at the same time, feel their transference and their resistances—and these surely palpably enough. And do not forget that you analyse not only ill people, but also cases of character-deformation which are not withdrawn from social life, like severe cases of neurosis. And how about pedagogical analysis ? Please ask our pedagogical colleagues whether they can confine their analytic work to the child and whether

the family, the teachers, the relatives do not get drawn in. Every person who is analysed is a kind of germinal cell for the future development and dissemination of analytical views. You are performing a great social work, whether you wish it or not. To deny this would be to leave psychic realities disregarded, to be lacking in the courage ' to face the music '.

What would analysis amount to if it were nothing more than a method for helping ' cases of nerves ' ? Whence the battle about it ? I know that it seems natural to many of our colleagues to regard Freud simply as the great discoverer of a new psycho-therapeutic method. A future age will look upon him as one of the great liberating spirits of humanity, who has been able to lessen the oppressive sense of guilt of men, to make them a little freer from vain terrors, and to render somewhat easier their brief sojourn on this planet. This may fall outside his and our intentions—science ranks higher for us—but our intentions will not be asked. For the remainder, these points of view are after all not irreconcilable. The future history of enlightenment will know how to find the connecting links between them.

In the discussion of the question of lay-analysis Freud has already pointed out that in the future syllabus of studies of the analyst cultural history, mythology, and comparative religion will have to be represented in some measure. My point here is to show that this necessity for the study of religious (and moral) concepts exists also from the purely therapeutic point of view. If, however, it is a fact that knowledge of the origin and development of religious concepts is important for psychotherapy, because they involve repressive factors, as well as reaction-formations and achievements in surrogate-formation and sublimation which are of special consequence, then a new acute problem presents itself. The discussion no longer turns, as some of you supposed, on one of the usual ' applications of psycho-analysis to moral science ', but on a therapeutic postulate. This runs : the genesis and development of these concepts must be studied analytically, i.e. the motives and aims of these collective formations must be grasped from analytic points of view, in order that they may be understood in practice. Thus there grows out of the analytic work on individuals not only the possibility but the necessity of taking up the study of these social creations, and this study reacts again, in the form of analytic understanding, upon the analysis of individuals, i.e. upon our therapy. Thus there becomes manifest a cycle which starts out from individual therapy, leads on to the investigation this suggests and

demands of the social phenomena in question as they operate upon individuals and upon the mass, and leads back to individual (and later to collective) therapy.

It is clear that this study must take place in uninterrupted contact with the living material, as otherwise all empirical foundation, all possibility of ascertaining common characters and differences, every possibility of comparison, and so all mutual illumination of the facts, would fall away.

This work has therefore to be done by analysts who are both in practice, and also have the training, the suitable personal qualities, the opportunity and the time to concern themselves with those other problems, which are, I repeat, of therapeutic importance too.[4] Whether or not this or that busy therapeutist may himself undertake such work from time to time, it will be desirable that a special group of analysts who are specially fitted for it should find their field of work here, since the study of a foreign science makes increased demands on each single individual. Have we in our circles reflected at all that such efforts of individuals are important, and just how important they are? And how important they might at some time become?

I maintain, and shall not tire of maintaining, that this special type of investigation calls for your special attention. The future will show whether I am right or wrong.

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[4] The valuable contributions of Ernest Jones to the analysis of religious phenomena may here be specially emphasized as a model.

WOMANLINESS AS A MASQUERADE

BY

JOAN RIVIERE

LONDON

Every direction in which psycho-analytic research has pointed seems in its turn to have attracted the interest of Ernest Jones, and now that of recent years investigation has slowly spread to the development of the sexual life of women, we find as a matter of course one by him among the most important contributions to the subject. As always, he throws great light on his material, with his peculiar gift both clarifying the knowledge we had already and also adding to it fresh observations of his own.

In his paper on 'The Early Development of Female Sexuality'[1] he sketches out a rough scheme of types of female development, which he first divides into heterosexual and homosexual, subsequently subdividing the latter homosexual group into two types. He acknowledges the roughly schematic nature of his classification and postulates a number of intermediate types. It is with one of these intermediate types that I am to-day concerned. In daily life types of men and women are constantly met with who, while mainly heterosexual in their development, plainly display strong features of the other sex. This has been judged to be an expression of the bisexuality inherent in us all; and analysis has shown that what appears as homosexual or heterosexual character-traits, or sexual manifestations, is the end-result of the interplay of conflicts and not necessarily evidence of a radical or fundamental tendency. The difference between homosexual and heterosexual development results from differences in the degree of anxiety, with the corresponding effect this has on development. Ferenczi pointed out a similar reaction in behaviour,[2] namely, that homosexual men exaggerate their heterosexuality as a 'defence' against their homosexuality. I shall attempt to show that women who wish for masculinity may put on a mask of womanliness to avert anxiety and the retribution feared from men.

It is with a particular type of intellectual woman that I have to deal. Not long ago intellectual pursuits for women were associated almost exclusively with an overtly masculine type of woman, who in

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[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, 1927.

[2] 'The Nosology of Male Homosexuality', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis* (1916).

pronounced cases made no secret of her wish or claim to be a man. This has now changed. Of all the women engaged in professional work to-day, it would be hard to say whether the greater number are more feminine than masculine in their mode of life and character. In University life, in scientific professions and in business, one constantly meets women who seem to fulfil every criterion of complete feminine development. They are excellent wives and mothers, capable housewives; they maintain social life and assist culture; they have no lack of feminine interests, e.g. in their personal appearance, and when called upon they can still find time to play the part of devoted and disinterested mother-substitutes among a wide circle of relatives and friends. At the same time they fulfil the duties of their profession at least as well as the average man. It is really a puzzle to know how to classify this type psychologically.

Some time ago, in the course of an analysis of a woman of this kind, I came upon some interesting discoveries. She conformed in almost every particular to the description just given; her excellent relations with her husband included a very intimate affectionate attachment between them and full and frequent sexual enjoyment; she prided herself on her proficiency as a housewife. She had followed her profession with marked success all her life. She had a high degree of adaptation to reality, and managed to sustain good and appropriate relations with almost everyone with whom she came in contact.

Certain reactions in her life showed, however, that her stability was not as flawless as it appeared; one of these will illustrate my theme. She was an American woman engaged in work of a propagandist nature, which consisted principally in speaking and writing. All her life a certain degree of anxiety, sometimes very severe, was experienced after every public performance, such as speaking to an audience. In spite of her unquestionable success and ability, both intellectual and practical, and her capacity for managing an audience and dealing with discussions, etc., she would be excited and apprehensive all night after, with misgivings whether she had done anything inappropriate, and obsessed by a need for reassurance. This need for reassurance led her compulsively on any such occasion to seek some attention or complimentary notice from a man or men at the close of the proceedings in which she had taken part or been the principal figure; and it soon became evident that the men chosen for the purpose were always unmistakeable father-figures, although often not persons whose judgement on her performance would in reality carry much weight. There

were clearly two types of reassurance sought from these father-figures : first, direct reassurance of the nature of compliments about her performance ; secondly, and more important, indirect reassurance of the nature of sexual attentions from these men. To speak broadly, analysis of her behaviour after her performance showed that she was attempting to obtain sexual advances from the particular type of men by means of flirting and coquetting with them in a more or less veiled manner. The extraordinary incongruity of this attitude with her highly impersonal and objective attitude during her intellectual performance, which it succeeded so rapidly in time, was a problem.

Analysis showed that the Œdipus situation of rivalry with the mother was extremely acute and had never been satisfactorily solved. I shall come back to this later. But beside the conflict in regard to the mother, the rivalry with the father was also very great. Her intellectual work, which took the form of speaking and writing, was based on an evident identification with her father, who had first been a literary man and later had taken to political life ; her adolescence had been characterized by conscious revolt against him, with rivalry and contempt of him. Dreams and phantasies of this nature, castrating the husband, were frequently uncovered by analysis. She had quite conscious feelings of rivalry and claims to superiority over many of the ' father-figures ' whose favour she would then woo after her own performances ! She bitterly resented any assumption that she was not equal to them, and (in private) would reject the idea of being subject to their judgement or criticism. In this she corresponded clearly to one type Ernest Jones has sketched : his first group of homosexual women who, while taking no interest in other women, wish for ' recognition ' of their masculinity from men and claim to be the equals of men, or in other words, to be men themselves. Her resentment, however, was not openly expressed ; publicly she acknowledged her condition of womanhood.

Analysis then revealed that the explanation of her compulsive ogling and coquetting—which actually she was herself hardly aware of till analysis made it manifest—was as follows : it was an unconscious attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of the reprisals she anticipated from the father-figures after her intellectual performance. The exhibition in public of her intellectual proficiency, which was in itself carried through successfully, signified an exhibition of herself in possession of the father's penis, having castrated him. The display once over, she was seized by horrible dread

of the retribution the father would then exact. Obviously it was a step towards propitiating the avenger to endeavour to offer herself to him sexually. This phantasy, it then appeared, had been very common in her childhood and youth, which had been spent in the Southern States of America ; if a negro came to attack her, she planned to defend herself by making him kiss her and make love to her (ultimately so that she could then deliver him over to justice). But there was a further determinant of the obsessive behaviour. In a dream which had a rather similar content to this childhood phantasy, she was in terror alone in the house ; then a negro came in and found her washing clothes, with her sleeves rolled up and arms exposed. She resisted him, with the secret intention of attracting him sexually, and he began to admire her arms and to caress them and her breasts. The meaning was that she had killed father and mother and obtained everything for herself (alone in the house), became terrified of their retribution (expected shots through the window), and defended herself by taking on a menial rôle (washing clothes) and by *washing off* dirt and sweat, guilt and blood, everything she had obtained by the deed, and ' disguising herself ' as merely a castrated woman. In that guise the man found no stolen property on her which he need attack her to recover and, further, found her attractive as an object of love. Thus the aim of the compulsion was not merely to secure reassurance by evoking friendly feelings towards her in the man ; it was chiefly to make sure of safety by masquerading as guiltless and innocent. It was a compulsive reversal of her intellectual performance ; and the two together formed the ' double-action ' of an obsessive act, just as her life as a whole consisted alternately of masculine and feminine activities.

Before this dream she had had dreams of people putting masks on their faces in order to avert disaster. One of these dreams was of a high tower on a hill being pushed over and falling down on the inhabitants of a village below, but the people put on masks and escaped injury !

Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found to possess it—much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be searched to prove that he has not the stolen goods. The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the ' masquerade '. My suggestion is not, however, that there is any such difference ; whether radical or superficial, they are the same thing. The capacity for womanliness was there in this woman—and one might even say it exists in the most

completely homosexual woman—but owing to her conflicts it did not represent her main development, and was used far more as a device for avoiding anxiety than as a primary mode of sexual enjoyment.

I will give some brief particulars to illustrate this. She had married late, at twenty-nine ; she had had great anxiety about defloration, and had had the hymen stretched or slit before the wedding by a woman doctor. Her attitude to sexual intercourse before marriage was a set determination to obtain and experience the enjoyment and pleasure which she knew some women have in it, and the orgasm. She was afraid of impotence in exactly the same way as a man. This was partly a determination to surpass certain mother-figures who were frigid, but on deeper levels it was a determination not to be beaten by the man.[3] In effect, sexual enjoyment was full and frequent, with complete orgasm ; but the fact emerged that the gratification it brought was of the nature of a reassurance and restitution of something lost, and not ultimately pure enjoyment. The man's love gave her back her self-esteem. During analysis, while the hostile castrating impulses towards the husband were in process of coming to light, the desire for intercourse very much abated, and she became for periods relatively frigid. The mask of womanliness was being peeled away, and she was revealed either as castrated (lifeless, incapable of pleasure), or as wishing to castrate (therefore afraid to receive the penis or welcome it by gratification). Once, while for a period her husband had had a love-affair with another woman, she had detected a very intense identification with him in regard to the rival woman. It is striking that she had had no homosexual experiences (since before puberty with a younger sister) ; but it appeared during analysis that this lack was compensated for by frequent homosexual dreams with intense orgasm.

In every-day life one may observe the mask of femininity taking curious forms. One capable housewife of my acquaintance is a woman of great ability, and can herself attend to typically masculine matters. But when, e.g. any builder or upholsterer is called in, she has a compulsion to hide all her technical knowledge from him and show deference to the workman, making her suggestions in an innocent and artless manner, as if they were ' lucky guesses '. She has confessed to me that even with the butcher and baker, whom she rules in reality with a

[3] I have found this attitude in several women analysands and the self-ordained defloration in nearly all of them (five cases). In the light of Freud's ' Taboo of Virginity ', this latter symptomatic act is instructive.

rod of iron, she cannot openly take up a firm straightforward stand ; she feels herself as it were ' acting a part ', she puts on the semblance of a rather uneducated, foolish and bewildered woman, yet in the end always making her point. In all other relations in life this woman is a gracious, cultured lady, competent and well-informed, and can manage her affairs by sensible rational behaviour without any subterfuges. This woman is now aged fifty, but she tells me that as a young woman she had great anxiety in dealings with men such as porters, waiters, cabmen, tradesmen, or any other potentially hostile father-figures, such as doctors, builders and lawyers ; moreover, she often quarrelled with such men and had altercations with them, accusing them of defrauding her and so forth.

Another case from every-day observation is that of a clever woman, wife and mother, a University lecturer in an abstruse subject which seldom attracts women. When lecturing, not to students but to colleagues, she chooses particularly feminine clothes. Her behaviour on these occasions is also marked by an inappropriate feature : she becomes flippant and joking, so much so that it has caused comment and rebuke. She has to treat the situation of displaying her masculinity to men as a ' game ', as something *not real*, as a ' joke '. She cannot treat herself and her subject seriously, cannot seriously contemplate herself as on equal terms with men ; moreover, the flippant attitude enables some of her sadism to escape, hence the offence it causes.

Many other instances could be quoted, and I have met with a similar mechanism in the analysis of manifest homosexual men. In one such man with severe inhibition and anxiety, homosexual activities really took second place, the source of greatest sexual gratification being actually masturbation under special conditions, namely, while looking at himself in a mirror dressed in a particular way. The excitation was produced by the sight of himself with hair parted in the centre, wearing a bow tie. These extraordinary ' fetishes ' turned out to represent a *disguise of himself* as his sister ; the hair and bow were taken from her. His conscious attitude was a desire to *be* a woman, but his manifest relations with men had never been stable. Unconsciously the homosexual relation proved to be entirely sadistic and based on masculine rivalry. Phantasies of sadism and ' *possession of a penis* ' could be indulged only while reassurance against anxiety was being obtained from the mirror that he was safely ' disguised as a woman '.

To return to the case I first described. Underneath her apparently satisfactory heterosexuality it is clear that this woman displayed well-known manifestations of the castration complex. Horney was the first among others to point out the sources of that complex in the Œdipus situation ; my belief is that the fact that womanliness may be assumed as a mask may contribute further in this direction to the analysis of female development. With that in view I will now sketch the early libido-development in this case.

But before this I must give some account of her relations with women. She was conscious of rivalry of almost any woman who had either good looks or intellectual pretensions. She was conscious of flashes of hatred against almost any woman with whom she had much to do, but where permanent or close relations with women were concerned she was none the less able to establish a very satisfactory footing. Unconsciously she did this almost entirely by means of feeling herself superior in some way to them (her relations with her inferiors were uniformly excellent). Her proficiency as a housewife largely had its root in this. By it she surpassed her mother, won her approval and proved her superiority among rival 'feminine' women. Her intellectual attainments undoubtedly had in part the same object. They too proved her superiority to her mother ; it seemed probable that since she reached womanhood her rivalry with women had been more acute in regard to intellectual things than in regard to beauty, since she could usually take refuge in her superior brains where beauty was concerned.

The analysis showed that the origin of all these reactions, both to men and to women, lay in the reaction to the parents during the oral-biting sadistic phase. These reactions took the form of the phantasies sketched by Melanie Klein [4] in her Congress paper, 1927. In consequence of disappointment or frustration during sucking or weaning, coupled with experiences during the primal scene which is interpreted in oral terms, extremely intense sadism develops towards both parents.[5] The desire to bite off the nipple shifts, and desires to destroy, penetrate and disembowel the mother and devour her and the contents of her body succeed it. These contents include the father's penis, her fæces and her children—all her possessions and love-objects, imagined as

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[4] 'Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict', this JOURNAL, Vol. IX, 1928.

[5] Ernest Jones, op cit., p. 469, regards an intensification of the oral-sadistic stage as the central feature of homosexual development in women.

within her body.[6] The desire to bite off the nipple is also shifted, as we know, on to the desire to castrate the father by biting off his penis. Both parents are rivals in this stage, both possess desired objects; the sadism is directed against both and the revenge of both is feared. But, as always with girls, the mother is the more hated, and consequently the more feared. She will execute the punishment that fits the crime—destroy the girl's body, her beauty, her children, her capacity for having children, mutilate her, devour her, torture her and kill her. In this appalling predicament the girl's only safety lies in placating the mother and atoning for her crime. She must retire from rivalry with the mother, and if she can, endeavour to restore to her what she has stolen. As we know, she identifies herself with the father; and then she uses the masculinity she thus obtains by *putting it at the service of the mother*. She becomes the father, and takes his place; so she can 'restore' him to the mother. This position was very clear in many typical situations in my patient's life. She delighted in using her great practical ability to aid or assist weaker and more helpless women, and could maintain this attitude successfully so long as rivalry did not emerge too strongly. But this restitution could be made on one condition only; it must procure her a lavish return in the form of gratitude and 'recognition'. The recognition desired was supposed by her to be owing for her self-sacrifices; more unconsciously what she claimed was recognition of her *supremacy* in *having* the penis to give back. If her supremacy were not acknowledged, then rivalry became at once acute; if gratitude and recognition were withheld, her sadism broke out in full force and she would be subject (in private) to paroxysms of oral-sadistic fury, exactly like a raging infant.

In regard to the father, resentment against him arose in two ways: (1) during the primal scene he took from the mother the milk, etc., which the child missed; (2) at the same time he gave to the mother the penis or children instead of to her. Therefore all that he had or took should be taken from him by her; he was castrated and reduced to nothingness, like the mother. Fear of him, though never so acute as of the mother, remained; partly, too, because his vengeance for the death and destruction of the mother was expected. So he too must be placated and appeased. This was done by masquerading in a feminine guise for him, thus showing him her 'love' and guiltlessness

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[6] As it was not essential to my argument, I have omitted all reference to the further development of the relation to children.

towards him. It is significant that this woman's mask, though transparent to other women, was successful with men, and served its purpose very well. Many men were attracted in this way, and gave her reassurance by showing her favour. Closer examination showed that these men were of the type who themselves fear the ultra-womanly woman. They prefer a woman who herself has male attributes, for to them her claims on them are less.

At the primal scene the talisman which both parents possess and which she lacks is the father's penis; hence her rage, also her dread and helplessness.[7] By depriving the father of it and possessing it herself she obtains the talisman—the invincible sword, the 'organ of sadism'; he becomes powerless and helpless (her gentle husband), but she still guards herself from attack by wearing towards him the mask of womanly subservience, and under that screen, performing many of his masculine functions herself—'for him'—(her practical ability and management). Likewise with the mother: having robbed her of the penis, destroyed her and reduced her to pitiful inferiority, she triumphs over her, but again secretly; outwardly she acknowledges and admires the virtues of 'feminine' women. But the task of guarding herself against the woman's retribution is harder than with the man; her efforts to placate and make reparation by restoring and using the penis in the mother's service were never enough; this device was worked to death, and sometimes it almost worked her to death.

It appeared, therefore, that this woman had saved herself from the intolerable anxiety resulting from her sadistic fury against both parents by creating in phantasy a situation in which she became supreme and no harm could be done to her. The essence of the phantasy was her *supremacy* over the parent-objects; by it her sadism was gratified, she triumphed over them. By this same supremacy she also succeeded in averting their revenges; the means she adopted for this were reaction-formations and concealment of her hostility. Thus she could gratify her id-impulses, her narcissistic ego and her super-ego at one and the same time. The phantasy was the main-spring of her whole life and character, and she came within a narrow margin of carrying it through to complete perfection. But its weak point was the megalomanic character, under all the disguises, of the necessity for supremacy. When this supremacy was seriously disturbed during

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[7] Cf. M. N. Searl, 'Danger Situations of the Immature Ego', Oxford Congress, 1929.

analysis, she fell into an abyss of anxiety, rage and abject depression ; before the analysis, into illness.

I should like to say a word about Ernest Jones' type of homosexual woman whose aim is to obtain ' recognition ' of her masculinity from men. The question arises whether the need for recognition in this type is connected with the mechanism of the same need, operating differently (recognition for services performed), in the case I have described. In my case direct recognition of the possession of the penis was not claimed openly ; it was claimed for the reaction-formations, though only the possession of the penis made them possible. Indirectly, therefore, recognition was none the less claimed for the penis. This indirectness was due to apprehension lest her possession of a penis *should be* ' recognized ', in other words ' found out '. One can see that with less anxiety my patient too would have openly claimed recognition from men for her possession of a penis, and in private she did in fact, like Ernest Jones' cases, bitterly resent any lack of this direct recognition. It is clear that in his cases the primary sadism obtains more gratification ; the father has been castrated, and shall even acknowledge his defeat. But how then is the anxiety averted by these women ? In regard to the mother, this is done of course by denying her existence. To judge from indications in analyses I have carried out, I conclude that, first, as Jones implies, this claim is simply a displacement of the original sadistic claim that the desired object, nipple, milk, penis, should be instantly surrendered ; secondarily, the need for recognition is largely a need for absolution. Now the mother has been relegated to limbo ; no relations with her are possible. Her existence appears to be denied, though in truth it is only too much feared. So the guilt of having triumphed over both can only be absolved by the father ; if he sanctions her possession of the penis by acknowledging it, she is safe. By *giving* her recognition, he *gives* her the penis and to her instead of to the mother ; then she has it, and she may have it, and all is well. ' Recognition ' is always in part reassurance, sanction, love ; further, it renders her supreme again. Little as he may know it, to her the man has admitted his defeat. Thus in its content such a woman's phantasy-relation to the father is similar to the normal Œdipus one ; the difference is that it rests on a basis of sadism. The mother she has indeed killed, but she is thereby excluded from enjoying much that the mother had, and what she does obtain from the father she has still in great measure to extort and extract.

These conclusions compel one once more to face the question :

what is the essential nature of fully-developed femininity? What is *das ewig Weibliche?* The conception of womanliness as a mask, behind which man suspects some hidden danger, throws a little light on the enigma. Fully-developed heterosexual womanhood is founded, as Helene Deutsch and Ernest Jones have stated, on the oral-sucking stage. The sole gratification of a primary order in it is that of receiving the (nipple, milk) penis, semen, child from the father. For the rest it depends upon reaction-formations. The acceptance of 'castration', the humility, the admiration of men, come partly from the over-estimation of the object on the oral-sucking plane; but chiefly from the renunciation (lesser intensity) of sadistic castration-wishes deriving from the later oral-biting level. 'I must not take, I must not even ask; it must be *given* me'. The capacity for self-sacrifice, devotion, self-abnegation expresses efforts to restore and make good, whether to mother or to father figures, what has been taken from them. It is also what Radó has called a 'narcissistic insurance' of the highest value.

It becomes clear how the attainment of full heterosexuality coincides with that of genitality. And once more we see, as Abraham first stated, that genitality implies attainment of a *post-ambivalent* state. Both the 'normal' woman and the homosexual desire the father's penis and rebel against frustration (or castration); but one of the differences between them lies in the difference in the degree of sadism and of the power of dealing both with it and with the anxiety it gives rise to in the two types of women.

A NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS UPON ENGLISH EDUCATION DURING THE LAST EIGHTEEN YEARS.

BY

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LONDON

A little more than eighteen years ago, in November 1910, a paper [1] entitled ' Psycho-Analysis and Education ', by Dr. Ernest Jones, was published in the *Journal of Educational Psychology*, and it is of interest to consider how far the suggestions made and the hopes expressed in this essay have been fulfilled during the eighteen years since its first appearance.

This essay was, as far as the present writer knows, the first publication advocating the application of psycho-analysis to educational theory and practice. It sums up tersely, but in a richly suggestive manner, the principal findings which psycho-analysis had at that date revealed. It points out that this new knowledge, if applied, must inevitably alter the trend, both of the child's early education (using ' education ' to denote the home-training of the earliest years) and of the later more specific education of a systematic kind ; and it shows how the standpoint of the adult in relation to many of the most fundamental problems of his own and the child's personality will undergo a very radical change.

As well as dealing with many specific changes, the essay makes a general plea for greater enlightenment on the part of the teacher concerning mental life, so that he may be able to enter more truly into the mind of the child he is educating. Above all, the author stresses throughout the need for more honest recognition of the sexual and emotional, as well as the intellectual, aspects of human beings. He writes :

' It is desirable that education should concern itself more than hitherto with what may be called the human side of the child, and not exclusively with the intellectual.'

It is necessary to divide the period referred to into the first ten years, bringing us up to 1920 or thereabouts, and the last eight, which carry us to our present date ; for there has been a quite remarkable change of attitude in the later period, separating it sharply from the

[1] This is now incorporated in *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Ch. XIX, 1st edition.

former. Following English tradition and temperament, we see, as might be expected, that the theory *as such* has been repudiated by the main system of English education : at best, passed by with indifference, at worst, treated with hostility or ridicule. From leading educationists and very many others connected with the organization and administration of educational policy, we have had denunciation or incredulity, mingled with a fear of doctrines which they felt to be revolutionary, even while they pronounced them negligible. With these have joined the main body of the psychologists who, from very different standpoints, have criticized the theory of the unconscious and its implications, sometimes as too empiric, sometimes as too hidebound in its determinism, sometimes as wholly unscientific. In the earlier period, from 1910 to 1920, certain features prominently present themselves. As theory, psycho-analysis was rejected by our great educational institutions. The universities and colleges gave it no place in their curriculum ; the teacher-in-training devoted no time to its study ; the teacher engaged in practical work had no systematic knowledge of it, and the central governing body of our educational system, if it did not shew open antagonism, nevertheless certainly gave no encouragement to the pursuit of this branch of knowledge. The individual teacher, the writer on education, the student of educational development, all these in the main followed the same example ; and this general attitude, either of open hostility or of negativism, was reflected almost everywhere in the English Press, including even the best-recognized educational organs. Only a handful of pioneers in the educational world lifted their voices here and there in favour of investigation, at least, of the new knowledge. But the period which has elapsed between 1920 and the present date has shown, as already noted, a remarkable change. The theory still remains but little accepted, partly owing to the English people's inherent fear and dislike of ideas, above all new ideas, and it would be hard to find even to-day more than a very few educational institutions where psycho-analysis is being studied directly ; nor do any large proportion of teachers, so far, seek psycho-analysis for the sake of enlightenment in their work. Nevertheless, Freudian theory has made a slight entrance into nearly all the teaching of educational ideas now being carried out in colleges, in training colleges and in the more modern schools, although often quite unknown to those who give such teaching, and even as they give it, repudiated by them. The theory of the unconscious is colouring their whole outlook in relation to personality in its

various aspects. Further, it is safe to say that not a book written by any serious psychologist or educationist since the year 1910, and doubly so since the year 1920, has been uninfluenced by the work of Freud and his followers, whether we turn to the academic psychologists, to the behaviourists, to the occupants of University chairs, to the experimentalists in education, to the more orthodox ranks of those found in the main body of our Secondary and Elementary schools, or to the individual teachers themselves. An illustration may be found in Professor Nunn's book, *Education: Its Data and First Principles*, which not only contains direct reference, of a sympathetic and understanding nature, to psycho-analysis, but also reveals in marked degree the influence of the latter's main implications on the author's own standpoint. In a preface to a recent book dealing with the bearing of psycho-analysis upon education, Professor Nunn has written: 'It is hard to see how any unprejudiced student can deny that Freud's researches have thrown a flood of light upon (among many other things) two human relations of universal interest of the utmost importance: namely, those between children and their parents and between children and their teachers'.

Again, in *The Foundations of Education* (1926 and 1927), Professor J. J. Findlay (late Professor of Education in Manchester University) deals specifically with some of the findings of psycho-analysis, especially those bearing on the child's sexual development. Although he is in opposition, yet he realizes that he cannot ignore these findings; and it is worthy of note that in his second volume he states that he feels he is unable to make any certain pronouncements in criticism of psycho-analysis, since it is a profound study demanding expert knowledge, which he cannot claim.

The same serious recognition of the claims of psycho-analysis upon the educator's attention is to be seen in Mr. Bertrand Russell's volume, *On Education*, a book which often expresses critical opposition to psycho-analysis, yet is influenced throughout by Freud's discoveries. And the same might be said of the lesser writers on educational questions, practical and theoretical, above all during these last five years. One other illustration must be given. In the sphere of 'mental tests' an appreciable modification has been seen, even though its causation is rarely acknowledged by the workers in that sphere. The validity of the mental test is now recognized as far more limited, even among its enthusiastic supporters, owing to its lack of provision for emotional factors and their modifying influence, and in some degree, though still

in a confused and partial manner, the ' mental testers ' are beginning to realize that such a thing as a test which is only ' mental ' is and must always be a fallacious idea.

Thus we see in various spheres of educational work, a different attitude making itself felt among the workers, great and small. Of all these we can say, without fear of contradiction, that they could not hold their present mental outlook had not the work of Freud been given to the world. Doubtless for long years to come, English educators will continue to repudiate many, if not most, of the theories of unconscious mind, and will also continue to absorb, largely unconsciously (and in that very act testifying to the truth of the dynamic unconscious within each one of them), in some modified form the implications of those theories. Certain developments prove indeed the direct influence of Freudian theory: we are already beginning to set up in this country bodies for the investigation of the child's emotional life, as manifested in the shape of various maladjustments—a recognition of the point made by Dr. Jones, that education must concern itself not only with the so-called intellectual side of the child, but with his human side also. We have at least some courses of lectures to teachers and others concerned in education, either directly dealing with psycho-analytic theory, such as those given at times by University College, London, or, in a somewhat indirect way, touching upon many of the leading implications of psycho-analysis, such as those given under the auspices of the L.C.C., by its own psychologist, Dr. Cyril Burt. It is probable that by now most University and Training College libraries are equipping themselves with the works of Freud and other leading psycho-analysts, and the larger educational libraries throughout the country are doing likewise. There is among the teaching body a certain limited demand for practical knowledge of psycho-analysis in the shape of obtaining analytic treatment as a help towards dealing with specific educational problems. The present writer, in common with others, has found that lectures explaining the psycho-analytic theory meet far more often than formerly with a real and intelligent interest, often developing into further pursuit of the subject. On the other hand, in respect to theory, a certain disadvantageous development has shown itself in many quarters: namely, the acceptance of certain small portions shorn of real content, often distorted from their true significance and applied alongside entirely opposing ideas. Again, we see here the traditional English attitude of compromising with a new truth too profound, and possibly too painful, to be accepted wholly,

by means of pouring the new wine into old bottles, with a result which is often either barren or disastrous. There are many taking part in education to-day deluding themselves and others that they understand and accept the theory of the unconscious : in reality, all they do is to choose what may be termed the tit-bits which gratify their wish for modernism, failing wholly to appreciate the significance of either the portion or the whole, and taking great care to repudiate one of the fundamental findings of psycho-analysis—the theory of infantile sexuality. On this point, the article of 1910 reveals the author as a true prophet, since in it he emphasizes the adult's ignorance in relation to the child's sexual life and development, an ignorance proceeding from the former's fear of and opposition to such development. He writes :—

' The illusions most parents (and it may be added, teachers) entertain as to the innocence of their children in such matters (that is sexual), are well-nigh unbounded. As regards young children, it is usually unshakeable, and with older ones it is frequently astonishing. . . . A child rarely accepts the false explanations given by his parents, who under-estimate his intelligence. . . . The organized conspiracy of silence is soon noticed by the child, and he is subjected to a mass of suggestion ; all the more potent for being indirect, which teaches him that the subject is taboo, mysterious, improper and essentially wicked. Those who object to direct enlightenment, therefore, should recognize they are really defending a false enlightenment. . . . It is, therefore, above all, necessary for the parent and teacher to strive to acquire a freer, purer and broader attitude than is now customary '.

If we turn to considerations of the more practical developments in education during the chosen period, then undoubtedly we can observe the influence of psycho-analysis strongly at work.

To take first the production of books designed for the teacher and student, quite a number either dealing specifically and directly with psycho-analytic theory, and others which incorporate a great deal of that theory, are being circulated among the public and are received on the whole with respect and a good deal of appreciation. I have already said that we have not embarked upon systematic courses of psycho-analysis for teachers, as has been done for some years past in Switzerland and Germany. Nor have we any school or educational institution definitely designated as psycho-analytic, but we have had at least one school, the Malting House School at Cambridge, in charge

of a principal, herself a psycho-analyst, which served as a centre for research of a psycho-analytic nature.

It is not, however, so much in these directions that the influence of psycho-analysis can be estimated, but rather is it to be traced in the ordinary school and in the ordinary curriculum which have modified or developed their original dominating trends in favour of a psychology which approximates at least in some degree to the newer ideas. Even in the very conservative school of to-day of whatever type it will be hard to find the stereotyped ideals and standards of twenty years ago. It will be worth while to take from the article of 1910 a few principles laid down by the author as essential in the application of psycho-analysis to education. The first is that education must become a more individual matter than it was at the date he wrote. He deplored the endeavour to fit every child to a pre-conceived pattern instead of bringing about a free development of his latent qualities.

We cannot observe the developments of the last ten years or so without realizing that there is a widespread belief in the educational world in such a principle, and where there is any freedom this principle of education as an individual matter is being carried out. The various experimental schools, the ideals of the P.N.E.U., the systems now in use in schools, such as the Dalton plan, the Howard method and others of like nature, these will serve as illustrations of this point.

The second principle posited in the essay is one already quoted, viz. that education should concern itself more than hitherto with what may be called the human side of the child and not exclusively with the intellectual. Nothing could be more notable perhaps than the attempts in this direction which now are to be traced throughout modern education : such attempts may indeed be in danger of over-stressing the so-called human side at the expense of the intellectual, but at all events they do prove a changed view-point. The very great increase of manual occupation, of arts and crafts, of the pursuit of bodily development (dancing, physical hygiene and so forth) and the introduction of such things as the film and the wireless as aids to a more human and realistic education may be cited in this connection. Again, a still more important aspect of this matter is the changed attitude in regard to retarded and ill-adjusted mental development, and to what was commonly named delinquency and moral defect.

A third matter of fundamental importance brought forward by the author is the need of an enlightened attitude in relation to sexual questions on the part of parents and teachers, with a recognition of

the large part which sexual interests play in early childhood. He demonstrates how important and how lasting are the effects of concealment and distortion in this sphere, leading very often to disharmony and neurotic disturbance in later life.

That the question of sexual education has yet been dealt with in any fundamental way by the educational world can hardly yet be said, nor indeed that the teachers themselves have gone far to a knowledge of their own sexual development. Nevertheless, the matter has become at least a living problem, no longer entirely taboo among educators or even educational governing bodies. Some freedom of thought and speech in this direction is beginning. Perhaps one might add a fourth principle laid down by Jones in this article: to quote his own words, 'we have to learn to stop doing harm, then perhaps we may learn to do good', and, 'better no enlightenment than a false one'. Such an attitude is also becoming a little more widespread than a decade ago. It is rare nowadays to find the teacher, of whatever type, and in whatever sphere, laying down glibly dogmatic rules concerning education itself, and the mind of his pupils. He is beginning to be much more aware of the depth and breadth of his problem, and some at least have come to the conclusion that if they are able to stop doing harm, that in itself is an achievement.

These few considerations may serve to suggest the various spheres in which psycho-analysis is influencing the development of education, although we may still regard the new developments as only in their infancy. They must follow the pattern of all fundamental change proceeding from deep, unconscious impulses, fragment by fragment, until they become part of the conscious cultural aim. If and when this takes place there is no question but that its achievement will owe much to the unremitting devotion to scientific research and the exceptional gifts of Ernest Jones.

NOTES UPON THE FEAR OF DEATH [1]

BY

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' Man fears Death as the Child fears to go in the Dark '.—FRANCIS BACON.

SYNOPSIS

I.—*Conscious and superficial layer. Guilt.*

II.—*Roots in the child's fear of separation from the Mother.* His helplessness and fear she may never return (*Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*). Bacon says, ' Man fears Death as a Child fears to go in the Dark. Fear of Loneliness and the Unknown.

III.—*Hysteria Stage of Fear of Death.* The Woman afraid to lose love (*Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*). Loss of Love = Loss of Life. Death Fears arising from the Mother and Father. Exposure of Infants, and the debt of life. Sacrifice to save life. Castration, sacrifice of the penis. Woman's fear of debt she cannot repay. Fear of childbed. Fear of Death in Women at Menopause. } Super-Ego combined with I.

IV.—*Obsessional Stage of Fear of Death.* Child begins to fear Death in proportion to realization of the Self. Realization of the Self due to the Resistance of the parents. This leads to death-wishes. Unconscious motive of parental threats represent ancient customs. Unconscious guilt connected with death-wish. } Ego in conflict with Super-ego, as with the parents, and outside world.

Death, Banishment and Castration.

Child's question of the existence and survival of the Self. Child's identification of the Ego and the Eye. Death typified by the shut eye, the extinguished Ego.

V.—*Fear of Death and Wish for Death.* The bad child banished from sight. Child who shuts eyes to banish unwelcome persons or scenes. Place of the parents in the construction. Œdipus Stage. Child suicide or threats of suicide to prevent murder. } Conflict between the Ego and the outer world, and with the Death impulse within the Id.

VI.—*Fear of Death and Wish for Death.* Influence of the death of the father, when it takes place in early stages of Ego-development. Loss of the Ego partially through this means. } Id stage, Vegetive, Nirvana Stage. Destruction impulse.

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[1] Read before the Tenth Psycho-Analytical Congress, Innsbruck, 1927.

Id character of the Self. Child surrounded and protected by the impersonal mother, the vegetive, Nirvana stage of mother regression desired in self-sought Death.

'Behind every fear there is a wish.' The fear of death is therefore likely to be a defence against the wish to return to the Mother.

When we come to consider the psychological manifestations of the fear of death and give careful study to the many ramifications which may be noticed in this widespread anxiety, we find that they show points in common, suggesting a fundamental origin in one of the earliest stages of human development.

One of the most remarkable phenomena of this fear is that it may frequently be found in persons for whom there is no immediate or known menace to life, when physical health is excellent, and assurances of medical opinion by no means mitigate the anxiety except for the shortest period. In consideration of this peculiarity, we may distinguish broadly *fear arising from actual danger to life, and psychological anxiety without real cause.* The former is outside the scope of this paper. Why the latter should be so prevalent and prove so devastating in its effects will be the endeavour of these notes to explain. It is interesting to notice the sublimation of this fear of death, however, in the aim of practically all medical science, to gain power over death, and to prolong life, or ease pain.

This form of anxiety, death-fear, may be found among widely differing types of persons, and in both sexes. It is common at all ages, but may be rather more emphatic under certain circumstances as well as at certain times. It appears in children of a neurotic disposition far more often than is usually believed, because so many are particularly reticent upon this subject on account of its cultural connection with guilt and sin, increased by the exploitation of this fear in the training of the young by religion in almost every age and among all peoples, except perhaps some of the Orientals, in whom its obverse tendency, the wish for death, may be found occupying a more important place.

Freud, in his significant work, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, states that anxiety is fundamentally connected with the idea of helplessness in the infant caused by realization of the mother's absence and the fear she may never return, should she be lost to sight, which biologically includes the fear of death. He also points out the tendency to isolate the unbearable event by the interposition of a momentary blank, when anxiety is at its height, which will have the effect of making it as though it had not happened, apparently a condition of

instantaneous unconsciousness, akin to that which is familiar under the name of *petit mal*. These points taken in connection with the actions and thoughts of the little child during times of stress and linked up with what may be gathered from evidence of memories of these early days in later life, from child-analysis as well as from observations of contemporary data from sick and healthy children, sometimes at a very early age, all tend to throw light upon this exceedingly complex fear of death and its complement, the wish for death.

In this way we may come to realize its fundamental alliance with the realization of helplessness, that acts as a wound to the primary narcissism of the dawning ego-structure, and we may ascertain what impressions pass through the rudimentary channels by which the infant first realizes the existence of the self and the outer world, whereby it learns to distinguish the dividing line between them. The infant must also acquire some knowledge of the conditions of life as an independent being, discover in course of time to what extent it is powerful, and how far it is helpless and where control may be exercised or when every effort against external resistance is unavailing.

Death essentially represents the power over which we have no control, a giant in whose grip we are weak, whose coming may be swift but whose summons must be obeyed. It is invisible, intangible, and therefore of a quality so UNKNOWN as to be terrifying in itself, a form of *death that is always to be feared*. The death which may be desired, however, is a self-sought death, and a condition under our own control, the act of our own will, like the achievement of Nirvana by the expert Buddhist, which is similar, except for duration, to the blank interposed by the frightened child, whose anguish eventually finds this relief.

Death anxiety, in its more superficial form, is connected with conscious guilt, by way of religious teaching and educational admonition. It is clearly a concomitant of the ego-ideal, and thus gains a conspicuous place during adolescence, when an attempt is frequently made to find relief in religious practices. We must bear in mind the close connection between adolescent guilt and fear of death which is linked by adolescent masturbation, which often breaks out anew at this time and proves a source of great anxiety to the boy or girl. The former especially will frequently receive some sort of warning, verbally or in the form of little books written for the purpose of awakening guilt, that the practice is a sin of a serious nature, causing death of the soul and often laying the foundation of physical disease which in time will also destroy the body. At a deeper level we find the boy, even without warnings

from outside sources, frequently alarmed by his first nocturnal emissions at this time, as is also the adolescent girl at the appearance of blood, when the menstrual flow has not been explained to her beforehand. Both conditions appear to signify disease or impending death to the adolescent mind and awaken apprehensions accompanied with extreme guilt, which probably revive old situations of a similar type connected with masturbation or enuresis in early childhood.

From this point we may recall the importance of both these childish habits for subsequent neurotic symptoms, and their association with spoken or implied threats of castration, which brings us to another aspect of the death anxiety, that which is closely interwoven with castration fear. This fear is so closely united with death-fear that it has often been described as its origin. Yet, when we come to consider the cultural sequence of the two customs in religious or penal codes, sacrificial death and mutilation, we find that the latter usually appears as a subsequent lessening of the early death penalty, which leads us to wonder whether after all castration fear may not be a derivative of the primary fear of death, which would be borne out by the equal prevalence of this anxiety in men and women, as well as its peculiar significance in each sex, which look like two branches from the same root.

Freud, in the work quoted above, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, shows these two branches clearly, when he states that the fear which proves the greatest dynamic in the life of the woman is that of *loss of love*, which acts as a full equivalent of the man's fear of the *loss of the penis*. In this case should we take the death-fear as the fundamental anxiety, we may find that it may be symbolized thus :

I.—*Loss of love*, means separation from the parents : the child's loss of power over them, and their gain of power to bring about its destruction, death.

II.—*Loss of the penis*, a second separation from the parents : also loss of the ability to return through congress with the mother in life ; but the possibility of doing so in the sought death, which forms a symbolic reunion. Loss of power, no weapon with which to struggle against the armed and mighty father, which represents the dreaded and hostile death. Yet we find that in the child's mind, self-immolation wrests from the father the power to slay the son. It may also represent the loss of the self, the ego becoming identified with this organ.

Following up these steps, it seems possible to divide death into a dual representation, thus : *hostile or violent death*, the action of the

cruel father, who slays the sons and orders the exposure of the daughters, unwanted father-death ; and *desired, benign mother-death*, the regression to the pre-natal state, wished for and neither unknown nor feared.

The woman cannot obtain the compensation of a symbolic return to the mother, as can the man, in cohabitation, even should she wish it, unless it be through identification with her unborn baby, which has been suggested by Helene Deutsch. Yet the death-wish of the woman which is carried out in suicide often takes the form of a mother-regression, drowning or the gas-oven. Nevertheless, we frequently find that women in whom the wish for death is the strongest, so that this expedient has been sought, have been those who have recently lost their father by death, and are so strongly fixated to him that they do not wish to continue to live without him, but in the company of the mother. In this case we see the incest-wish phantasy of union with the father in the grave (the mother), which is one of great intricacy, since it shows both hostility to the mother as well as a reunion with her, and simultaneously with the father. The mother-symbol, the grave, may also serve to cancel the guilt to some extent, whereas the action itself has the practical result of escaping from the mother, who under these circumstances has probably been regarded with the keenest jealousy.

Relative to the fear of the hostile father-death, it may be as well to return to the primitive customs of the world, since so many other difficulties of psychological development have been illumined by reference to aboriginal tribes. Up to the present, I believe that the effect upon the child of the primæval custom of the slaying of maturing sons by the primal father has escaped psycho-analytical investigation as one of the possible roots of fear, which still makes a prompt appearance in little children when confronted with their angry parents.[2]

The primitive father in his anger might destroy his children; among some tribes this was taken as a matter of course, in others special punishments were allotted to the murderer of his own child, which shows that it must have been prevalent but was coming into disfavour with the march of civilization, yet present-day parents may still in their anger make use of threats and punishments that show a more or less direct reference to the same idea, which call forth the cry from the child, ' Then I will go away and kill myself instead '. The parent who hears this will often say that he or she cannot remember

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[2] See *Difficulties in Child Development:* Ch. XII, ' Both Sides of the Œdipus Conflict '. By Mary Chadwick (Allen & Unwin).

the words which provoked the outcry of the child, which is an interesting example of convenient forgetting, but one may surely assume that it was something pertinent, and in the symbolic punishments still in use in the modern nursery we may find the similar idea of banishment representing death, in the sending out of the room, away from sight, into the corner, where the child cannot see others and its face is hidden, which seems regarded by the child as a serious punishment as well as by its elders. One will remember in this connection that in the Bible death is frequently referred to as hiding the face, or being no more seen, sometimes as the result of God hiding His face from those who had done wrong.

In by-gone days the duration of a child's life was exceedingly precarious. The father held the prerogative to order exposure at birth among many races and could also bring about the death of sons or daughters in later years should occasion demand. Again, children could be sold, eaten or lost, which are all common themes of fairy-tales, in itself a factor of no little importance. Long ago the fairy-tale did not exist solely for the amusement of the children to whom it was related. It served the varied purpose of instruction and admonition as well as that of entertainment, by teaching the probable consequences of different types of behaviour. The good and pleasing children were rewarded; the bad ones, those who did not please, were punished, death itself being the result in many instances of this failure, which showed the child clearly enough that to continue to please was the price to be paid for the permanence of the parents' affection and protection. Should this be lost, then life itself might be insecure.

In those early days, as shown in the fairy-tales, the child would disappear in some way, be driven from home, lost in the forest, married to the first suitor who offered, whether desirable or not, like the girl in the legend married to the giant or monster, if not to death himself, while little brothers and sisters listened or looked on. Wild beasts in the mountain or a monster as in a tale might devour it, for the parental love had been forfeited. Thus love and life did very really become identified, especially in the case of the girl, whose value in the home depended upon her usefulness to her mother and her capacity to please her father.

For this reason, it is easy to see why the woman especially learns from childhood onwards that it is her duty to please, and to fear loss of life together with loss of love in connection with this capacity. We may also realize why the fear of death should manifest itself in such

close union with her primary narcissism, because she knows that her beauty is a prime factor in her ability to please. It may also offer an explanation why the fear of death or not pleasing should manifest itself in such close relation with the menstrual period, which shows a diminution in beauty as well as of usefulness; and in unmarried women especially we often find it appear at this time, accompanied by a heightened craving for love. The death-fear, as we have already mentioned, becomes conspicuous during adolescence (which marks the beginning of the mature sexual life), in connection with child-birth and before the approach of the menopause, which many women regard as a foreshadowing of death and fear it as such.

We may see running through all these forms of the fear of death the double thread, loss of power and gain of power, in the fear of helplessness, portrayed as a decrease of power when most needed in face of the mighty foe, or failure to please the important love-object, as we also observe in the desire for death an escape from and triumph over the enemy, which is felt to be a gain of immortal power and sometimes believed to be eternal life.

Let us now turn back to early childhood to discover there what light we may to untangle this riddle, still looked at from the dual aspects of father-death, the hostile and external, involuntary and which cannot be escaped, and mother-death, the desired. In the case of the girl, both may be equally hostile and expected, because of the jealousy of the mother for the daughter, on the one hand, and from the father should she fail to please, upon the other. This may indeed cause the anxiety and haunting dread of not pleasing, which is far more common in the woman than in the man; her readiness to sacrifice herself in any way if only the love of another may be retained, her frequent attitude of apology for her mere existence and her fear of incurring debt, although often trying to put others under an obligation to herself, as though in an attempt to buy back her original life-debt to her father for having allowed her to live, or to have a reserve for the future, something to fall back upon at the time of waning power and her greatest need for love, when she gets old and her beauty fades, so that it becomes not so easy to please as before.

If we take the fear of death or wish for death as the two manifestations of the realization of helplessness or desire for power on the part of the child, this also presupposes an estimation of the self in relation to an outer world which contains both benign and hostile beings, who may be controlled or placated, as well as some conception

of differences whereby the outer world is distinguished from the self, in fact, a stage of ego-development sharply enough defined to resent interference and to associate this with a fear of extinction of the ego as of the person. In this case one would assume that the fear of death may be a slightly later development than the wish for death, and conversely the stage of the wish for death is a still more deep regression to the prenatal, which other writers have also shown.

From material connected with the fear of death in young children, we find that it appears in the following circumstances :

1. The result of expressions of parental anger, threats and punishments, leading to the retort : ' I'd rather kill myself ! '

2. The result of death-wishes against the parent, sometimes connected with squint.

3. The result of physical restraint, impeded muscular movement, calling up the cry from the child, ' You're killing me ! '

4. As a correlate of fear of the dark, or of becoming blind as a punishment for death-wishes or masturbation.

Several of these conditions of death anxiety are familiar and have frequently been dealt with. In this paper, however, I should specially like to call attention to the third and fourth sections, *the result of physical restraint*, the value of the kinæsthetic sense, which stimulates such a violent reaction and anxiety in the child, and *the connection of blindness with death*, because of the opposed and relative idea of sight and life, the eye and the ego, which appears in English children from the identical sound of the two words, eye, the organ of vision, and I, the self. Blindness as a castration symbol is, of course, only too familiar.

Those of us who have considerable experience of children and of infants know that a frequent cause of anxiety is to be unable to move, to be held fast, and not to be able to see. A baby whose bonnet, coverlet or sleeve has slipped over the eyes or hands, will often cry in unmistakable terror and struggle violently to escape.

It would seem that vision and the muscular sense, particularly the latter, are the two earliest vehicles of the dawning ego, both being rudimentary ways in which the infant may learn to control the outside world subjectively to a very great extent. Many babies discover how to exercise their omnipotence through sight. They are thus able to make objects appear and disappear at will upon many occasions, and will show disappointment when it cannot be carried out. They also experience considerable fear concerning visual hallucinations, the

result of visual projection, which cannot be voluntarily controlled,[3] and they will often be led to believe that not only can they make objects disappear by the expedient of shutting their eyes, but that their eyes actually create the visions which pass before their eyes. They can turn light into darkness by this means, and are alarmed because they cannot also banish the darkness through some corresponding action of their own. This will frequently act as another cause of the fear of the dark, and may explain why Francis Bacon used this simile in his *Essay* upon death, ' Man fears Death as a child fears to go in the Dark '. In connection with this fear of children connected with things seen, to exclude which they shut their eyes in the attempt to exclude or to make non-existent, one often finds material in the associations of children and others which lead one to suppose that the mystery of the primal scene has been one over which they do not know whether to trust the evidence of their eyes. Children seem to occupy themselves with an infinity of phantasies upon this theme, the subjectivity of vision, as well as those representing the identification of the eye and the ego, and construct others relating to the tiny image of themselves which they see in the eye of another.

In passing, one may mention that a favourite excuse of parents to children who ask questions about something they have seen which they do not want to explain or acknowledge is this : ' You must have been dreaming ', which leads the child to doubt the evidence of its eyes rather than the veracity of the parents. The child then adopts the same form of reasoning, and plays with the idea of the subjectivity of vision at its own convenience.

Quite early do children begin to realize that death is a state of shut eyes and of immobility. The extinction of life and the cessation of vision means for them perpetual darkness, which also impedes movement. The same equation, death and darkness = closed eyes, which involves the extinction of the ego in death, seems to have been a belief that existed among the Egyptians and caused them to paint the widely open eye upon the side of the sarcophagus to ensure eternal life.

It is this idea of the extinction of the ego, which is the most intolerable factor in the conception of the fear of death. The greatest difficulty presented to the mind is to realize a negative condition, a state

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[3] As Forsyth pointed out in his paper ' The Infantile Psyche : with special reference to Visual Projection,' published in the *British Psychological Journal*, April, 1921.

of non-existence of the self or the non-continuance of existence in relation to the outside world, which is connected to some extent with the child's early idea that things that are out of sight cease to exist, and that objects are created by their sight and exist subjectively. That the world will still continue when we are not there to see or enjoy it was one of the greatest anticipatory horrors of a patient of mine, who connected the idea of death with that of perpetual darkness and isolation, in which he could see no one, nor could he be found if lost, which was directly linked with a memory of early childhood when he woke to find that his mother had left him in his perambulator, having gone into a shop.

Phantasies of this description are to be found among those of many patients, but the following are taken from two whose development in each case was deeply affected by the death of the father in early childhood. Both believed that they were partially responsible for his death, and felt that they were to some extent also dead, for the reason that they could no longer exist in the *eyes* or *thoughts* of this parent. The father of the girl had once said, ' in his eyes she was beautiful ', and ' she had nice eyes ', therefore her beauty had ceased to exist now he was no longer there to admire her and take pleasure in it. The boy, in the other instance, identified the dead father in his coffin with his own brain inside his skull. His eyes could look down upon it, but which was the greater, the son or the father, he could never determine. Again, he felt that as the father lived on in his son, so he, being the part of his father, was now dead in him and decaying.

The child, we have remarked, may exercise some control over the environment through vision, as likewise by shutting the eyes ; it may and does create the isolation or blank which serves to wipe out the undesired incidents. The baby's self-shut eyes partly control its universe, and in some cases may produce a swift regression to momentary unconsciousness, symbolic of death. The reverse of this self-blinding to shut out unwelcome sights, or again symbolically to kill an unwanted person by making him disappear, will be the contrast to the banishment punishment of the naughty child by the angry adult, together with the idea of blindness as a masturbation punishment, i.e. castration, the hostile death caused by the external force, who wishes to abolish the child from sight and life. ' Get hence and be no more seen ! '

Again, to return to the part played by physical restraint in the growth of the death-fear. By means of the realization of pleasure

through muscular movement and muscle erotism, the child learns to appreciate the power of its own ego at a very early stage of auto-erotic libido-development. Muscle erotism may thus take on a very high cathexis, which would lead to a correspondingly intense reaction to muscular opposition of restraint from outside sources, so giving rise to anxiety, which expresses itself as the fear of death and causes the cry, ' Let go, you're killing me ', in response to limitation of movement by the grip of another. This idea appears once more in the constant use of the expression ' the chill grasp of death ', or ' in the grip of death ', and recalls the action of some animals who when held tightly immediately relax every muscle, become as dead, hoping that their captor will then lose interest in an inanimate captive and throw it away.

This factor of hatred or fear of physical restraint and of interference by touch shows itself, together with the painful sensation of loss of control of the senses and muscular movement, in those who dread going under an anæsthetic. In this loss of muscular control they feel that possession of themselves, the ego and super-ego is threatened. On the one hand, they will not be able to defend themselves against the attack of the operator, and they also fear ' they may do something dreadful ', an outbreak of the id-impulses, which would cause humiliation to the super-ego, which has been put out of control by the anæsthetic. This state of affairs only too often happens in reality, as those know who have had an opportunity to observe those under anæsthetics or recovering from them. Until the anæsthetic takes effect, it is by no means seldom that we find the patient struggle as though for life, the shout ' Let me go ! ' is frequent, and cases have been known when the patient has broken free and made a determined counter-attack upon the anæsthetist. In one of these the anæsthetist, being also afflicted with a well-developed death-fear, fled from the surgery and locked the door, waiting in terror outside while the patient proceeded to smash everything he could.

We may meet with this same strong reaction to the interfering touch of another in those waked from a deep sleep, or in the unconscious patient, who may be suffering from the effects of concussion meningitis, or some other acute cerebral condition. They will all show the greatest disturbance or irritability should they be touched, or the bedclothes moved so as to uncover them, a characteristic they share with persons suffering from some conditions of the graver psychoses.

In his admirable paper upon tic,[4] Ferenczi demonstrates the close connection between this muscle innervation and primary narcissism, and points out the characteristic irritability of epileptic patients and schizophrenics, who also show abnormalities of muscular movement, both spasm and death-like rigidity, as well as stressing the relation between the psychological causes of tics and disturbances of ego-development in conflict at an extremely early level.

In reference to the correlation of primary narcissism and muscle erotism, unconsciousness as the healing blank and the phenomenon of the shut eyes as a symbol of death, I should like to conclude these notes with a few illustrations taken from a young patient of my own, a girl of fifteen, who had suffered from pseudo-epileptoid attacks since the age of seven years. She was also subject to recurrent death-anxiety and showed interesting symptoms connected with shut eyes, her attitude towards father and mother, love of muscular movement in dancing, and extreme resentment of any interference with her liberty, as well as these attacks of unconsciousness, which simulated both epilepsy and death.

They would occur whenever she wished to isolate or reverse any unpleasant event, and make it as though it had not happened. She would then shut her eyes to the world and become unconscious for a time, until the anger of the relations had been changed to tender solicitude. Sometimes when unconscious she would abuse and strike the mother, accusing her of trying to kill her, and say that she would rather take her own life, since at present it was unbearable. She had also the habit of ' shutting her eyes at a person ', who had annoyed her past endurance, in order to banish them from sight as well as existence for her, to destroy them as definitely as she extinguished the universe and herself by her attacks of unconsciousness. The first of these, significantly enough, followed an air-raid, in which she thought she was going to be killed. It was a daylight raid, and she was out shopping by herself at the time. How she ran home, dropping her parcels out of the basket as she went, she did not know, only realizing their loss when she arrived home without them. Her father was an officer in the Indian Army, to whom she was devotedly attached, a feeling he reciprocated, but she had never seen him again since she and the mother returned from India when she was about three years old.

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[4] ' Psycho-Analytical Observations on Tic ', this JOURNAL, Vol. II, 1921.

In this case, the separation from the loved father seems to have led to a profound amnesia of her whole life before this time, because she could remember at the start of the analysis nothing about her life there, nor the voyage home, except what she had been told. She had numerous phantasies of her father's return for her wedding and the presents he would bring her, one of which was to be a lace wedding-veil, which recalls the interesting symbolism of ancient bridal customs.

We have here in the symptoms of this girl the wish for death, shown in the recurrent temporary withdrawal from the world, the regression to the mother, as well as the anxiety on account of her, and hostility shown towards her during the attacks, because she felt the mother kept the father away and also prevented her dancing with her boy friends, yet at the same time she feared death from the hostile soldiers as well as from some vague source, particularly at the end of each year. Each attack would be preceded by the cry : ' Mother, I'm dying ! ' which called the mother to her side, in time for the girl to sink unconscious in her arms, but frequently during the attack she would accuse the mother of killing her and wished her to go away.

This type of regression to unconsciousness, accompanied by the expression of personal power, seen in the convulsions and epileptiform attacks of young children and infants when angry or feeling their utter helplessness, was remarked upon and likened to the quest of Nirvana by the pious, as early as 1919, in a paper read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society by Forsyth, which afterwards appeared some two years later in the *Psycho-Analytical Review*, as ' Rudiments of Character-formation ', and again, at the Berlin Congress in 1922, when Alexander showed the connection of the state of trance, and voluntarily developed by the Yogi with primary narcissism, in which mastery is obtained over the self, over the adverse conditions of the world and bodily pain, through a state of unconsciousness and physical immobility which is supreme muscular control, but also a condition bordering upon death and akin to catalepsy, catatonia and advanced dementia præcox.

In the early stages of dementia præcox to be found in children, it is also typical to find concurrently the fear of death, anxiety-states aroused by physical restraint, muscular spasms and hypercathexis of muscle erotism, showing itself in repeated rhythmical movements, the prevention of the continuance of which will generally produce extreme irritation or anxiety. In the characteristic phantasies of these children we find, not only the themes of regression to a prenatal state of immo-

bility, but also those of violence directed against another, generally the father, or suffered by the self from a hostile foe, that is, both *death-wishes* and the *fear of death*.

It is common to find in children with whom this fear of death has reached a high development, together with the death-wishes, rituals of magic by which not only shall the death of those whom they fear be accomplished, but also rites of re-animation for the reversal of the death-wishes of others as well as themselves. This, in point of fact, represents the attempt to gain power over the almighty force, death, to hold in their own hands the control of death and the re-animation of those whom they have condemned to die. This being accomplished, they seek further rituals or phantasies of procreation and self-procreation, in fact, all the acts of God, to whom the power of life and death are ascribed, in which case they would be more powerful than the parents themselves.[5]

Many children will find a means of producing a temporary stasis in mind or of physical anæsthesia by intense rigidity, the simulation of death akin to that of the trapped animal to escape from the hostile grip of an enemy, which the animal produces by the opposite mechanism, muscular relaxation. Muscular control of this kind gains the power that is sought, a compensation to the primary narcissism, in phantasy if in no other way, to spare them the anguish of humiliation in acknowledging a power greater than their own, which in itself will provide anxiety, and call forth this feeling of menace to the ego, which afterwards crystallizes into the fear of death, because they believe that to yield will mean death or captivity of the ego, their own loss of power or love, reinforced with primitive death-wishes against this stronger foe, provoking unconscious guilt and fear from those far-off times when the father met the opposition of the child with death.

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[5] Cf. Ernest Jones, ' The God Complex ', *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis ;* also Mary Chadwick, ' Gott-Phantasie bei Kindern ', *Imago,* XIII, 1927.

PRIVATION AND GUILT

BY

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I

In his paper on ' The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego ',[1] in 1926, Ernest Jones prefaced his discussion of some of the problems arising out of this topic with the remark that ' there is every reason to think that the concept of the super-ego is a nodal point where we may expect all the obscure problems of the Œdipus complex and narcissism on the one hand, and hate and sadism on the other, to meet '. Since that date, contributions towards the further elucidation of these issues have been made by Freud and others, and our knowledge of the structure and modes of functioning of the super-ego, in the neuroses, psychoses and normal character, has been greatly amplified.

On the other hand, the results of Melanie Klein's direct researches into the minds of very young children, whilst underlining the theoretical value of the concept of the super-ego, and deepening our sense of its enormous dynamic power, have nevertheless increased certain of the theoretical difficulties attaching to the first modes of statement of its origin, of its relation to the Œdipus complex, and the developmental phases of the libido. To my mind, the most illuminating suggestion which has yet been offered on these tangled issues is that made by Jones (elaborating a hint of Freud's), when he says that *privation is equivalent to frustration.*[2] He further remarks, ' . . . guilt, and with it the super-ego, is as it were artificially built up for the purpose of protecting the child from the stress of privation, i.e. of ungratified libido, and so warding off the dread of aphanisis that always goes with this ; it does so, of course, by damping down the wishes that are not destined to be gratified. I even think that the external disapproval, to which the whole of this process used to be ascribed, is largely an affair of exploitation on the child's part ; that is to say, non-gratification primarily means danger, and the child projects this into the outer world, as it does with all internal dangers, and then makes use of any disapproval that comes to meet it there (*moralisches Entgegenkommen*)

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[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. VII, pp. 303 *et seq.*

[2] ' The Early Development of Female Sexuality ', this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, p. 463.

to signalize the danger and to help it in constructing a barrier against this '.

My desire in this paper is to set out (*a*) some of the difficulties which appear to arise when the earlier formulas for the origin of the super-ego are set against the facts of mental history discovered directly by Melanie Klein's technique ; and (*b*) to suggest how this view of Ernest Jones', together with his concept of *aphanisis*, appear to resolve these difficulties.

To state the difficulties first :

After reading a series of the earlier accounts of the genesis of the super-ego, one is left with the impression that a certain time-relation between this and the Œdipus complex was conceived to hold. Freud's classic phrase that the super-ego is ' the heir of the Œdipus complex ' hints strongly that the former is held to appear as and when the latter dies out ; and this view is also emphasized in both the title and the substance of ' The Passing of the Œdipus Complex '.[3] It comes into explicit expression in the following : ' I have no doubt that the temporal and causal relations described between the Œdipus complex, sexual intimidation (the threat of castration), formation of the super-ego and advent of the latency period, are of a typical kind '.

This, then, was the general point of view, previous to Klein's work, with regard to the time and mode of onset of the super-ego, viz. that it belonged essentially to the phallic stage of libidinal development, was the outcome of the frustration and anxieties experienced by the child in his object-relationships at that level, and signalized the passing of the Œdipus complex and the beginning of the latency period.

Now this way of stating the history of the super-ego has clearly to be modified in order to fit the fuller facts offered by Melanie Klein as the outcome of her direct investigations of very young children.

There are two main points to be considered here. (1) Both in ' The Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis ',[4] and ' The Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict ',[5] Melanie Klein develops her conclusion that

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[3] *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 269. Freud then goes on to reserve some doubts as to the part played by the dread of castration, doubts aroused by Rank's work on the birth trauma ; and to which he returns in *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, 1926. This latter is obviously also closely relevant to the issues I am raising, and the development of Freud's views therein clearly coincides in direction with Jones' contribution.

[4] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, Pt. 1.

[5] Ibid., Vol. IX, Pt. 2.

'the Œdipus complex comes into operation earlier than is usually supposed', and that 'the very onset of the Œdipus wishes . . . already becomes associated with incipient dread of castration and feelings of guilt'. She thinks it is no longer possible to hold that the guilt found to be linked up, in the analysis of adults, with the pregenital impulses is 'of subsequent growth, displaced back on to these tendencies, though not originally associated with them'. Going beyond the hints given by Ferenczi and Abraham in this connection, she says, 'My findings lead rather further. They show that the sense of guilt associated with pregenital fixation is already the direct effect of the Œdipus conflict. And this seems to account satisfactorily for the genesis of such feelings, for we know the sense of guilt to be simply a result of the introjection (already accomplished, or, as I would add, *in process of being accomplished*),[6] of the Œdipus love-objects'.

The formation of the super-ego, thus, so far from being a single psychic act, or even a process which can be placed mainly within a single phase of development, the phallic, is seen to be interwoven with all developmental phases, to have its deepest roots in oral experiences, and to run on continuously throughout all the emotional vicissitudes of the child, from the breast to the latency period.

(2) The second point, closely connected with the first, and made very clear by Klein, is that the parents 'introjected'[7] are not the *real* parents, with their real characteristics, but *the parents as apprehended by the child through the medium of his own active psychology*. This is put most clearly in her contribution to the 'Symposium on Child Analysis', p. 356.[8] 'For these external objects (i.e. the parents) are certainly not identical with the already developed super-ego of the child, even though they have at one time contributed to its development. It is only thus that we can explain the astonishing fact that in children of three, four and five years old we encounter a super-ego of a severity which is often in the sharpest contradiction to the real love-objects, the parents'. Or, again, 'the connection between the formation of the super-ego

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[6] Present writer's italics.

[7] 'The authority of the father or the parents is introjected into the ego, and there forms the kernel of the super-ego, which takes its severity from the father, perpetuates his prohibition against incest, and so ensures the ego against a recurrence of the libidinal object-cathexis'. 'The Passing of the Œdipus Complex'.

[8] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, Pt. 3.

and the pregenital phases of development is very important from two points of view. On the one hand, the sense of guilt attaches itself to the oral- and anal-sadistic phases, which as yet predominate; and, on the other, the super-ego comes into being while these phases are in the ascendant, which accounts for its sadistic severity'. The structure of the super-ego is thus 'built up of identifications dating from very different periods and strata in the mental life'.

Now these views, whilst they make some aspects of the super-ego at once more intelligible—as, for instance, its fantastic severity, and its independence of the real character of the parents—nevertheless raise certain further theoretical difficulties. It is, for example, not easy to see at first sight how and why guilt, as distinct from primary anxiety, should arise at the oral stage—since guilt would seem to imply some definite measure of distinction between the self and the not-self, and would seem to rest upon some degree of object-relationship, which as yet must be only rudimentary. The picture of ego-modifications as the result of abandoned object-cathexes, in the phallic or later genital phases, is quite clear. 'When the ego assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object, and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, "Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me"'.[9] But in what ways can this be seen to hold of the relatively undifferentiated 'object' and 'me' in the earlier phases?

Obviously, the process of 'introjection' in these earlier phases must be different in some important sense from that occurring after there has been true object-relationship Nor, perhaps, is this difference fully covered by pointing out that in these early stages the object is but a *part*-object—the nipple, the mother's bowel-contents, long before the mother. That the 'me' predominates over the 'not-me' is made clear because, as Klein shows, the child apprehends the parents only as it apprehends itself, and in terms of its own impulses. It is not the *parents* who are 'introjected', but a distorted imago, the psychic contents of which are derived rather, perhaps, from *projection*. The mechanism of introjection yields the form, the externality of the super-ego in relation to the id; but it is projection which determines its concrete mode of operation (cutting, biting, destroying, etc.). Or, to put it differently, it is very truly a part of the child's own psyche which is differentiated to act as if it were external to the id impulses. One

[9] Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 37.

suspects that Freud's ' primary identification ' [10] may perhaps play a greater part in the total drama than was originally thought.

Again, in what sense or senses can we understand the dictum that ' anxiety of conscience is internalized castration anxiety ', at these early stages ? This is clear and understandable for the phallic phase—but not so easily to be read as one runs for the anal and oral, in spite of the already familiar notions of the loss of the nipple and bowel-contents.

These and other difficulties of clear statement crowd upon one. What follows is a partial and very tentative attempt to get round them. I do not propose to take them one by one, but to try to re-phrase the problem of the early onset of guilt along the lines of Jones' view that ' privation is equivalent to frustration '. I do so in the hope that my fragmentary remarks may provoke others to clarify these problems further.

II

From the moment when the travail of the mother begins, experience for the child is a series of disturbances of equilibrium, of moments of increase in tension, and more or less successful discharge of tension. The part played by the first and severest of these disturbances, birth itself, is now (since *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*) clear in many respects. Birth, because of the suddenness and intensity of the stimuli the child then suffers, and his psychic helplessness in face of these, arouses the first and greatest anxiety-state. This acute birth helplessness is the prototype of all later anxieties, the further occasions being probably a milder re-activation of this original reaction.

Now here we may also make use of an interesting set of facts gained from recent direct studies of infant behaviour. The experimental studies by Watson of the innate responses of the infant in the earliest days following birth yield data which fit in well with Freud's view. There are two kinds of external stimuli which call out the fear-reaction in the earliest days—sudden loss of support, and a sudden loud noise.

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[10] ' At the very beginning, in the primitive oral phase of the individual's existence, object-cathexis and identification are hardly to be distinguished from each other ': *The Ego and the Id*, p. 35.

' This, the first and most important identification of all, is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis ; it is a direct and immediate identification, and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis ', p. 39.

(These may both be called real dangers, and may be contrasted with the phobias appearing later, the earliest true phobias instanced by Freud, viz. being alone, being in the dark, being with strangers ; these are reactions to *the absence of the loved person*, and may already be looked upon as neurotic.)

A sudden loud noise reduces the child to the state of psychic shock and helplessness which is anxiety, since he cannot move away from or shut out the too intense stimulus, as he can shut out, for example, too intense a light, by closing his eyes and turning away his head. He has no ear-lids to close !

Sudden loss of support, if the child is dropped or his blanket twitched when he is falling to sleep, is in the same way a real danger, and one that will from the nature of the case readily re-animate the birth anxiety. This will have in it, however, not only the element of real danger, but the seeds of the later fear of *loss of object*—since support in the mother's arms must itself be libidinally toned, meaning love as well as safety.

It is illuminating here to contrast for a moment the theoretical use which Watson makes of the facts he so carefully gathers, with the insight of Freud. On Watson's view, all *later* phobias are derived from these two by environmental ' conditioning '. Because they (the fears of the dark, of strangers, of particular animals, etc.) appear later, he assumes this to mean that they are therefore environmentally, rather than psychically, conditioned. For him, the instance of the later fear —the dark or the animal—is a sign, a condition, of the earlier instance, built up into one pattern with it by reflex association.

For Freud, also, these particular later phobias are secondary phenomena—signs and conditions ; but of tensions arising from *inner* stimuli. The anxiety is real, no less than in well-grounded fears of real outer dangers ; but the danger apprehended is the state of psychic helplessness as the result of overwhelming *inner* tension which cannot be adequately discharged ; and which is thus reacted to *as if it were an external danger*.

And these inner stimuli in the earliest days are the component sexual impulses at the oral and anal levels of sexual development—the libidinal element in sucking and biting, in the passing of fæces or their accumulation within the bowel ; and the first object-relationships connected with these erotogenic zones. The phantasies made plain in the later play of children, as well as in the psychoses and neuroses of adults, show that these object-relationships take the form of the desire,

first, to incorporate the object (= mother's nipple), then to bite and destroy it ; and later to find out and appropriate the contents of her body (bowel-womb) ; and to destroy rivals (father or other children) who might stand in the way of satisfaction. Presently, when the phallic phase sets in, the desire is to see and possess the genital of the loved person ; and, again, to remove and destroy all rivals.

(Melanie Klein insists, and it helps our difficulties to keep in mind, that these phases in libidinal development overlap and merge into each other very intimately throughout the early years. In other words, even when the child has progressed to the more developed object-relationship of the phallic level, he is bound to be yet so insecurely planted there that his phallic impulses and phantasies will be deeply infused with the characteristics belonging to the pregenital zones and pregenital impulses.)

Two questions at once arise : (1) How and why should these early libidinal trends awake anxiety ? And (2) at what age do they begin to do so ?

To take the second first. No precise time can be indicated from the available evidence. But it will be *at such time as some measure of true object-relationship has developed*, even though the object be mainly one apprehended in terms of oral experience. That is to say, the nipple-breast-mother will then (at whatever point in the series nipple-breast-mother this may happen) be already well distinguished as *something not-me*, which the *me* wants, has, loses, wants again and has again, and so on—in a series of changes which come and go within the field of the *me*, but which are outside its control. It probably can only happen at a time when, although the nipple-breast remains the important part of the mother, the core of her meaning, she is something well beyond this in richness and articulation of perceptual content. When, in other words, the exteroceptors of the child are sufficiently educated and synthesized, and the memory-traces of the ego sufficiently developed, as to make the perception of a *person* (in some terms) possible (this being, in its turn, dependent upon the loosening of the libido from its primary narcissistic investment) ; and yet, at such a time when there is still a huge element of *primary identification* involved in this perception—of filling out the content of the perception with the *me's* own visceral and kinæsthetic experiences, and id impulses.

The evidence seems to suggest any time within the second half of the first year, varying with the child, and possibly with circumstance (such as the age of weaning, the oversight or hearing of parental coitus,

etc. But much remains to be known here). Undoubtedly, well before the end of the first year with some children, and during the early part of the second year with others, direct observation will show developed sufficient sense of persons and of relationship to persons as to make possible manifestations of jealousy and of rage aroused by jealousy; of a direct response of fear to frowns and angry looks on the faces of loved people; and of anxieties other than those called out by intense or sudden outer stimuli.

Now to return to the first question. Until the suggestion made by Jones, already referred to, and the remarks leading in the same direction by Joan Riviere, in her paper in the 'Symposium on Child Analysis',[11] the tendency was to look upon the experience of weaning, and the real behaviour of the parents in ordering the training in cleanliness, as determining causes of guilt. Now, however, we should be more inclined to regard them simply as occasions.

At first sight there is little theoretical difficulty about the part played by training in cleanliness. One knows that this *is* usually done in such a way as deliberately to foster the feeling of responsibility in the child. The long-continued active pressure brought to bear upon him, urging to the control of the sphincters, no matter how pleasantly and patiently done, is clearly of the same psychological order as his own feeling of guilt. The parents *do* set conditions to the continuance of their love; there is real frustration, as distinct from privation. (Further reflection suggests, it is true, that even here the situation is more complicated than this; the severity of the guilt aroused, for example, is too great to be explained away by this real situation.)

Very few parents, however, make a moral affair of weaning. It is far more usually a simple matter-of-fact change, and done with care and sympathy. How then should it give rise to guilt in the child? Melanie Klein's term is that the anal and oral frustrations 'release' the Œdipus tendencies; and with them, guilt.

Is it possible to articulate more fully the steps which lead from oral privation to guilt and the super-ego?

It is, in the first place, obvious that a great heaping-up of oral libido, of the impulses which have hitherto enjoyed some measure of real satisfaction, but which are now thwarted, will occur; and will lead to a sense of unbearable tension and psychic helplessness. Rage and hate impulses will, as a result, greatly augment the sadistic

[11] This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, p. 370.

element in the love of the nipple-breast mother, which itself is commonly one of the conditions of the weaning. There will be a considerable heightening of the awareness of *things-not-me*, and thus of object-relationships. These will be primarily objects which are interfering, denying and therefore hostile, *things-which-thwart-me*, and which *me* would destroy if it could; but, nevertheless, there will be this heightening of object-sense, and of the search for an object on which to discharge the heaped-up libido. *An object which cannot yet be found.* For, quite apart from the will and pleasure of the parents, the nature of the oral-sadistic impulses is such that they cannot really be satisfied—neither the love nor the hate. The child wants not only to bite the nipple—as he will do if allowed; but to destroy all thwarting objects and rival persons; and even the loved mother, by way of love. That is what he is at this stage—a creature who loves and hates *with his mouth and teeth;* and can no other.

Underlying the real moral element in the anal training, moreover, are the same fundamental privations. Apprehending, loving and hating in terms of his bowel experiences, the child desires and phantasies the fulfilment of desires which never can be realized in fact. He 'desires to get possession of the mother's fæces, by penetrating into her body, cutting it to pieces, devouring it and destroying it'.[12] And along with this sadistic and possessive love of his mother, itself permeated with the hatred aroused by her oral interferences, goes his hate and dread of his father. (The first onset of the genital impulses takes place under the ægis of this sadistic phase; hence the strength and spontaneity of the castration fears.)

There are two further considerations which strengthen these hints that the privation set up by weaning may but serve to augment and give point to the privations inherent in the oral and anal libidinal situations. In the first place, the pregenital zones appear to be relatively segmental and isolated in their functioning, and to be incapable of the full discharge of the libidinal tension of the whole body, as may occur with the genital orgasm under favourable psychological conditions. And secondly, all demands at these levels are of too timeless, ungraded and absolute a nature to find complete satisfaction in a real world limited by time and space conditions.

One therefore sees the trauma of weaning as perhaps but applying the match to a fire of already prepared dissatisfaction, inherent in the

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[12] 'The Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict', p. 170.

libidinal situation at this stage. And the later anal privations add fuel to this fire.

This intolerable tension would reduce the weak and young ego to a state of psychic helplessness approximating to that of birth itself, were it not dealt with somehow. And it is dealt with by projecting the danger to the ego into the outside world, as external frustration. From there it later returns, like the thrown boomerang, into the psyche, as guilt and the super-ego—now charged with the power and authority of the external, thwarting, world.

This third stage of guilt must, however, be built upon the first stage of ' primary identification ', and what in all likelihood go along with it, the earlier among Ferenczi's ' stages in the development of the sense of reality '.

We can thus perhaps decipher three main stages in the whole process. The first has itself three main aspects : (*a*) primary auto-erotism, antedating all object-cathexes ; (*b*) an almost complete ' omnipotence '—omnipotence conditioned by subjective changes, phantasies, gestures, cries, and the like. The exteroceptors and musculature are not yet developed enough to make perception of things and persons possible ; (*c*) primary identification, in which the outer world (= persons) is drawn into the circle of the psyche. At this stage, the *me* is much more solid and continuous than the sporadic incursions of the *not-me*. These are (at first) isolated, without relations, and therefore without meaning. The events in the *me* must be much more closely linked up and continuous, and the first effect of the *not-me* shocks must be simply to throw the *me* into high relief. The former will be laid hold of in terms of the latter, and assimilated to it. Hence there must be already a tendency on the part of the *me* to assume responsibility for events in so far as they are pleasurable, to refer intrusions of the external to preceding internal changes. For only so can they be (illusorily) controlled before there is perceptual discrimination of specific cause and effect.

In the characteristic moments of this stage ' the ego-subject coincides with what is pleasurable and the outside world with what is indifferent (or even painful as being a source of stimulation) '.[13] External events which bring discomfort are turned away from—as it were, closed over by the flow of narcissistic libido.

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[13] Freud, ' Instincts and Their Vicissitudes ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 78.

One can perhaps see this element reflected even in certain later phases. For example, one motive in the much later identification of the girl with the father (when this occurs) may be the desire for control of the conditions of pleasure. If the penis (= nipple) is her own (part of the *me*), then she can enjoy it as and when she wishes, free from the to-her-merely-arbitrary will of others. This, of course, is partly built upon the object-directed anal desire for mastery, and oral desire for possession, as well as the true Œdipus relation ; but still further below the identification may be this reference of all sources of pleasure to *me* as sufficient cause.

This first stage will pass over continuously and imperceptibly into the second—as presently, the second into the third.

The second stage is that of the earliest object-cathexes, and rudimentary object-relationships.

The possibility of object-relationships has two concurrent and inter-related aspects : (1) the growing strength of the ego, which comes to have less need of narcissistic libido ; and (2) the increase in the variety, connectedness and continuity of external stimuli. It may be presumed that outer events come to be tolerated in attention (not turned away from altogether, as in the primary narcissistic stage) only as they become linked up with an end-state of pleasure, and thus, conditions of satisfaction. External perceptions thus come to have enough relatedness to be referred to external conditions, and, to a greater or less extent, distinguished from internal happenings. These external events must, of course, themselves be apprehended at first as personal agencies, in terms of the internal causal series. Just as in the first stage the *me* assimilates external events in order to control them, so, in this second stage, it does so (in form) in order to *understand* and so control them, by acting on them. It feels them to be outside itself, but like itself.

When this perceptual ordering of the external world in terms of personal agency, together with the appropriate object-cathexes, has been reached, the stage is set for the reference of internal libidinal tension in its turn to external danger. This is the time when ' the ego thrusts forth upon the external world whatever within itself gives rise to pain ' ; [14] when *privation becomes equivalent to frustration.* ' I haven't got what I want ' becomes ' You deny me '. This gap is crossed

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[14] ' Instincts and Their Vicissitudes '.

on the slender real bridge of the actual withholding of the pleasures of the breast by the mother.

' I am afraid of my helplessness before my own sadistic desires ' is thus turned into ' I fear your cruel thwarting ' ; and this is further developed into ' You thwart me *because* I wish to possess and destroy you '. ' You took it from me *because* I wanted to bite '. It is this *because* which acts as the needed barrier to the uprush of libido. And the thwarting agencies (as Klein makes so clear and as we have seen must inevitably be so) are given all the intemperateness and ruthlessness of the child's own pent-up impulses. What is feared, as Jones has shown, is retaliatory injury to the body involving total extinction of pleasure. It is this dread of *aphanisis* which is in due course specified and localized as castration-fear ; and which is in the third stage internalized again in its turn.

The earliest components of guilt thus belong to the least differentiated and graded levels of experience. From the fact that the first and most powerful object-cathexes occur here, guilt draws its all-or-none-ness and automaticity. This it is which causes the later ' conscience ' to remain a ' categorical imperative ' in its mode of operation, its not-to-be-questioned-ness, even when its specific content and incidence in the objective world is infused with discriminated reality.

It would seem to be on this background of the sense of being thwarted by the punishing mother for sadistic desires towards her that the more complicated cross-relationships of the Œdipus situation are embroidered. Mrs. Klein suggests that the oral (and anal) frustrations ' release the Œdipus tendencies ' ; and perhaps, with them, the incipient genital phase.

And so we come to the third stage, when we pass from the sense of frustration to guilt proper ; when the love-objects are ' introjected ', and the castration-anxiety proper is internalized.

If we were to logicize this process of internalization, the steps might run something like this :

(*a*) ' You thwart me because I wish to possess and/or destroy you '.

(*b*) ' If I do not wish to possess and/or destroy you, you will love (= not hate) me '.

(*c*) ' I will thwart myself, because I hate you '. (Consciously, ' because I love (= do not hate) you '.)

(*d*) ' I can love myself if I thwart myself '.

(*e*) ' I love myself if I love (= do not hate) you '.

And (*e*) would be the logic of the normal conscience, on the genital level; (*c*) that of the obsessional.

Things do not, of course, happen so simply. At every step there is in fact the most complex shuttle-like back and forth movement between the internal and the external—just as there is in later history between the super-ego and the id.

Of the general dynamic and economic functions of this internalization there is no need to speak here. One point may be made, viz. that it makes for the development of the real ego and for knowledge and control of the external world—both by withdrawing the stress of control of the id from the ego, and by freeing external events from their over-investment with libidinal values.

I have, in this very fragmentary and tentative paper, been primarily interested in the second stage of the genesis of guilt, because it is there that (to my mind) the greater obscurities still remain. One conclusion is reinforced by the facts and considerations here dealt with, viz. the inevitability of guilt in the human mind. It arises from the developmental processes themselves, in the child, and not from his accidental circumstances or faulty education. It is not to be explained (away) by false theologies; but they by it.

GENITAL AND EXTRAGENITAL LIBIDO

BY

J. SADGER

VIENNA

The fundamental difference between the sexual life of human beings and that of all other creatures is that, while the latter serves exclusively the purpose of reproduction, the former is principally directed towards the attainment of pleasure and sublimation. In animals the sexual instinct proper makes itself felt at the time of heat and leads almost always to impregnation ; where human beings are concerned, however, only a pharisaical hypocrisy can identify the sexual instinct with that of reproduction. I have but to mention how seldom the union of the sexes takes place with the intention of procreation ; indeed, in most cases there is an endeavour to guard against this possibility with every kind of device and precaution. The aim of pleasure is almost alone as a determining factor in the act. Nor does sexual feeling begin at puberty, but is already present in childhood, and does not disappear even quite late in life, although the capacity to produce semen or accomplish erection may have long since ceased. Finally, the sexual act itself is no longer connected with the rutting season, but may be practised at any time. The reason is not merely that human beings in general have liberated themselves by their technical progress from anxious care about the means of subsistence, but (and this is far more important) that their sex-instinct is far stronger, more differentiated and more many-sided than that of any of the animals. One could go so far as to say that in civilized man of the present day the sexual instinct has become quite insatiable, constantly pressing for fresh gratification. It harnesses all the mental energies in the service of the libido, and since it is so far more complicated than it is in animals, it ever renews itself in changing forms which condense together all the possible modes of gratification.

For the purpose of this paper I think it will be useful to divide sensual desire, i.e. the libido, into the genital and the extragenital. What I have just said about the insatiability of human libido applies less to that associated with the sexual parts proper than to the extragenital libido. The former has a definite onset at four separate periods : in infancy ; at the time of the first maturing of the sexual instinct, between the third and the sixth years of life ; then round about the eighth year ; and finally when maturity is reached. The latter, on the

other hand, is active almost from the moment of birth—some children are born sucking—and with many people ends only at death, even though potency, i.e. the capacity of the sex-organs to function, has long since died away.

Genital libido can be satisfied fully and completely by the sexual act on each occasion that it is performed. In this it resembles the ego-instincts, e.g. hunger and thirst, which can always be entirely lulled to sleep for some time by specific gratification—food and drink. If, however, people deprive themselves of normal coitus for a considerable time, the result may be very grave disturbances of the capacity for intellectual work. Thus Wilhelm Ostwald relates that he noticed one day that he could make no headway in his scientific research. He considered what might be the causes of this phenomenon and found that he was constantly thinking of one of his girl pupils. Finally, he had no choice but to make love to her in order to be able to apply himself again to his work. On the other hand, the practice which has recently found so much favour, of ' living life to the full ', may yield complete subjective gratification, but not seldom leads to the cessation of all sublimation, and therewith to intellectual stagnation. We find a very striking instance of this in the children of the coloured races. Before puberty they are mentally at least as alert as the children of white men. But after puberty their intellect is generally stunted, because from that time on they have absolutely no genital inhibition. As soon as the libido is entirely sated there ceases to be any urge to sublimation. Observation of every-day life teaches us, moreover, that when children and young people begin persistently to masturbate their mental receptivity and educability suffer greatly. If we consider these and similar facts of experience, we shall understand the demand for sexual asceticism. Practised with wise deliberation it certainly has its advantages—in so far as it is safely tolerated. Let every one endeavour to live in genital continence and thus to release energies for sublimation to the furthest point that his nature permits. But the man who tries to enforce upon himself a stricter moral life than his constitution allows will develop a neurosis. In every individual case to find the optimum, to exaggerate neither abstinence nor his genital needs—this is one of the most important tasks for every human being.

In contrast to the genital components, the extragenital can hardly be completely satisfied even temporarily. It is these latter components upon which the insatiability of the human sexual instinct

depends,[1] and which therewith give the impulse to its ennoblement and sublimation and, in the sequel, to all civilization. Neither the genital instinct nor even certain of the ego-instincts contribute so much to human progress as do the extragenital component instincts. For even the direst external necessity does not hound mankind so relentlessly forward as does the inner craving to satisfy those stimuli, let us say, of the erotism associated with the skin, mucous membrane and muscles, which arise ceaselessly almost throughout life. Now we may assert that the true and most important carriers of civilization are the extragenital components of the sexual instinct,[2] while the genital component is by nature designed rather for the preservation of the race. Of man who fulfils solely, or, let us say, mainly, the phallic function, was the sentence written : he lived, he took a wife, he died. That is to say, with reproduction the purpose of man's life on earth is practically exhausted.

On the other hand, when the genital but as yet unsublimated libido co-operates with the extragenital in the manner characteristic of mature human beings, it seems generally to strike a blow at the genital, at least in intellectual circles. And many a one experiences, as Goethe finely says, ' A renewal of puberty with all its bliss '. In this connection Nestrov has an illuminating dictum : he would like to know, he said, what became of all the clever cobblers' apprentices, for the master-cobblers were all duffers. In the former, both kinds of libido work harmoniously together, whereas the masters, if sublimation is lacking, are the slaves of merely genital gratification and so sink into banality.

Nevertheless, we must not quite undervalue the cultural importance of the genital instinct also. Asceticism, practised to a degree which is possible, i.e. so far as it can be tolerated readily and without harm

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[1] Once the genital component instinct becomes insatiable, as in satyriasis and nymphomania, or even in excessive masturbation, it must be reckoned as disease and not progress, as the victims of it themselves feel.

[2] In this connection, compare my paper ' Haut-Schleimhaut und Muskelerotik ' (*Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*, Bd. III, Zweite Hälfte, S. 545). The best example of the satisfying of the genital and the insatiability of the extragenital components is to be found in certain perversions. A sadist, a scoptophiliac or an exhibitionist will work himself up for hours at a time, and would prefer not to stop at all, but he will finally practise coitus or onanism in order at last to put an end to the excitation.

remains a valuable adjuvant to intellectual progress. And humanity seems often to have reached its highest achievements through the coalescing of a maximum of extragenital sexual instincts with a relatively weak genital instinct, so weak that it never or at any rate very rarely irresistibly impelled the subject in the direction of activity, as in the case of Leonardo da Vinci, Michael Angelo and Mentzel, Newton and Kant. In such cases the genital libido is not directly employed, but works as a subterranean, ever-kindling fire and produces an almost life-long youth. Again, genital sexuality, which is still susceptible of sublimation, plays a considerable part in one of the very most important tasks of the human sexual instinct—the eroticization of our ego-instincts, so that a large part of the libido can be lived out, as for instance in some congenial professional work. This seems especially true of the years when sexual energy is declining. This libidinal tincture not only strengthens the ego-instincts to a quite extraordinary degree, but also serves to direct them to the profit and advancement of humanity in general. Thus that which originally subserved self-interest alone gradually becomes altruistic and therewith highly valuable from the cultural point of view.[3]

Genital and extragenital libido operate together in a special manner in the constitution of that which we are wont to call ' love '. And here let me first of all lay down a fundamental principle : one can love truly only in the first five years of life ! That which later gives the impression of love—the longings of puberty, the passion of the adult in love—is only a repetition of the primal love of tenderest childhood. We know from experience that at that period a child can really love any human being without respect of sex or age, in so far as the beloved person powerfully stimulates either his genital or extragenital libido, or both together. First and foremost comes the mother or wet-nurse, then all the people who take care of him, beginning with those who are responsible for tending him, and so down to persons who only occasionally help him to perform his bodily functions and quite unintentionally stimulate him sexually. Finally there is the father who plays lovingly with the little boy, especially when in bed, and there are his playfellows of both sexes who constantly stimulate at least his scoptophiliac tendencies or muscle-erotism.

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[3] It must not be supposed that I am paying too much attention to the teleological aspect. It only appears so because development—evolution—has in actual fact produced in human beings the situation I describe.

I want to come back once more to the insatiability of the sexual instinct. I spoke of this before mainly in connection with the extra-genital components, but I must now narrow down my statement a little. In all civilized human beings the genital libido too is at *one* point not to be sated, because there the incest-barrier calls a halt. As we know, the persons first loved by each human being are his own parents. In this relation ethics, substantially reinforced by castration-anxiety, forces upon us lasting, life-long renunciation. We must always content ourselves with a mere substitute: instead of the mother, whom we really desire, we must seek out a woman who resembles her. This naturally gives rise to a dissatisfaction which, though wholly unconscious, continues to the end of time and has in sublimation the beneficial results which we already know.[4] In the Don Juan, Casanova and Messalina types we have an unpleasing extreme instance of this dissatisfaction. All their lives long persons of this type run after the parent of the opposite sex, and are incapable of sublimation. But sublimation occurs, often in no small degree, in another group of persons who are permanently fixated to the mother. I refer to the inverts.

We know that at puberty nearly all human beings pass through a homosexual period. Boys wax enthusiastic for ' true ' friendship, school-girls for the girls of their ' set ', and it is by no means uncommon for such friendships, with their inevitable admixture of sexuality, to last throughout life. This period of what we may call natural inversion is of great cultural and social significance. On the one hand it promotes the necessary detachment from the parents; on the other, it serves important purposes in the intellectual sphere. ' When man is ripe for love ' there awakes in him first of all the longing for the original sexual objects, the parent of the opposite sex. But the incest-prohibition forbids the sensual desire for father or mother. And to transfer the desire to other objects is often very difficult, especially for the shy, awkward boy of the so-called upper social circles, because he generally meets with but little sympathy in girls of his own age or older than himself. Inversion—the love-saturated friendship with one of his

[4] Is it not possible that one of the reasons for the erection of the incest-barrier was the need for sublimation? In the religions of many peoples, even in Greek mythology, incest was a privilege of the gods, or, as amongst the Egyptians and the ancient Peruvians, of the rulers of the land, the Pharaohs and Incas, who in their god-like perfection had no need of sublimation.

own sex—offers him a refuge. But because in such a friendship important sexual cravings must in nature remain unsatisfied, he makes numerous sublimations to art and science and social feeling. If, however, a lad ' has luck ', as we may say, and reaps prematurely reciprocal love or even full genital enjoyment from women, or if, on the other hand, a school-girl is much wooed, sublimation remains very superficial and poor. It is worst of all when anyone has not even made a friend when he reaches maturity, for then he is in danger of losing altogether the capacity for sublimation and continuing to live his life wholly without interest, at the most fulfilling the duties of his calling. As psycho-analysis can demonstrate, a man of this sort is indissolubly dependent on the mother, and since he is bound to shut off his desire for her from his conscious wishes and to confine his libido entirely to his own ego, he easily loses all interest in the outside world. We see how necessary is mental homosexuality if we are not ' to pour out the baby with the bath-water '.

There is still another relation which merits discussion : the relation to narcissism or self-love. I have been able to show that inversion always occurs by way of the subject's love for his own ego. Now in the sexual development of human beings narcissism is almost the only fixed pole and attracts them, let us say, from the end of the first year till death. Originally it signifies the combining of all forms of auto-erotism in a single unity. But it does not exist only in that pre-phallic period, but just as much in the time of sexual ripening, between the third and sixth years, further in the latency and adolescent periods, and finally throughout the whole of life as a libidinal contribution to ordinary self-interest.

At bottom, the object and self-love are in perpetual rivalry from the first day of existence. The earliest object discovered by the child and that to which he gives his first love is the mother's breast,[5] and in a lesser degree the teat of the bottle. At the same period the infant experiences several times a day pleasure in excretion, and if he is freed from the trammels of his clothes and kicks vigorously, the self-gratification of his muscle-erotism. In the further tending of little children the erotism associated with the skin and mucous membrane, as well as their genital sensibility, are all regularly stimulated. The child learns

[5] According to Friedjung many children of five or six months and upwards use the mother's breast, if they are still being suckled, not merely as a fount of nourishment, but also quite visibly as a source of pleasure through contact.

to ' love ' all those persons who afford that kind of gratification to his whole sexual feelings, or at least his genital feelings. This betrays itself in the sequel, for even the adult invariably chooses only such love-objects as resemble the person who originally tended him in some feature or other. Extragenital erotism, which is principally associated with the skin, certain tracts of mucous membrane and the muscles, early leads, when all these are combined, to narcissism ; whilst genital sexuality leads inevitably to object-love, for it presupposes the existence of a second object—' you ' as well as ' me '. We know that even the person who masturbates alone conjures up, or at least originally did so, a being of phantasy, with whom he practises all sorts of sexual activities, although outwardly his behaviour is merely autoerotic. The little word ' love ' betokened originally simply the affection of one person for another, and it was only later and figuratively that it was applied to self-love. Finally, it is noteworthy that the remaining extragenital components, such as scoptophilia, ophresiolagnia and lustful cruelty, presuppose the existence of an object and so become proper adjuvants of love.

In conclusion I will say a word about the social and religious evaluation of genital and extragenital libido. Society demands of a man that he should beget children and of a woman that she should rear them. This is why he has brought the genital libido and she the extragenital to the fullest possible perfection. As a rule a man's love is focussed on the woman, and a woman's on the child. In general it is wont to leave a man cold when he is not blessed with children, but the wife in such cases is mostly unhappy, moves heaven and earth, hastens from one gynæcologist to another, and does not shrink even from operations, if only she may conceive a child. In the tending of children a true mother finds full and complete happiness, free of reproach. I know a grandmother who suffered from a grave hysteria, and who became better as each grandchild was born, and found in each a new light of life because the children's mother had to work so hard that she was for the most part prevented from looking after them, and so the grandmother in her old age could once more act the part of mother.

What I have said is true of average people only. There are, as experience teaches us, men, as well as women, who are extraordinarily fond of children, some who actually dote on them. Obviously such men feel that they are unhappy in their marriage if they remain childless. On the other hand there are many women who will not hear of having a child, and if, nevertheless, they become pregnant, they

produce a constant hyperemesis or other serious general symptoms, till they contrive to have abortion induced ' to save the mother's life '.

There is no love which does not contain at least 95 per cent. of sexuality. This is true of parents' feelings for their offspring and *vice versa*.[6] A child loves his mother and she him only as long as both can count on the stimulation of the erotism of skin, mucous membrane and muscles. The last fragment of love which remains and may be preserved all their lives long takes the form of kissing and embracing. Later, when the child grows older and this stimulation ceases, love turns into tenderness and finally, in the children, into dutiful regard for their mother—in short, into such feelings as seem to have no tincture of sensuality. These last ultimate transformations of feeling belong exclusively to human beings, for with the animals the mother only cares about her young as long as she is necessary to them. After that she becomes indifferent, and later still, it sometimes happens that the offspring mates with its own mother, as though she were a strange female of its species. We may even venture to assert that tenderness and dutiful regard, feelings peculiar to human beings, are to some extent a substitute for the incest-barrier which they alone recognize. The longer a young creature needs its mother's care, the more intimate becomes the relation between the two. We see this in the animal-world, and the young creature which needs its mother's help longest of all is the human child. Very often offspring who are deformed or in some other way handicapped, and therefore need most tending, are cared for with a love surpassing what is given to others. For in such cases the mother can indulge her own ' extragenital ' libido over a longer period.

It is a very instructive fact that it is pre-eminently under the influence of Christianity that the concept of sexuality has been almost equated with that of immorality. At the most it is tolerated because for purposes of reproduction it cannot be evaded ; but anyone who ventures even to speak of it in any other relation is always in danger of being ostracized as an immoral person. What is the reason for this strange attitude, which is in such sharp contrast to that of the Greeks, Romans and civilized peoples of the East, all of whom rejoiced in the pleasures of the senses ? I think it is the more amazing, seeing that our whole civilization, including art, religion and science, represents

[6] In the language of German thinkers, the term ' love ' is used for the love between mother and child as much as for the boy's attraction to the girl. Thus it is quite well understood that both feelings are identical at heart and that neither is free from sensuality.

nothing other than an intellectualized sexual act, and that presumably without the despised sexual instinct we should never have arrived at moral ideas. What, then, is the source of the dogma that everything sexual is essentially immoral ?

Let us make clear first of all that this ban lies principally upon the genital sexual instinct, i.e. what is generally known as the ' sex-instinct ', and hardly applies to the autoerotic ' component-instincts '. And again, with reference to the genital the central idea, though as a rule it is quite unconscious, is the fear of incest and of the Œdipus complex. Human beings have, at least unconsciously, a strong feeling of the difficulty with which the incest-barrier is maintained. This is why primitive men, long before there was any ' revealed ' religion, fell back on the threat of castration in order to secure the destruction of the Œdipus complex. But as the cultural religions made their appearance, that which seemed necessary to civilization was given the sanction of a divine command. The fight is not wholly ended even to-day ; witness the phantasies common to all mankind and the by no means rare actual transgressions of the incest-barrier, even in civilized Europe.

Now what part has primitive Christianity played in this struggle ? As we know, Christianity was a powerful reaction against paganism, with its delight in the pleasures of the senses, and it carried asceticism and sublimation to extremes. For it commanded men to love their enemies, to look on women as vessels of wrath, to refrain, as far as might be, from sensuality or, best of all, to subdue it entirely. People nowadays feared that Freud's teachings were, on the contrary, a fresh menace to that which Christianity had achieved so painfully, and because of the frailty of human nature, only imperfectly. They dreaded to loosen even a little the shackles of the beast sexuality, lest it should easily swallow up all morality. And they forgot that the last thing psycho-analysis stands for is a charter for licentiousness and that, on the contrary, it endeavours to sublimate our sexual instincts to the greatest possible degree, although, of course, only in so far as is really practicable. It restores to the sexual merely its fitting place in life, always emphasizing that this does not mean that we are to follow out our own natures without restraint, but rather that we are to aim at an ennobling and higher discipline of them. But psycho-analysis does not seek to attain this goal through genital asceticism, which for the majority of mankind is unattainable, but through the fostering and sublimation of extragenital libido.

PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY

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THE HAGUE

Of recent years the attitude of psychiatrists to psycho-analysis has gradually altered. Only a little time ago one might witness a psycho-analytical lecture given at a meeting of a psychiatric society being greeted with roars of laughter. To-day our opponents refrain from this sort of resistance, for laughter, formerly looked on as a proof of intellectual superiority, might now be regarded as indicating narrow-mindedness. We may admit that analysis is coming into fashion.

This outward success has little to do with the inner value of analysis. That value does not stand or fall with the number of its adherents or the manner in which it is received. Neither does the authority, the social position or the scientific bent of adherents or opponents prove anything for or against analysis. Both truth and error have their martyrs, and each has been defended by the loftiest intellects with all their might. Goethe and Newton were the most vehement adversaries; so were Schopenhauer and Hegel. It is easier for posterity to choose between the theories of these great men and to give the preference to one or the other than to judge between the love of truth and integrity of this thinker or that. It is always extremely dangerous to adopt or reject a theory on account of the standing of its opponents or its disciples. Authority is a very untrustworthy guide. If we let our judgement of psycho-analysis be swayed by the verdict of those psychiatrists, authorities in their profession, who are now its adherents, we should be making just as great a mistake as if we had rejected it with them in former years. Facts alone are of value.

Psycho-analysis itself by no means rejects psychiatric methods. 'You will admit', Freud says,[1] 'that there is nothing essential in the work of psychiatry which could oppose psycho-analytic researches. It is therefore the psychiatrists who oppose it, and not psychiatry itself. Psycho-analysis stands to psychiatry more or less as histology does to anatomy; in one, the outer forms of organs are studied, in the other, the construction of these out of the tissues and constituent elements. It is not easy to conceive of any contradiction between these two fields of study, in which the work of the one is continued in the

[1] Freud, *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-Analysis*, p. 216.

other. You know that nowadays anatomy is the basis of the scientific study of medicine; but time was when dissecting human corpses in order to discover the internal structure of the body was as much a matter for severe prohibition as practising psycho-analysis in order to discover the internal workings of the human mind seems to-day to be a matter for condemnation. And, presumably at a not too distant date, we shall have perceived that there can be no psychiatry which is scientifically radical without a thorough knowledge of the deep-seated unconscious processes in mental life'.

Freud says that the relation between anatomy and histology reflects that between psychiatry and psycho-analysis; the comparison goes further than he takes it. In histology we find the description of various kinds of cells, epithelium, connective tissue, parenchyma, etc., belonging to the liver, the spleen, the stomach and other organs. Here the form of the cell is the principal thing, while the organ is secondary; in anatomy it is the opposite. In psycho-analysis, the psychic motivation is the principal thing and the clinical picture secondary; while in psychiatry the reverse is the case. But we can carry the comparison still further. Histology studies the elements of the organs—the cells; anatomy studies the cell-complexes—the organs. Psychiatry scrutinizes the reaction-complexes—the symptoms and clinical pictures; psycho-analysis examines the separate elements of the syndrome—the motives. Freud says:[2] 'Now in amentia not only is acceptance denied to fresh perceptions, but the importance (cathexis) of the inner world—that inner world which formerly reflected the outer world as an image of it—is withdrawn too; the ego creates for itself in a lordly manner a new outer and inner world; and there is no doubt about two facts, that this new world is constructed after the pattern of the impulses in the id, and that the motive of this collapse of the ego's relation with the outer world is a severe frustration by reality of a wish, a frustration which seemed too unendurable to be borne. The close affinity of this psychosis with normal dreams is unmistakable'.

And further: 'There always remains as a common feature in the ætiology both of the psychoneuroses and the psychoses the factor of frustration—the lack of fulfilment of one of those eternal uncontrollable childhood's wishes that are so deeply rooted in our composition, phylogenetically fore-ordained as it is'. That is to say, it is the psychic conflict and the psychic conflict only which is the motive and

[2] Freud, 'Neurosis and Psychosis', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 252–3.

the cause of the psychoses. Freud does not touch upon the somatic at all.

Stärcke [3] expresses himself on this subject more plainly: 'What always happens in these discussions is that people speak of schizophrenia, *its* anatomy, *its* hereditary character, etc., as if there really were some actual entity to which this name were given. In reality no such entity exists. What we call schizophrenia is a conglomeration of the most varied etiological factors, displaying, superficially, the common result of the predominance of the motor reactions of the lower levels, and conceptually, the moods and thoughts correlative to these'. Thus, in Stärcke's opinion the psychoses are purely psychogenic. Freud says nothing about any etiology other than the psychic, but Stärcke says of the anatomy of schizophrenia: 'In reality no such thing exists'.

Here lies the parting of the ways, where the psychiatric and the psycho-analytical modes of thought threaten to diverge.

The psycho-physical problem is just what the psychiatrist has always to wrestle with. It is precisely the view taken of this problem which causes the split into different psychiatric schools. On the one side are the somatically orientated psychiatrists, whose trend is neurological and who lay stress on the constitutional factor; on the other are the more psychically orientated thinkers, whose tendency is psychological and philosophical. This psycho-physical problem is the shibboleth of the psychiatric sects.

Take the matter of epilepsy. According as we view it from the psychological or the neurological standpoint, we are speaking of two fundamentally different phenomena, which have no points of resemblance and only this in common: that these two heterogenic spheres touch in—the epileptic. The patient is the visible synthesis of the neurological and the psychiatric modes of thought, a synthesis which, as I conceive of it, is still unsuccessful. The psycho-physical problem has no more found its solution than it had before the birth of the era of the pathological anatomy of the nervous system. Jaspers, Bumke [4] and others constantly assure us that all the advances made in the 'Herd' pathology of the brain have not brought us any nearer to the mind. Schneider [5] finds himself confronted 'hourly' by the psycho-physical

[3] Stärcke, *Psychologie en Neurologie*, 1928, S. 484.

[4] Bumke, 'Psychologie und Psychiatrie', *Klinisches Wochenblatt*, 1922, Bd. I.

[5] Schneider, 'Reine Psychiatrie, symptomatische Psychiatrie und Neurologie', *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Neur. und Psych.*, 1919, S. 49.

problem ; Kronfeld [6] likewise can get no further ; his way is suddenly ' barred by the psycho-physical problem '. Kleist [7] does not let himself be deterred by the presence of this question. He does not regard it as any handicap in successful psychiatric work : ' for the true problems of psychiatry do not touch that of body and mind at all, and, as has often been said, can be reconciled with any and every view on that subject '.

Here we have the fundamental difference between the psychiatric and the psycho-analytical modes of thought. The analyst thinks in purely psychological terms ; the psychiatrist, on the other hand, has always to be prepared with two different lines of thought—the somatic and the psychic. The ideal which hovers before psychiatry is precisely the synthesis of these two lines of psychiatric research.

The psycho-analyst can agree with the psychiatrist only in so far as they are dealing with psychic problems. Directly it is a matter of anatomy, metabolism, decomposition, etc., we are outside the scope of analysis. Freud himself does not touch this field ; for many of his adherents such things do not exist.

Psycho-analysis then is not a medical science, far less a section of psychiatry. It is a psychological trend, a pure mental and not a natural science. Freud was quite right and entirely logical when, regardless of the indignation of so many of the faithful in the battle about lay-analysis, he refused to admit that physicians should have a monopoly in the field of psycho-analysis. Its scope as a mental science is far wider than the field of physical disturbances. In Freud's notes on ' The Interest in Psycho-Analysis ' we have a sketch of this comprehensive field of interest ; it overlaps into the realm of psychology, philology, philosophy, biology, the history of evolution and of civilization, art, sociology and pedagogy.

The meeting-place of psycho-analysis and psychiatry is the *psychology of the psychoses*. In this field both analyst and psychiatrist are at home. Both have to make concessions there. The psychiatrist has to accustom himself to the thought that when the psychic personality disintegrates sexual complexes of a very primitive nature are clearly revealed. The psycho-analyst has to reconcile himself to the peculiar feature of the psychoses—that we have simultaneously to reckon with both psychic and somatic factors, so that here the analytic

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[6] Kronfeld, *Das Wesen der psychiatrischen Erkeuntnis*, Berlin, 1920.

[7] Kleist, *Die gegenwärtigen Strömungen in der Psychiatrie*, 1925.

mode of thought does not lead to the etiology of the disease, but to ascertaining the presence of some particular lowly complex, when the higher complexes have vanished through mental deterioration.

The dispute as to whether psycho-analysis or psychiatry is the more comprehensive is a war of words. The scope of analysis is greater in the direction of the mental sciences ; that of psychiatry is greater in the direction of the natural sciences.

When the psycho-analyst undertakes an investigation, let us say of the feeling of happiness, he naturally moves on purely psychic ground. He examines, for instance, the feeling of happiness experienced when the subject is in love and the same feeling in progressive paralysis. In the former case the analyst will demonstrate the purely psychic motivation : the fusion of the object with the ego-ideal and the transference of the subject's narcissistic libido to that object. Again, the arising, ebbing and vanishing of the state of being in love remain a problem of a purely psychic nature. What the analyst finds in the paralytic is something fundamentally different. Here, as in the former case, there is a feeling of happiness and simultaneously a failure of the higher functions. If the patient undergoes the modern malaria-salvarsan treatment, the paralysis may disappear and with it the feeling of happiness. This disappearance is again something quite different from the change of state in the first instance, where there were only psychic motives at work. The analyst would be missing the point if he tried to explain paralysis by a consideration of the paralytic's mental complexes only. Similarly, it is erroneous to ascribe epilepsy to psychic causes alone. This is doing violence to facts.

The psychoses are and must remain conditions which have both a psychic and a physical side. Both sides are present in *every* psychosis. Probably nobody would regard the acute delirium in *typhus abdominalis* or smallpox as psychogenic, although the patient's psychic structure before the outbreak of the illness will not be without influence on its manifestation. Conversely, a case of melancholia may appear almost purely psychogenic, but I doubt if anyone would assert positively that it is so. Always we find the same thing—every psychosis is at once somatic and psychic. Both its inception and cure may appear to proceed from the one side or the other.

The attitude of the psycho-analyst to psychiatric cases resembles that of the historian to ancient ruins. They are fragments, more or less obliterated or fallen to pieces, which arouse his interest. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, has no more interest in psycho-

analysis than the archæologist in historical traditions. The monument interests him, its coming into being and its decay, and the feelings and motives of human beings are for him only phases and periods through which his monument has passed.

Psychiatry and psycho-analysis may be compared with archæology and history. Psychiatry and archæology are natural as well as mental sciences. On the other hand, psycho-analysis and history are *pure* mental sciences, whose orientation is psychological.

The psychiatrist who has remained aloof from psycho-analysis finds the utterances and complexes of his patients incomprehensible. In the *etiology of the psychoses* analysis is much less important, for there we have always to reckon on encountering somatic as well as mental factors, from the gravest degeneration to the mildest intoxication and the slightest delirium.

It is only in the sphere of the neuroses that psycho-analysis is of etiological importance, and it is noteworthy that the therapeutic success of analysis is confined to this field. The concept ' neurosis ' must be more closely defined. An anxiety-state following on the breaking-off of an engagement will be accounted a neurosis, but an anxiety-state at the beginning of the senile period is not a neurosis, even though the picture be the same. In this respect we have advanced precisely as far in our psychiatric method of classification as chemistry had advanced in the Middle Ages. As then, so now, all theories are equally good : in psychiatry anything may be asserted, for no one can refute it. Just as alchemy developed into chemistry, so psychiatry must follow the path from phantasy to facts. Fixed standards are as yet almost entirely lacking. No one can conjecture which road will ultimately lead us to the solution of the problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS OF ERNEST JONES, M.D.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF NAMES OF PERIODICALS

C. *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse.* (Out of print.)
I. *Imago.* (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wien.)
J. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.* (Baillière, Tindall & Cox.)
Y. *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschungen.* (Out of print.)
Z. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse.* (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wien.)

	Date.	Title.	Publication.	Vol.	Part.	Pages.
	1900					
1.	Nov.	The Value of Babinski's Sign.	*University College Hospital Medical Society.*			
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	1901					
2.	May 21	Calcification of the Pericardium.	*Pathological Society of London. Transactions of the Society.*	LII	III	181–193
3.	Sept. 28	Rotation of the Tongue in Tumor Cerebri.	*Lancet.*	LXXIX	4074	848–849
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	1904					
4.	April	Treatment of Tracheotomy Wounds in Diphtheria.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	I	4	153–158
5.	June	The Nomenclature of Tubercle.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	I	6	269–270
6.	June 25	The Enumeration of Leucocytes.	*Lancet.*	LXXXII	4217	1790–1793
7.	July	The Teaching of Elementary Hygiene in London.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	I	7	312–316
8.	July	A Point in the Technique of Widal's Reaction.	*Clinical Journal.*	XXIV	12	192
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	1905					
10.	May	Ape-like Movements in Extreme Microcephaly.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	II	5	214–215
11.	Oct. 26	Multiple Bilateral Contractures simulating pseudo-hypertrophic muscular paralysis. (An aberrant form of the Nageotte-Wilbouchewitch Syndrome.)	*Neurological Society of the United Kingdom.*			
			Brain.	XXVIII	3 & 4	585–586
12.		The Onset of Hemiplegia in Vascular Lesions	*Brain.*	XXVIII	3 & 4	527–555
13.	Nov.	Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis. *	*The Antiseptic.* *	II	11	454–458
	1906					
14.	Feb. 16	Parenchymatous Goitre in a Girl aged six.	*Society for the Study of Diseases in Children.*			
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	March		*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	III	3	120
15.	May	The Early Recognition of Pulmonary Tuberculosis. *	*The Antiseptic.* *	III	5	189–196
	1907					
16.	15 Janvier	La vrai aphasie tactile.	*Revue Neurologique.*	XV	1	3–7
17.	Jan. / Feb.	Alcoholic Cirrhosis of the Liver in Children.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	IV	1 / 2	1–14 / 43–52
18.	Feb.	Eight Cases of Hereditary Spastic Paraplegia.	*Review of Neurology and Psychiatry.*	V	2	98–106
19.	March	The Occurrence of Goitre in Parent and Child.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases*	IV	3	101–103
20.	March 21	Peripheral Facial Paralysis with Instantaneous Onset.	*Neurological Society of the United Kingdom.*			
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22.	Sept. 5	The Clinical Significance of Allochiria.	*First International Congress of Psychiatry, Neurology and Psychology, Amsterdam.*			
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23.	Oct.	Alcoholic Cirrhosis of the Liver in Children.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	IV	10	440–443
24.	Oct. 31	Case of Isolated Paresis of Right Serratus Magnus.	*Royal Society of Medicine, Neurological Section.*			
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25.	Nov. 5	The Development of the Articulatory Capacity for Consonantal Sounds in School Children.	*Internationales Archiv für Schulhygiene*	IV	2 und 3	186–201
26.	Dec.	The Mechanism of a Severe Briquet Attack contrasted with that of Psychasthenic Fits.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	II	2	218–227
27.		The Precise Diagnostic Value of Allochiria.	*Brain.*	XXX	4	490–523
28.	Dec. 13	Histological Report on a Case of Syphilitic Cortical Sclerosis.	*Society for the Study of Diseases in Children.*			
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	April, 1908		*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	V	4	166–168
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29.	13 Mars	Le côté affecté par l'hémiplégie hystérique	*Revue Neurologique.*	XVI	5	193–196
30.	March 15	Case of Primary Spastic Paraplegia illustrating the Nature of Schäfer's Reflex.	*Royal Society of Medicine, Neurological Section.*	I	2	59–60
31.	April	The Symptoms and Diagnosis of Juvenile Tabes.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	V	4	131–140

	Date.	Title.	Publication.	Vol.	Part.	Pages.
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33.	April 27	Rationalisation in Everyday Life.	*First International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Salzburg.*			
	Aug.–Sept.		*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	III	3	161–169
34.	July	The Significance of Phrictopathic Sensation.	*Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.*	XXXV	7	427–437
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36.	Mar. 16	(With W. C. Heggie.) A Case of Glioma of the Optic Thalamus.	*Ontario Academy of Medicine, Section of Surgery.*			
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37.	March	The Cerebro-spinal Fluid in Relation to the Diagnosis of Metasyphilis of the Nervous System.	*Bulletin of the Ontario Hospital for the Insane.*	II	3	15–39
38.	April 14	Modern Progress in our Knowledge of the Pathology of General Paralysis.	*Hamilton Medical Society, Ontario.*			
	July 24		*Lancet.*	LXXXVII	4482	209–212
39.	April 15	An Attempt to Define the Terms used in connection with Right-handedness.	*Psychological Bulletin.*	VI	4	130
40.	April	A Review of our Present Knowledge concerning the Sero-diagnosis of General Paralysis.	*American Journal of Insanity.*	LXV	4	653–688

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	Aug. 26		*Boston Medical and Surgical Journal.*	CLXI		281–284
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43.	June 2	Demonstration of Two New Tests for General Paralysis of the Insane.	*Ontario Medical Association, Ophthalmological Section.*			
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45.	June 7	The Pathology of General Paralysis.	*London Medical Society, Ontario.*			
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46.	Aug. 6	The Differences between the Sexes in the Development of Speech.	*Sixth International Congress of Psychology, Geneva.*			
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47.	Aug.–Sept.	Remarks on a Case of Complete Autopsychic Amnesia.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	IV	3	218–235
48.	Aug.–Sept.	The Pathology of Dyschiria.	*Review of Neurology and Psychiatry.*	VII	8	499–523
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49.	Oct.	Psycho-Analytic Notes on a Case of Hypomania.	*American Journal of Insanity.*	LXVI	2	145–183
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51.	Nov. 24	The Psycho-Analytic Method of Treatment.	*Niagara District Medical Association, St. Catherines, Ontario.*			
	May		*Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.*	XXXVII	5	285–295
52.	Dec., 1909—Jan., 1910	The Dyschiric Syndrome.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	IV	5	311–327
53.	Dec. 29	Freud's Theory of Dreams.	*American Psychological Association, Baltimore.*			
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54.	Jan.	On the Nightmare : A. Pathological.	*American Journal of Insanity.*	LXVI	3	383–417
55.	Jan.	The Œdipus Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet's Mystery : A Study in Motive.	*American Journal of Psychology.*	XXI		72–113
56.	Feb. 3	Simulated Foolishness in Hysteria.	*Detroit Society of Neurology and Psychiatry.*			
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57.	April 15	Freud's Psychology.	*Psychological Bulletin.*	VII		109–126
58.	April	Freud's Theory of Dreams.	*American Journal of Psychology.*	XXI	2	283–308
59.	April	The Question of the Side Affected in Hemiplegia and in Arterial Lesions of the Brain.	*Quarterly Journal of Clinical Medicine.*	III	11	233–250
60.	May 7	The Mental Characteristics of Chronic Epilepsy.	*National Association for the Study of Epilepsy, Baltimore.*			
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61.	May 2	The Therapeutic Effect of Suggestion.	*First Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington.*			
	Feb., 1911		*Canadian Journal of Medicine and Surgery.*	XXIX	2	78–87
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62.	June 1	A Modern Conception of the Psychoneuroses.	*Canadian Medical Association, Toronto.*			
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63.		Review of the Recent English and American Literature on Clinical Psychology and Psychopathology.	*Y.*	II	Erste Hälfte	316–346
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64.	July	Some Questions of General Ethics arising in Relation to Psychotherapy.	*Dominion Medical Monthly.*	XXXV	1	17–22
65.	Nov. 12	The Relation between Organic and Functional Nervous Diseases.	*Toronto Orthopædic Hospital.*			
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66.	Nov.	Psycho-Analysis and Education.	*Journal of Educational Psychology.*	I		497–520
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67.	Nov.	The Practical Value of the Word-Association Method in the Treatment of the Psychoneuroses.	*Review of Neurology and Psychiatry.*	VIII	11	641–672
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69.	Januar	Beitrag zur Symbolik im Alltag.	*C.*	I	3	96–98
70.	Jan.	Syphilis of the Nervous System.	*Interstate Medical Journal.*	XVIII	I	39–47
71.	Jan. 18	Reflections on Some Criticisms of the Psycho-Analytic Method of Treatment.	*Chicago Neurological and Medical Society.*			
	July		*American Journal of the Medical Sciences.*	CXLII	I	47–57
72.	Feb./ March	Remarks on Dr. Morton Prince's Article : "The Mechanism and Interpretation of Dreams."	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	V	6	328–336
73.	Januar	Unbewusste Wahl wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen.	*C.*	I	4	166–167
74.	April/ May	Some Instances of the Influence of Dreams on Waking Life.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VI	I	11–18
75.	May 10	The Pathology of Morbid Anxiety.	*Second Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Baltimore.*			
	June/ July		*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VI	2	81–106
76.	May 13	The Deviation of the Tongue in Hemiplegia.	*Thirty-seventh Meeting of the American Neurological Association, Baltimore.*			
	Oct.		*Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases.*	XXXVIII	10	577–587
77.	May 15	The Relationship between Dreams and Psycho-neurotic Symptoms.	*Wayne County Society, Detroit.*			
	July		*American Journal of Insanity.*	LXVIII	I	57–80
78.	May 16	The Psychopathology of Everyday Life.	*Detroit Academy of Medicine.*			
	Oct.		*American Journal of Psychology.*	XXII	4	477–527
79.	June	The Relation of Nasal Obstruction to Articulatory Capacity.	*British Journal of Children's Diseases.*	VIII	6	241–249

80.	Aug.	Ein Beispiel von literarischer Verwertung des Versprechens.	*C.*	I	10/11	496–497
81.	Sept.	Das Problem des "Gemeinsamen Sterbens," namentlich mit Bezug auf den Selbstmord Heinrich von Kleists.	*C*	I	12	563–567
82.	Sept.	Darwin über das Vergessen.	*C.*	I	12	614
83.	Nov.	Analyse eines Falles von Namenvergessen.	*C.*	II	2	84–86
84.	Dezember	Ein klares Beispiel sekundärer Bearbeitung.	*C.*	II	3	135
85.	Dec.	The Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis.	*Detroit Society of Neurology and Psychiatry.*			
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86.	Dec. 29	The Value of Sublimating Processes for Education and Re-education.	*American Psychological Association, Washington.*			
	May, 1912		*Journal of Educational Psychology.*	III		241–256
87.	Februar	Das Problem des Hamlet und der Odipus-Komplex.	*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde.*		10	1–65
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88.	Februar	Unbewusste Zahlenbehandlungen.	*C.*	II	5	241–244
89.	April/ May	A Forgotten Dream. Note on the Œdipus Saving Phantasy.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VII	1	5–16
90.	Mai	Ein ungewöhnlicher Fall von "gemeinsamen Sterben."	*C.*	II	8	455–459
91.	May 30	Analytic Study of a Case of Obsessional Neurosis. (Einige Fälle von Zwangsneurose.)	*Second Annual American Psycho-Analytical Association, Boston.*			
	Sept.		*Y.*	IV		563–606
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	April/ May, 1913	(The Relation between the Anxiety Neurosis and Anxiety-Hysteria.)	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VIII	I	1–9
93.	Oktober	George Meredith über Träume.	*C.*	III	I	54
94.	Oktober	Ein rationalisiertes Vergessen.	*C.*	III	I	54
95.	Oktober	Strindberg über Geburt und Tod.	*C.*	III	I	55
96.	Oktober/ Dezember	Die Bedeutung des Salzes in Sitte und Brauch der Völker.	*I.*	I	4	361–385
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97.	Dec.	Papers on Psycho-Analysis. (Contains in revised form Nos. 33, 41, 47, 51, 53, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 89.)	*Baillière, Tindall & Cox.*			
98.		Der Alptraum in seiner Beziehung zu gewissen Formen des mittelalterlichen Aberglaubens.	*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkundo.*	XIV	7	1–149
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100.	April 18	The Inter-Relation of the Biogenetic Psychoses.	*Opening Exercises of the Phipps Clinic, Baltimore.*			
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101.	May 8	The Case of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland.	*Fourth Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington.*			
	Dec.		*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VIII	6	289–330
102.	May 9	Hass und Analerotik in der Zwangsneurose.	*Third Annual Meeting of the American Psycho-Analytical Association, Washington.*			
	Sept.		*Z.*	I	5	425–430
103.	Mai	Die Bedeutung des Grossvaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen.	*Z.*	I	3	219–223
104.	June/July	A Simple Phobia.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	VIII	2	101–108
105.	Juli	Der Gottmensch-Komplex: Der Glaube, Gott zu sein, und die darausfolgenden Charaktermerkmale. (With Dr. Maeder.)	*Z.*	I	4	313–329
106.	Aug.	Übersetzungsvorschläge der gebrauchlichsten psycho-analytischen Termini.	*Z.*	I	4	415
107.	Sept. 8	Die Stellungnahme des psycho-analytischen Arztes zu den aktuellen Konflikten.	*Fourth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Munich.*			
	Januar, 1914		*I.*	II	1	6–10
108.	Oktober	Andrea del Sartos Kunst und der Einfluss seiner Gattin.	*I.*	II	5	468–480
109.	Nov.	Die Bedeutung der frühesten Eindrücke für die Erzeugung von Vorliebe und Abneigung.	*Z.*	I	6	563–564
110.		Treatment of the Neuroses.	*Modern Treatment of Nervous and Mental Diseases. (Edited by Jelliffe and White.)*	I		331–416
	1914					
111.	Feb. 13	Some Practical Aspects of the Psycho-Analytic Treatment.	*Tenth Australasian Medical Congress, Auckland, New Zealand.*			

	Date.	Title.	Publication.	Vol.	Part.	Pages.
112.	Mai	Traüme in der Psychoanalyse.	*Z.*	II	3	274–275
113.	Mai	Suggestion und Übertragung.	*Z.*	II	3	275
114.	Juli	Frau und Zimmer.	*Z.*	II	5	380
115.	Juli	Zahnziehen und Geburt.	*Z.*	II	5	380–381
116.	Juli	Haarschneiden und Geiz.	*Z.*	II	5	383
117.	Juli	Die Empfängnis der Jungfrau Maria durch das Ohr: Ein Beitrag zu der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Religion.	*Y.*	VI	7	135–206
118.	Juli	Die Technik der Psychoanalytischen Therapie.	*Y.*	VI	7	329–342
119.	July 26	The Significance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology.	*British Medical Association. Section of Neurological and Psychological Medicine, Aberdeen.*			
	Nov.	"	*Review of Neurology and Psychiatry.*	XII	II	474–481
	1915					
120.	Jan. 30	The Theory of Repression in its Relation to Memory.	*British Psychological Society, Durham.*			
	Oct.		*British Journal of Psychology.*	VIII	I	33–47
121.	Feb.	Professor Janet on Psycho-Analysis: A Rejoinder.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	IX	6	400–410
	Januar, 1916–1917		*Z.*	IV	I	34–43
122.	Sept.	Urethralerotik und Ehregeiz.	*Z.*	III	3	156–157
123.	July	War and Individual Psychology.	*Sociological Review.*	VIII	3	167–180
124.	Sept. 10	War and Sublimation.	*British Association for the Advancement of Science: Psychological Section, Manchester.*			
			Reports of the Association.	LXXXV		699
	Dec. 24		*International Review.*	I	10/11	453–461

	1916					
125.	Jan. 16	The Psychology of Temptation.	*St. Andrews, Willesden Green.*			
126.	Jan. 29.	The Theory of Symbolism.	*British Psychological Society.*			
	Oct., 1918		*British Journal of Psychology.*	IX	2	181–229
	Dez., 1919		*Z.*	V	4	244–273
	Sept., 1922		Z.	VIII	7	259–289
127.	March 16 April/ June	The Unconscious Mental Life of the Child.	*Child Study Society.* *Child Study.*	IX	3	37–41
128.	Dec. 16	The Child's Unconscious.	*Nottingham Frœbel Society.*	IX	4	49–55
129.	Dec.	Translation of Ferenczi's " Contributions to Psycho-Analysis."				
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	1917					
130.	March 21	Repressed Instincts and War.	*University College, London.*			
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	1918					
131.	Jan. 18	Psychosexual Impotence and Anæsthesia.	*British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology.*			
132.	April 9	War Shock and Freud's Theory of the Neuroses.	*Royal Society of Medicine : Section of Psychiatry.*			
	May		*Proceedings of the Society.*	XI	3	21–36
133.	July 6	Why is the " Unconscious " Unconscious ?	*Joint Meeting of the British Psychological Society and the Aristotelian Society.*			
	Oct.		*British Journal of Psychology.*	IX	2	247–256
134.	Sept.	Papers on Psycho-Analysis. (Second Edition.) (Contains in revised form Nos. 33, 41, 47, 51, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 111, 119, 120, 121, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135.)	*Ballière, Tindall & Cox.*			

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135.	Dec.	Anal-Erotic Character Traits.	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	XIII	5	261–284
	Juni, 1919		*Z.*	V	2	67–92
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	1919					
136.	May 17	Psychology in Everyday Life.	*University of London.*			
137.	Dezember	J. J. Putnam. Obituary.	*Z.*	V	4	233–243
	Jan., 1920		*J.*	I	1	6–16
		*	*			
	1920					
138.	Jan. 21	Recent Advances in Psycho-Analysis.	*British Psychological Society, Medical Section.*			
	Oct.		*British Journal of Medical Psychology.*	I	1	49–71
	July		*J.*	I	2	161–185
139.	March 14	A Linguistic Factor, in English Characterology.	*British Psychological Society.*			
	Oct.		*J.*	I	3	256–261
140.	March	Editorial Introduction.	*International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.*	I	1	3–5
141.	April	Treatment of the Neuroses (Russian translation, 1922).				
142.	July	The Symbolism of Being Run Over.	*J.*	I	2	203
143.	Oct.	A Substitute Memory.	*J.*	I	3	273–274
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	1921					
144.	Oct.	Persons in Dreams Disguised as Themselves.	*J.*	II	4	420–423
145.		Putnam's Addresses on Psycho-Analysis. Edited with Bibliography. Contains No. 137.	*International Psycho-Analytical Library, No.* 1.			

146.		Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses, Edited. Contains No. 132.	*International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 2.*			
	1922					
147.	Jan. 12	Psycho-Analysis.	*Western Pharmacists' Association.*			
148.	Feb.	Symbolism.	*Tooting Neurological Society.*			
149.	March 14	Some Problems of Adolescence.	*British Psychological Society: Joint Meeting of the General, Medical and Educational Sections.*			
	July		*British Journal of Psychology.*	XIII	1	31–47
	1923		*I.*	IX	2	145–168
150.	April 5	Father-saving Dream.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	Dec.		*J.*	III	4	507
151.	May 16	Psycho-Analysis.	*Croydon Natural History and Scientific Society.*			
152.	June 21	The Island of Ireland: A Psycho-Analytical Contribution to Political Psychology.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	Dec.		*J.*	III	4	508
153.	Sept.	Notes on Karl Abraham's "The Female Castration Complex."	*J.*	III	3	327–328
	Sept.		*Z.*	VIII	3	329–330
154.	Sept. 27	A Psycho-Analytic Study of the Holy Ghost.	*Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Berlin.*			
	July		*J.*	IV	3	376–377
	1923		*I.*	IX	1	58–72
		(Nuo Studio Psicoanalitico sullo Spirito Santo.)	*Archivio Generale di Neurologia, Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi.*	III	2	117–126
155.	Nov. 24	*Clinical Psychology.*	*University of Wales, Medical School, Cardiff.*			
156.	Nov. 26	Narcissism.	*Heretics Society, Cambridge.*			
157.		Psychotherapy.	*Encyclopædia of Education (Pitman).*			1371–1372
158.		Dream Analysis.	*Encyclopædia of Education (Pitman).*			493–494

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	1923					
159.	Jan.	Anxiety and Birth.	*J.*	IV	1	120
	März		*Z.*	IX	1	79
160.	March 22	The Nature of Auto-Suggestion.	*British Psychological Society, Medical Section.*			
	July		*J.*	IV	3	293–312
161.	July 25	Cold, Disease and Birth.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	Sept.		*Z.* (*Ferenczi Jubilie Festschrift.*)	IX	3	260–265
162.	July 31	Classification of the Instincts.	*Seventh International Congress of Psychology, Oxford.*			
	Jan., 1924		*British Journal of Psychology, General Section.*	XIV	3	256–261
163.	Oct. 9	The Relation of Psycho-Analysis to Sociology.	*Sociological Society.*			
164.	Dec. 10	Slips (of Mental Functioning) in Daily Life.	*Richmond Athenæum.*			
165.	May	Papers on Psycho-Analysis. (Third Edition.) Contains in revised form Nos. 33, 41, 47, 51, 53, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 89, 91, 92, 99, 102, 103, 104, 107, 111, 119, 120, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135, 138, 144, 149, 160, 161.	*Baillière, Tindal & Cox.*			
	1925	(French Translation.)	*Payot.*			
166.		Essays on Applied Psycho-Analysis. (Contains in revised form Nos. 55, 81, 87, 90, 96, 101, 105, 108, 117, 123, 124, 139, 152, 154.)	*International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 5.*			

	1924					
167.	Jan.	The Relationship of Psychology to Sociological Problems.	*Third Winter School for Health Visitors and School Nurses.*			
168.	Feb. 19	Psycho-Analysis and Anthropology.	*Royal Anthropological Institute.* *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.*	LIV		47–66
			I.	X	2 u. 3	133–158
169.	Feb. and March	The Practice of Psycho-Analysis. (Six lectures.)	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
170.	April 21	The Relation of Technique to Theory.	*Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Salzburg.*			
	Jan.		*J.*	VI	1	1–4
	Juni		*Z.*	XI	2	145–149
171.	May 29	Modern Psychology and Upbringing.	*British Medical Association, West Herts. Branch, Barnet.*			
172.	Oct. 27	Psycho-Analysis and Determinism.	*Oxford Psychological Society.*			
173.	Oct.	(With Collaborators.) Glossary. Edited with Preface.	*Supplement No. 1 to J.*			1–16
174.	Nov. 19	Mother-Right and the Sexual Ignorance of Savages.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	April, 1925		*J.*	VI	2	109–130
	1927		*I.*	XIII	Sonder-heft. Glaube u. Brauch 2, 3 & 4	199–222
175.		Social Aspects of Psycho-Analysis. Edited, with Preface. Contains 163.	Methuen.			
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	1925					
176.	April 14	Psycho-Analysis and the French Temperament.	*Paris Psycho-Analytical Group.*			

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177.	Nov. 4	A Peculiar Dream.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	April, 1926		*J.*	VII	2	
178.		Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology.	*Problems of Personality (Studies in Honour of Morton Prince.)*			15–25
		*	*			
	1926					
179.	Feb. 4	Psycho-Analysis.	*British Medical Association, Portsmouth Division.*			
180.	Feb./ March	The Theory of Sexuality. Six lectures.	*Institute of Psycho-Analysis.*			
181.	March 3	The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	July/ Oct.		*J.*	VII	3 and 4	303–311
	Sept.		*Z.* (*Freud's Seventieth Birthday Festschrift.*)	XII	3	253–262
182.	March 3	Deprivation of the Senses as a Castration Symbol.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	April		*J.*	VII	2	236–237
	März, 1927		*Z.*	XIII	1	114
183.	April	Karl Abraham. Obituary and Bibliography.	*J.*	VII	2	155–189
	Juni		*Z.*	XII	5	155–191
184.	April	Snake Symbolism in Dreams. A Rejoinder.	*Psyche.*	VI	24	87–89
185.	June 2	The Mantle Symbol.	*British Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	Jan.		*J.*	VIII	1	63–65
	März, 1927		*Z.*	XIII	1	77–79

186.	June 12	Dreams.	*University College, London.*			
187.	Sept. 7	The Psychology of Religion.	*Tenth International Congress of Psychology, Gröningen.*			
			Transactions of the Congress.			99–105
	July		*British Journal of Medical Psychology.*	VI	4	264–269
188.	July	Discussion of Dr. Bernard Hart's paper, "The Conception of Dissociation."	*British Journal of Medical Psychology.*	VI	4	257–259
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	1927					
189.	Jan.	James Glover. Obituary and Bibliography.	*J.*	VIII	1	1–9
	Juni		*Z.*	XIII	2	234–241
190.	April 5	La Conception du Surmoi.	*Paris Psycho-Analytical Society.*			
	Novembre		*Revue française de Psychanalyse.*	I	2	324–336
	October, 1928	(The Development of the Concept of the Super-Ego.)	*Journal of Abnormal Psychology.*	XXIII	8	276–285
191.	April	Lay Analysis.	*J.*	VIII	2	174–198
	Juni		*Z.*	XIII	2	171–192
192.	May/June	The Relation between Psycho-Analysis and General Medicine. Six lectures.	*Institute of Psycho-Analysis.*			
193.	July	Child Analysis.	*J*	VIII	3	387–391
194.	Sept. 1	The Early Development of Female Sexuality.	*Tenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Innsbruck.*			
	October		*J.*	VIII	4	459–472
	März, 1928		*Z.*	XIV	1	11–25
195.	Nov. 28	Psycho-Analysis and the Artist.	*Newcastle Literary and Philosophic Society.*			
	April, 1928		*Psyche.*	VIII	4	73–88
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	1928					
196.	Feb. 23	Memorandum on Psycho-Analysis.	*British Medical Association: Committee on Psycho-Analysis.*			

	Date.	Title.	Publication.	Vol.	Pate.	Pages.
197.	June 7	Brief Account of Psycho-Analytic Process.	*British Medical Association: Committee on Psycho-Analysis.*			
198.	Sept. 25 1929	Psycho-Analysis and Folk-lore.	*Folklore Congress, London. Transactions of the Congress.*			
	1929		*Scientia.*	Anno XXIII		
199.		Abnormal Psychology.	*Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th Edition.*			
200.		Sigm. Freud: Biography.	*Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th Edition.*			
201.		Psycho-Analysis.	*Benn's Sixpenny Library, No. 153.*			1–80
202.		Psychoanalyse und Religion.	*Das Psychoanalytische Volksbuch. (Edited by Federn und Meng.)*			263–276 1–129
203.		Zur Psychoanalyse der christlichen Religion.	*Imago-Bücher XII.*			
		*	*			
	1929					
204.	March	The Inferiority Complex of the Welsh.	*The Welsh Outlook.*	XVI	3	76–77
205.	March 14	Contributions to Draft Report.	*British Medical Association: Psycho-Analysis Committee.*			
206.	March 21	La Jalousie.	*Sorbonne University, Paris. Revue française de Psychanalyse.*	III		
	Oct.	(Jealousy.)	*J.*	X	4	
207.	April 9	The Psychopathology of Anxiety.	*Royal Society of Medicine, Psychiatry Section; and British Psychological Society, Medical Section.*			
	April		*British Journal of Medical Psychology.*	IX	3	
208.	July	Fear, Hate and Guilt.	*Eleventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Oxford.*			